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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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## ANCIENT INSTRUCTION IN "GRAMMAR" ACCORDING TO QUINTILIAN.

Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* has had an enormous influence on school teaching in most Western European countries, especially England and Germany, and, though about a hundred years ago pedagogues and theorists of education gradually ceased to consult his work or to refer to it, some of the principles and methods which he advocated have persisted down to the present. In view of this and of the high authority which Quintilian enjoyed among educators for many centuries it is perhaps regrettable that very few consistent efforts seem to have been made, at least in more recent times, to find out exactly what, in Quintilian's opinion, instruction in "grammar," which, according to his precepts, is the most important part of instruction in the lower grades, should be like.

It is generally agreed that not everything that Quintilian mentions and discusses in the first book of his *Institutio Oratoria* should, in his opinion, actually be taught or discussed in school. If this view is accepted three questions, therefore, naturally arise: 1. Why did Quintilian mention those things which are not to be taught or discussed in school, since he obviously did not intend to write a treatise on grammar but on instruction in grammar? 2. What part exactly of the material and the problems which he discusses was, in his opinion, to be discussed in school, and what part was not to be discussed? 3. What relevance, if any, did this latter part have to the proper subject of the first book of Quintilian's work? A few attempts to answer these questions have been made within the last several

decades. But they have arrived at widely divergent results, and these results seem in no case quite satisfactory. It may therefore seem worth while to take up the question again.

## I.

In 1886 H. Nettleship published an article<sup>1</sup> in which he tried to show that chapters 4-6 of the first book, which, in a way, seem to form the core of Quintilian's discussion of instruction in grammar in school, were very badly organized. The different parts of this section of Quintilian's work did not form a proper and logical sequence. There were senseless repetitions, the same things being discussed twice or even three times in somewhat different words. Even the same examples were sometimes repeated. Finally these chapters contained much that had no or very little relevance to Quintilian's proper subject. A more detailed analysis seemed to show that the whole section fell into two distinct parts, namely chapters 4, 1—5, 54, and 5, 55—6, 27, which were not very well connected with one another and which in part covered the same ground. In the first section a good many coincidences with the *Ars Grammatica* of Remmius Palaemon could be found, while the second section showed some traces of possible relation to the elder Pliny's work *De Dubio Sermone*, though it had to be admitted that our knowledge of this latter work is altogether very scanty and indirect. The result then seemed to be that chapters 4, 1—5, 54 represent in the main an extract from the *Ars* of Remmius Palaemon, ch. 5, 55—6, 27 an extract from the work of Pliny, in both cases with additions made by Quintilian. These two excerpts were rather carelessly put together by Quintilian. This assumption seemed to explain both the repetitions and the apparent lack of logical sequence from one section to the other. For though the main subjects of the works of Palaemon and Pliny were different they dealt to some extent with the same material and the same problems. Nettleship's theory seemed to explain also why the chapters contain so much that is really not relevant to Quintilian's subject. For the subject of both these earlier works was different from that of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.

<sup>1</sup> H. Nettleship, "The Study of Latin Grammar among the Romans in the first century A. D." in *Journal of Philology*, XV (1886), pp. 189 ff.

Since Quintilian obviously did not intend to write a big book on grammar, and since, differences in some points of general theory and in details notwithstanding, the bulk of the material to be dealt with in a work on Latin grammar became more or less established and was handed down from one grammarian to the other, it is clear that most of the material with which Quintilian deals in the chapters under consideration, including the stock examples, must have been taken from earlier sources, possibly to some extent from Palaemon, though it is difficult to prove this definitely. In addition Nettleship has shown that in some important respects Quintilian deviates from Varro's *De Lingua Latina* and agrees with Valerius Probus,<sup>2</sup> who in his turn may have agreed with Pliny the Elder, though here again, in this latter respect, it is difficult to find conclusive proof.

To admit all this, however, is not at all the same as admitting that the relevant chapters in Quintilian's book are nothing but careless and hasty extracts from two earlier works, badly fitted together and badly adapted to the purpose of Quintilian's work as a whole. Even if one does not share the unrestricted admiration for Quintilian as a writer and educator which has prevailed through so many centuries, an accusation of this kind should not be raised against a man of such great renown unless a serious attempt has first been made to understand the chapters as they are and to see whether, if correctly understood, they do not make sense as part of the book to which they belong.

Such an attempt was undertaken by F. H. Colson,<sup>3</sup> who later became the author of a well-known commentated edition of the first book of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.<sup>4</sup> He tried to show that there is a logical sequence in chapters 4 to 6, and what this logical sequence is. Chapter 4, he says, "disposes of the work of classification and definition." It would, perhaps, have been more correct to say that it deals with the most elementary analysis of language, namely 1. division of words into syllables and letters, 2. distinction of the various types of words, or the parts of speech, as the grammarians call it, 3. discussion of in-

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 345.

<sup>3</sup> F. H. Colson, "The grammatical chapters in Quintilian I, 4-8" in *C. Q.*, VIII (1914), pp. 36 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber I*, ed. with introd. and commentary by F. H. Colson (Cambridge University Press, 1924).

flection, namely a. declension, i. e. the inflection of nouns (and adjectives), and b. conjugation, i. e. the inflection of verbs. But the decisive problem comes in only with chapters 5 and 6. These chapters, according to Colson, deal with the *recte loquendi regula*. In explaining this rule Quintilian has first to discuss the outright mistakes. These fall into two categories, namely barbarisms, which are mistakes "*in singulis verbis*," and solecisms, which are mistakes "*in pluribus verbis*." The former are discussed in chapter 5, 5-33 (5, 1-4 being an introduction to the whole problem), the latter in chapter 5, 34-54. But, to quote Colson literally "barbarisms and solecisms are mere deformities; the normal application of the '*regula recte loquendi*' lies in the choice of words which are more or less *dubia*." Hence the remainder of the two chapters, according to Colson, deals with the doubtful cases, and, following the same division as before, in 5, 55 to the end of that chapter with doubtful cases "*in singulis verbis*" and in chapter 6 with doubtful cases "*in pluribus verbis*."

As will be shown presently, the first part of Colson's analysis contains, in one way or another, implicitly almost everything that is necessary for a correct understanding of the chapters in question. But in the last part of his explanation he goes completely astray. Colson himself has noticed that in chapter 6 Quintilian discusses many problems which concern strictly "*singula verba*," as for instance the question of whether the word "topper" can be used in good Latin style. He tries to avoid the difficulty by pointing out that these problems belong among the problems of *sermo*, that *sermo* consists of *plura verba*, and that hence problems concerning single words are in fact problems concerning *plura verba*. This is really a kind of logical somersault. For if this argument is correct, the distinction of mistakes and problems *in singulis verbis* and *in pluribus verbis*, which Quintilian after all has made expressly,<sup>5</sup> loses its meaning. Apart from this it is difficult to see why Quintilian

<sup>5</sup> In I, 5, 35 Quintilian goes even so far as to discuss the question whether *amarae corticis* is not a barbarism rather than a solecism because the mistake is found only in *amarae*, though it becomes a mistake only in connection with *corticis* if *cortex* is assumed to be of masculine gender. Yet we are supposed to believe that the faulty use of one foreign word can be a mistake *in pluribus verbis* because single words belong also to *sermo*.

brings in the principles of *ratio*, *vetus*, *auctoritas*, *consuetudo*, which are the foundations of the *recte loquendi regula*, only at the beginning of chapter 6, if the rules of correct speech, as far as they concern single words, have been discussed in the last paragraphs of chapter 5, especially since Colson himself points out that these principles apply to single words just as well as to combinations of words.

To complete this survey it may finally be mentioned that J. Cousin in his book on Quintilian<sup>6</sup> has also touched upon the question. He says he cannot understand the difficulties found by Nettleship and Colson. To him the arrangement of the chapters seems perfectly natural and sound. For in chapter 5 Quintilian deals simply with deviations from correct usage, while in chapter 6 he deals with the creative forces of language (*les forces créatrices de la langue*). However, though it may be readily admitted that Quintilian in chapter 6 implicitly also touches upon the "creative forces of language," if one wishes to use such an expression, it seems obvious that in a part of his treatise in which he is concerned with school instruction in the lower grades it cannot have been his intention to deal directly with such an exalted subject. The question therefore must be taken up again.

In fact the solution of the problem seems so simple that one would be ashamed of writing about it if it were not for the fact that three outstanding scholars over a period of half a century have given one artificial solution after the other and nobody seems to have pointed out what should have been before everybody's eyes.

There has never been any doubt concerning chapter 5, 1-54. Here Quintilian deals with outright mistakes in speaking, namely barbarisms, which are *in singulis verbis* and solecisms which are *in pluribus verbis*. The difficulty begins with 5, 55 ff. According to Colson Quintilian at this point begins to discuss doubtful cases and it is here that the *recte loquendi regula* comes in. This is to some extent correct. It must, however, be pointed out that doubtful cases are also discussed in the section on solecisms; as for instance where Quintilian says<sup>7</sup> that if *amarae corticis* is correct then *medio cortice* is a solecism and if

<sup>6</sup> Jean Cousin, *Étude sur Quintilien* (Paris, 1935), I, p. 73.

<sup>7</sup> I, 5, 35.

*amari corticis* is correct then *media cortice* is a solecism, but does not make a decision as to which expressions are correct and which are solecisms. What then is the difference between the section on solecism and the last sections of the fifth chapter? The answer is not difficult to give, if one looks at the questions discussed in this latter section. They are: 1. the use of foreign words in Latin; 2. the declension of Greek words and names in Latin, namely whether the Greek or the Latin endings should be used (here Quintilian tries to show that in some cases the application of the one method, in other cases that of the other method may be awkward); 3. the formation of compound words in Latin (here Quintilian tries to show that, in spite of the attempts of some early Latin poets, the Latin language has not the same facility in forming composites as the Greek has); 4. the use of words in a metaphorical sense; 5. the use and creation of onomatopoetic words. It is clear that in all the cases mentioned it is not merely doubtful whether one form or another is correct, as in the cases discussed under the head of solecism, but it is a matter of taste how far one can or should go in the use of certain words and forms.

So far then the logical sequence seems to be perfectly sound. First the pupils have been taught that there are various types of mistakes which one can make in speaking, reading aloud, and writing, and what these types are. Then they learn that there are certain fields in language in which it is not possible to make an absolutely clear-cut distinction between what is correct and what is incorrect, in which therefore the individual has a certain leeway in either direction, and in which it depends largely on good taste whether he will speak or write well or not.

In this last section in which Quintilian discusses the "doubtful" cases in the sense just defined Quintilian cannot avoid completely a discussion of the question of what seems preferable in certain specific cases and what seems less preferable. In doing this he must occasionally refer to certain criteria of good taste, in this connection mostly the authority of acknowledged authors. Yet so far there has been no systematic discussion of the criteria of correct speech and of good taste in general. The student has merely learned that there are certain types of outright mistakes which he must try by all means to avoid and that there are cases in which a decision is difficult. He will therefore ask: "Well,

all right. We have learned that there are certain types of mistakes which we must avoid. But how, if there are two forms which we find used by others are we to decide which is the correct form or, if both may be used, which is preferable?"

It is exactly at this point that Quintilian brings in the four criteria of correct and good speech, *ratio*, with the two subdivisions of *analogia* and *etymologia*, *vetus*, *auctoritas*, and *consuetudo*. He then goes on to apply these criteria to the various types of cases and problems which have been discussed in the preceding chapter and shows how, by means of these criteria, a decision as to what is correct and what is not, can be reached. Since each of the five criteria applies both to single words and to combinations of words it would have been most cumbersome to keep the problems *in singulis verbis* and those *in pluribus verbis* separate under each one of the five headings. It is therefore very understandable that Quintilian did not follow such a pedantic arrangement, but discusses freely problems of either kind wherever they serve best to illustrate the application of a certain criterion. He certainly did not confine himself to problems *in pluribus verbis* nor had he any reason to do so.

This interpretation explains also the repetitions in Quintilian's first book, which induced Nettleship to consider the chapters in question as a badly integrated compound of extracts from the writings of other grammarians. In 5, 8 we hear that the use of words alien to the Latin language is one kind of barbarism. In 5, 56 ff. we are advised that some words of Gallic origin and many Greek words and especially Greek names have become so much a part of the Latin language that they may be used without hesitation, but that it is not always quite easy to decide which words may be used and which may not. In chapter 6, finally, we learn what criteria may be applied in order to decide such questions. Likewise in chapter 5, 35 we have learned that if *amarae corticis* is correct then *medio cortice* is a solecism because the word is used with the wrong gender. But we do not learn which is correct or how to determine which is correct. In 6, 5 we learn that if we are not sure about the gender of a word we may decide the question by comparing it with a word of similar form and meaning, the gender of which is known. Or we may form the diminutive of it. If the diminutive is

mASCULINE then the word itself is also masculine, etc. There is no reason why the same examples should not occasionally be used again when the same problem is dealt with a second time but from a different point of view.

We may, of course, consider the method which Quintilian advises the teacher to use as pedantic. We may think that it would be much better to tell the pupils about the criteria of good speech as soon as we begin to tell them about the difference between correct and incorrect speech. But there have always been schoolmasters and educators who preferred the step by step method, even if this meant that the student was kept in the dark for a long time in respect to those aspects of a matter which he must know if he is really to understand what it is all about. In fact the division of barbarism in the narrower sense into barbarism by addition, by subtraction, by transmutation and by immutation, which Quintilian sets forth in 5, 10 ff., appears infinitely more pedantic than the way in which he wishes the teacher to deal with the various aspects of correct and good speech. Yet it has provoked much less criticism from modern philologists than has the arrangement of the material in chapters 5 and 6. At any rate there can be really no doubt that Quintilian arranged it that way because he thought that this was the proper sequence in which it should be taught and that he did not merely throw together extracts from other writers.

So far, then, it has been demonstrated that the various parts of chapters five and six of Quintilian's first book do form a logical sequence and that the repetitions which can be found in these chapters are not senseless but serve a purpose, since the same problems are considered again and again from different points of view. It has not been shown, however, so far what parts exactly of what Quintilian discusses in these chapters he wished actually to be discussed in school; and, since everybody agrees that he did not think that everything should be discussed in school, why he discussed these other matters at all. In order to answer this question it is necessary first to make a new inquiry into the exact nature and historical importance of the five criteria of correct and good speech which Quintilian discusses in chapter 6.

## II.

The four, or, since the first principle has two subdivisions, the five principles or criteria of correct speech, according to the first paragraph of the sixth chapter of Quintilian's first book, are as follows: *ratio*, which comprises *analogia* and *etymologia*, *vetustas*, *auctoritas*, and *consuetudo*. Nettleship, in the article quoted above, has pointed out<sup>8</sup> that Varro, according to Diomedes,<sup>9</sup> had spoken of only four principles, namely *natura*, which corresponds to *etymologia*, *analogia*, *consuetudo*, and *auctoritas*. In his opinion, furthermore, an analysis of the work of Charisius leads to the conclusion that Pliny referred not only to *consuetudo*, for which he is quoted, but also to *ratio*, and that he acknowledged *veterum licentia* and *veterum dignitas* as an element in the explanation of usage. From this he infers that Quintilian's division must be derived from Pliny. He considers the new division as very bad and says that "it is small blame to the philosophers if they were expected to rise in arms against a division like that." His objection is that the subsumption of *etymologia* and *analogia* under the head of *ratio* does not make much sense, and that *vetustas* cannot be accepted as an independent principle but belongs partly to *auctoritas* and partly to *consuetudo*.

Six years later H. Usener raised the same objections against Quintilian's division,<sup>10</sup> but tried to give a different explanation of what appeared to him a confusion in the terminology. He believed that *vetustas* was at some time used as a synonym of *etymologia* since etymology tries to go back to the oldest form of a word. Quintilian, he believed, found two lists, one with *etymologia* and one with *vetustas*, and, in combining them, had to find a new meaning for *vetustas*. So he separated *vetustas* from *auctoritas* to which, if taken in the sense in which Quintilian gives the word, it really belongs. There were also some grammarians who eliminated etymology and so arrived at a division into three principles: *ratio* = *analogia*, *auctoritas*, *con-*

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.* (see note 1), p. 202.

<sup>9</sup> Diomedes, I, 433.

<sup>10</sup> H. Usener, "Ein altes Lehrgebäude der Philologie" in *Wien. Sitzb.*, 1892, pp. 582 ff., reprinted in *Kleine Schriften*, II (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 297 f.

*suetudo*. So where *etymologia* was brought in it was mistakenly combined with *analogia* under *ratio*.

Finally Colson took up the question in the article quoted above,<sup>11</sup> in another article, published in 1919,<sup>12</sup> and in a note on page 73 of his edition of the first book of Quintilian.<sup>13</sup> His conclusions are expressed most clearly and briefly in the note last mentioned, which runs as follows: "I suggest that the original formula was philosophical and described the processes by which the words became what we find them. On this view the formula ran '*natura, vetustas, analogia, consuetudo, auctoritas*', and the meaning is that the true words are given by nature, then modified by time (*vetustas*) till we get the *prima positio* of the noun or verb, which is then inflected by analogy, and this again is modified by usage and literary authority. The looser form of the formula sometimes dropped *vetustas* and thus we get it as it appears in Diomedes.<sup>14</sup> When the grammarians took it over, and used it to determine the correct word in each case, it naturally underwent modifications. For *natura* is substituted *etymologia*, the name of the science which inquires into words in themselves, and through the corruptions of *vetustas* discerns their *natura*. This rendered the retention of *vetustas* unnecessary. But the memory of it lingered and by some schools was retained as a rather unnecessary variant to *auctoritas*." In support of this construction, for which there is otherwise no direct evidence whatever, Colson quotes<sup>15</sup> two sentences from Varro's *L. L.*, namely, *neque omnis impositio verborum extat quod vetustas quasdam delevit* and *vetustas pauca non depravat, multa tollit*.

All the explanations mentioned obviously imply that Quintilian had no real insight into the matter with which he was dealing and combined various irreconcilable theories in a very mechanical fashion. Since the first part of the present inquiry has shown that, contrary to the opinion of most modern scholars who have written about the problem, the arrangement of the

<sup>11</sup> See note 3.

<sup>12</sup> F. H. Colson, "The analogist and anomalist controversy" in *C. Q.*, XIII (1919), pp. 24 ff.

<sup>13</sup> See *supra*, note 4.

<sup>14</sup> I. e. in Varro, cf. *supra*, p. 345 and note 9.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 12), p. 33, n. 2.

material in chapters 5 and 6 of the first book makes very good sense it seems worth while to ask whether the second accusation raised against Quintilian is not also unjustified.

Colson has made one observation<sup>16</sup> which is very sound and which really gives the key to the problem. This is where he says that when the grammarians took over an old scientific terminology and used it for an investigation of the norms of correct speech it naturally underwent modifications. But if this is realized there is no need for artificial reconstructions.<sup>17</sup>

Varro's work was a scientific work on the Latin Language. When dealing with etymology he discussed also at length the Stoic theory of the origin of language. According to the Stoics, language was *φύση*, which meant that originally the words had had a natural and direct connection with the things which they designate. In the course of time, however, the words had changed their appearance so that this original connection between word and thing was no longer easily recognizable. It was the task of etymology, as the science of the "true" form of the word, to find the original word from which the word in its present form had sprung and so to win a deeper insight into the nature of the thing designated by it. In this form, etymology was probably an offspring of Antisthenes' theory that ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις was one of the most important tasks of a philosopher.<sup>18</sup>

Varro devoted three of the lost books of his work *De Lingua*

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 73-4, note, *s. v. ratione . . . consuetudine*.

<sup>17</sup> J. Cousin, *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 48, likewise points out that there is a difference between a philosophical analysis of the historical origin and development of a language on the one hand and the use of etymology and analogy as normative principles on the other. Yet he, like Colson, still tries to derive Quintilian's terminology from the philosophical study of language rather than from a theory of the norms of correct usage: "par 'sermo' Quintilien entend ici la conversation et le style, c'est-à-dire des séries de phrases, c'est-à-dire enfin l'expression d'un certain nombre d'images verbales et l'indication des rapports qui les unissent. Donc le sermo s'appuie sur la 'ratio'; la raison provoque des transformations morphologiques de deux façons en éliminant les morphèmes normaux (c'est l'analogie), en créant de nouveaux morphèmes: la science qui consiste à faire l'histoire de ces créations est l'étymologique. Le 'sermo' s'appuie encore sur l'ancienneté, c'est-à-dire que la correction exige que l'on évite les néologismes." It will be shown later that this latter explanation of Quintilian's view of *vetus* as one of the criteria of correct speech is also incorrect (cf. *infra*, p. 350).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also *Hermes*, LXII (1927), pp. 463 ff.

*Latina* to the discussion of the Stoic doctrine of etymology, setting forth in one whole book all the arguments that had been brought forth in its favor and in another book the arguments which had been used against it. Likewise he wrote several books on the analogist-anomalist controversy. It is true that Varro was interested in these matters not only from a philosophical and historical point of view, but considered also the question of how far etymology and analogy should be used as criteria of correct speech. Yet it is clear that in a study which is primarily, even if not exclusively, concerned with philosophical and historical problems of language, etymology and analogy are entirely different principles which cannot be brought under one head.

Quintilian, on the other hand, obviously takes not the slightest interest in these philosophical and historical controversies. This becomes especially clear when he suggests<sup>19</sup> various Latin words by which the word *etymologia* might be replaced in order to avoid the Greek term. The words that he mentions are *nota*, a translation of the Aristotelian term *σύμβολον*, *veriloquium*, and *originatio*, but he does not say one word about the fact that the first word belongs to a theory according to which language is *θέση*, the second to a theory according to which language is *φύσις* in the Stoic sense, while the third one is indifferent in regard to these opposite theories.

Quintilian, then, is interested in etymology and analogy exclusively inasmuch as they have been considered as criteria of correct speech. If this is taken into consideration it is by no means difficult to understand how they can be brought together under the one head of *ratio* and contrasted with *consuetudo* and *auctoritas*, and also with *vetustas* though this principle, which presents a special problem, may be discussed later.

*Consuetudo* and *auctoritas* as criteria of good speech are not criteria imposed on the language from the outside, but they are, so to speak, identical with the language itself, namely with that language which was spoken in "good society" and written by authors acknowledged as models of correct speech and good style. In appealing to these principles no further reason why one word or one form should be chosen rather than another can be given except that good and accepted language is what it is,

<sup>19</sup> Quintilian, I, 6, 28.

and perhaps the rather indefinable reason that this is "good taste." It is quite different with *analogia* and *etymologia*.

Analogy, it is true, plays a very important rôle in the formation and structure of the spoken and written language both of the educated and of the uneducated people. But those who defended analogy as a normative criterion of correct speech did not, as a rule, refer to analogy as it was incorporated in the actually spoken and accepted language. As both the ancient references to Caesar's *De Analogia* and Quintilian's own treatment of analogy in the sixth chapter of the first book show, they tried to improve the Latin language by making it more analogical than it actually was. From *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* they appealed to an abstract and "rational" principle which in the actually spoken language was but imperfectly expressed.

The same is true of the advocates of etymology as a criterion of correct speech. There was no doubt that *meridies*, for instance, was supported by both *consuetudo* and *auctoritas*. But the advocates of etymology nevertheless insisted that one should say *medidies* because the meaning of the word was clearly "the middle of the day," hence *medidies* was obviously the original form of the word and at the same time the form which expressed the meaning of the word more clearly. The same principle was also applied to spelling,<sup>20</sup> when it was argued that one should write *obtinuit*, not *optinuit* and *inmanis*, not *immanis*, because the two words contain the prepositions *ob* and *in*.

Both the advocates of *analogia* and those of *etymologia* as criteria of correct speech, therefore, were not satisfied with unrestricted acceptance of the *consuetudo* of educated people, but tried to "rationalise" language by making it more systematic than it actually is. This is the reason why, from this point of view, both analogy and etymology may be considered as *ratio*. It is quite interesting that in this connection the word *ratio* comes very near in its meaning to the modern terms "rational," "rationalizing," though it also retains to some extent its original ancient meaning, since both the advocate of analogy and the advocate of etymology tried to determine correct usage by "calculating" or "figuring" from one word to another.

At any rate it seems quite clear on the basis of these observa-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 7, 7-8.

tions that *ratio* as the common denominator of *analogia* and *etymologia* makes very good sense and, in fact, makes sense only if and where analogy and etymology are considered primarily as criteria of correct speech. This is what Quintilian, in contrast to Varro and others, does. It is possible that this part of Quintilian's terminology was taken over from some earlier author, possibly even from Pliny, though this cannot be proved with the material at our disposal. But it certainly does not owe its existence to a misunderstanding of an earlier theory of the historical origin of language, as Usener and Colson believed, nor is it directly derived from Varro as Cousin tried to show.

It remains to explain the fifth principle discussed by Quintilian, which he calls *vetustas*. That it is not the meaning of this principle to warn against the use of neologisms, as Cousin contended,<sup>21</sup> is clear from the very first words that Quintilian says about it:<sup>22</sup> *Verba a vetustate repetita non solum magnos adsertatores habent, sed etiam adferunt orationi maiestatem aliquam non sine delectatione: nam et auctoritatem antiquitatis habent et, quia intermissa sunt, gratiam novitati similem parant.* In other words, it is one of the desirable effects of the use of archaic words that they make the impression of something new while at the same time having the authority of something old. This makes it also quite clear that the principle of *vetustas* is not identical with *consuetudo*, since it is of the very essence of an archaic word as archaic that it does not belong to present-day *consuetudo*. On the other hand it is not identical with *auctoritas* either, for the same reason; for though what is old has a certain authority of its own this is not the authority of those authors who are still at the present time generally accepted and acknowledged models of good style. In fact, therefore, and contrary to the opinion expressed by Nettleship and Colson, *vetustas* is at least as different from *auctoritas* and *consuetudo* as *auctoritas* and *consuetudo* are different from one another.

In order to understand the introduction of the principle fully it is perhaps pertinent to point out that this is the only one of the criteria mentioned by Quintilian which has no equivalent in Greek theory. *Analogia* and *etymologia*, as their very names indicate, are directly taken over from Greek theory. *Consuetudo*

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 17.

<sup>22</sup> Quintilian, I, 6, 5-6.

and *auctoritas* together correspond to the Greek definition of ἐλληνισμός as the ἔθισμὸς τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων Ἑλλήνων. But there is nothing in Greek theory that corresponds to the Latin principle of *vetustas*.

In a way the Greeks were very conservative in literature. Through many centuries the various types of poetry continued to be written in the dialect and language in which they had originated, so that an epic poet had to learn the Homeric artificial dialect in order to be able to write epic poetry. Furthermore choric and tragic poetry of the fifth century and to some extent later had tried to create a special more solemn language by the use of archaic and unusual words and word-forms. But though the Asianic school of oratory in the Hellenistic age had also revelled in pointed expressions and unusual words, it was not a practice of the Greek rhetoric and oratory of the period in which Greek grammar was gradually elaborated to produce special effects by the use of obsolete and archaic words. This is exactly where Greek and Roman practice differed from one another. This difference in its turn derived from the entirely different position of early literature in Greece and Rome. Early Roman literature was not, like Homer or the great orators of the fifth and fourth centuries, a model for all times. It was considered as somewhat rude and clumsy and, generally speaking, far surpassed by the poetry and prose of the Ciceronian and Augustan ages. Yet there was also something forceful, vigorous, and at the same time venerable about it. Hence the language of this literature was for a large part obsolete and antiquated. To imitate it in whole poems or speeches would have been very bad taste. Yet occasionally an expression or a word borrowed from one of the old writers could very well give a sentence a special glamour, a special color, or a special dignity. But it required much taste to do this in exactly the right way.

This then is the meaning of *vetustas* as distinguished both from *consuetudo* and from *auctoritas* in the narrower sense of the authority of acknowledged models like Cicero. It may also be noted that *vetustas* is not only different but also of a somewhat different character as a principle of correct speech from the other principles mentioned. For while those other principles have to do with correct speech pure and simple the principle of *vetustas* is concerned with expressions the use of which, as a

general rule, would be incorrect, but which under certain conditions may be considered not only unexceptionable but a legitimate means of producing special effects. In Greek theory the principle could not be brought in because the practice did not and could not exist since there was no archaic literature in the Roman sense. In Roman theory it was necessary to bring in the new principle if the theory was to be complete.

All this shows clearly that the Roman grammarians were not always slavishly dependent on Greek models. It shows also that Quintilian knew very well what he was doing when he introduced *vetustas* as one of the principles of correct speech. He certainly did not confuse two different lists of terms or an explanatory principle in the history of language with a normative principle. Quite to the contrary, he or his predecessor, if he took over the term from a predecessor, realized clearly a special problem of Latin style and linguistic usage. Instead of depreciating the deviation of Quintilian and other Roman grammarians from a philosophical terminology which had been created in connection with speculations concerning the origin and development of language, one should therefore rather praise the Roman grammarians for having freed themselves, when turning to new problems, from those parts of the old terminology which were not suitable to their new purpose and for having created a partly new terminology which was very well adapted both to the subject matter and to the problems with which they intended to deal.

### III.

As long as the opinion prevailed that Quintilian in the central chapters of his first book had carelessly thrown together excerpts from the works of several earlier grammarians without paying much attention to logical sequence and coherence, or that his terminology originated largely from misunderstandings of the terminology of various predecessors, it was a rather hopeless undertaking to try to find out which of these things Quintilian actually wished to have taught in school, except perhaps to say that he may not have had a very definite opinion about this question. It is therefore not very surprising that the attempts to answer the question, which have nevertheless been made on this basis, have arrived at rather divergent results and are not very satisfactory. Since it has been shown now that Quintilian

in these chapters does have a plan and understands very well what he says, it will perhaps be possible to take up the question again with better success.

What Quintilian is trying to do is especially clear in the sixth chapter of the first book. Quintilian considers analogy as a useful criterion of correct speech in those cases in which the criteria of *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* do not lead to a clear decision, either because custom has accepted two different forms on which the authorities also do not agree with one another, or because a given word or a form is so rarely used that it is impossible to say what the custom is. If in a case like that the gender of a word is doubtful the question may be decided on the basis of analogy, either by comparing it with other words of the same declension and similar meaning (or with the same consonants or letters preceding the ending) or by reference to the gender of the diminutive, etc.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand Quintilian thinks that the quest for analogy should not be carried so far as to do violence to the actually spoken language as accepted by refined custom. He therefore is strongly opposed to those who urge that one should say *audaciter* instead of *audacter* because of the analogy of *feliciter* or *loquaciter*, or that one should say *face*, *dice*, *duce*, in analogy to other imperatives of the third conjugation.

Likewise he believed<sup>24</sup> that one should follow "etymology" in regard to the division of compound words into syllables, that is one should divide in such a way that the two elements of the word are separated from one another: *haru-spex*, not *harus-pex*, but *abs-temius*, not *ab-stemius*. In other words, he would strongly object to the American custom of dividing, e. g. "analogy" at the end of a line, which does not give a very nice sense if the two parts are understood separately. He likewise believes that sometimes etymological inquiry can give a better insight into the full meaning of a word or a name.<sup>25</sup> But, just as in the case of analogy, he is opposed both to doing violence to the spoken language in favor of abstract principles and to "scientific" explanations which in actual fact are nothing but wild speculations. The main criteria are *consuetudo*, that is the actual practice of refined society, and the authority of acknowledged writers.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 5-6.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 7, 9.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 29 ff.

On this basis it is not very difficult to see why Quintilian discusses what he discusses in this chapter. He treats analogy and etymology more fully than the other three principles exactly because he thinks that as criteria of correct speech they are of very restricted value. For there was, as he himself points out on various occasions, a school of grammarians and teachers of grammar who considered these principles to be the very main-stay of grammar, who tried to teach a language much more "correct" than any language spoken anywhere in society or outside the narrow circle of a grammatical clique, and who were very proud of their endless speculations in this field. As has been pointed out very often, Quintilian did not wish to write a grammar, nor even a grammar for schools,—neither a *Grammatik* nor a *Schulgrammatik*,—but a treatise on what should be taught in school and how it should be taught. Hence he had also to say *what* should *not* be taught and *how* grammar should *not* be taught, and, as often happens, the polemical part of his discussion became more extensive than the positive part. For he was not satisfied with stating dogmatically that analogy and etymology have only a very restricted value as criteria of correct speech. He wished also to show that he was right in his opinion and why that was so. Consequently he tried to show that analogical and etymological speculations become extremely uncertain as soon as they go beyond the first and most obvious steps. He also tried to show<sup>26</sup> that analogy is one of the formative principles in the development of *consuetudo* itself but that there is no sense in pursuing this principle beyond the part which it naturally plays in linguistic custom anyway.

It is quite interesting to see that here Quintilian travels in exactly the opposite direction from Varro. Varro starts with the discussion of the origin of language and of the rôle of analogy in its further development and formation. Then he also comes to discuss the question of how far etymology and analogy may be used as criteria of correct speech. Quintilian, on the contrary, starts with analogy and etymology as criteria of correct speech. But in the course of this discussion he arrives at the conclusion that, since analogy is after all *merely* one of the formative elements of *consuetudo*, there is no sense in pursuing it beyond and against *consuetudo* itself.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 16.

From all this it seems obvious that Quintilian in this chapter addresses himself primarily to the teacher. He tries to convince him that he must not give an undue importance to analogy and etymology as criteria of correct speech. He does not, or at least not primarily, say or imply that the teacher must discuss everything with his pupils in the same way in which Quintilian discusses it in this part of his work. Yet the line cannot be drawn quite sharply. For since there are teachers who have a different view of analogy and etymology and since his pupils will hardly fail to hear of their theories sooner or later, the teacher can scarcely avoid giving them some warning when he discusses the subject with them. Hence, while at first sight it may seem as if Quintilian in this chapter was mainly concerned with matters which the teacher has to consider for himself but not to teach, in fact most of what Quintilian says will, in one way or another, have also to be touched upon in school. The main difference will be one of emphasis and extent. For the actual teacher will of course spend more time in trying to teach correct speech according to refined *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* than in warning against a pedantic use of analogy and etymology, while Quintilian, in advising the teacher, does the opposite.<sup>27</sup>

The short section on *vetustas* presents a slightly different problem and the solution of this problem is perhaps not entirely without importance, since it may also throw some further light on the last sections of the fifth chapter, the purpose of which has been so strangely misunderstood by several scholars. Generally speaking, Quintilian is very anxious to keep the tasks of the teacher of grammar and the teacher of rhetoric, who teaches only the higher grades, clearly distinguished from one another. As far as speech is concerned the grammarian, who teaches the lower grades, has to deal only with correct speech pure and simple, while all questions of style are reserved for the teacher of rhetoric. The question of where, when, and how an obsolete or archaic word may be used is really a question of style and therefore should be reserved for the teacher of rhetoric. In fact the problem is taken up again in the 8th book,<sup>28</sup> which, like all books of the *Institutio*, except the first, deals with the instruction in rhetoric or oratory. Yet Quintilian cannot altogether avoid mentioning this principle in the first book, since, according to

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 39-40.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 3, 24 ff.

the other criteria of correct speech as Quintilian wishes them to be applied, the use of archaic words which are not supported by modern usage would be excluded. Nevertheless it must be conceded that under certain circumstances their use is justified. Hence this possibility has to be mentioned, though the problem as such can be treated properly only after a higher stage has been reached. It is clear in this case also that it is not only Quintilian who mentions the problem at this point; it will also have to be touched upon briefly by the grammar teacher in school.

The position of the last sections of the fifth chapter,<sup>29</sup> which follow upon the discussion of barbarism and solecism, is exactly the same. As pointed out above, there are, according to ancient theory, two types of outright mistakes in the use of language, barbarisms and solecisms. These are defined, divided into various subdivisions, and discussed in chapter 5, sections 1-54. From the definition, description, and illustration by examples, of these mistakes the treatise could go on directly to the criteria of correct speech which, as shown above, are dealt with in chapter 6. Yet since there are certain words, forms, and combinations of words which under certain circumstances may be objectionable and even fall under one of the categories of linguistic mistakes discussed before, but under other circumstances do not, this problem of the doubtful and ambiguous cases has to be mentioned though its adequate treatment is reserved for the teacher of rhetoric.

All this proves once more that Quintilian had very definite opinions of his own concerning the problems discussed in the second half of chapter 5 and in chapter 6, and that he is very far indeed from merely combining excerpts from the works of earlier Roman grammarians. It is not impossible that *vetustas* as a criterion of correct speech was for the first time introduced by Pliny, though, on the basis of the material available to us, it is not possible to prove this. But there can hardly be any doubt that, especially in those sections in which he touches on the borderline between grammar and rhetoric, Quintilian is largely on his own. At any rate it is quite clear that there is nothing superfluous in the whole section from chapter 5, 55 to the end of chapter 6 and that though Quintilian is writing for the teacher and not for the pupil it was his opinion that nearly

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 55-72.

everything that he mentions in this section must in one way or another at least be briefly touched upon in school.

The situation is somewhat different in regard to chapter 4 and chapter 5, 1-54. In these sections Quintilian apologizes several times for dealing with such elementary matters, but more often and more profusely in chapter 5 than in chapter 4, though the subject matter of chapter 4 seems still more elementary than that of the first part of chapter 5. The reason is not difficult to find. For Cicero in his rhetorical works on various occasions<sup>30</sup> speaks of such subject matter as this latter part of Quintilian's work with a certain contempt as of something that the boys must be taught because, without this knowledge, they cannot even dream of becoming orators, but which belongs to elementary instruction and is not really worthy of the attention of the rhetorician.

This somewhat contemptuous view of his own subject in these chapters, which Quintilian has taken over from Cicero, has had certain consequences of which one must be aware in order to understand fully the composition of this part of Quintilian's work. In chapter 6, as shown above, he criticizes the views of earlier grammarians directly, clearly, and adequately. In chapter 5 he mentions the extremely mechanical and totally inadequate division of barbarism into barbarism by addition, subtraction, transposition, and immutation as something generally known and universally accepted without a word of direct criticism,<sup>31</sup> though later,<sup>32</sup> when he comes to concrete examples like *scopa* and *scala* instead of *scopae* and *scalae* he has to admit that it does not make very good sense to find the mistake in the "subtraction" of the letter *e* rather than in the use of the singular instead of the plural. Likewise in his section on solecism he mentions the even more absurd application of the same fourfold subdivision to the latter category of faulty speech without direct criticism, and then brings the more sensible subdivisions under the head of *immutatio*,<sup>33</sup> after having eliminated *additio*, *detractio*, and *transmutatio* as possibly constituting independent categories of faulty speech. Yet he does explicitly object<sup>34</sup> to the extreme pedantry of those who consider *amari*

<sup>30</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, III, 48 and 38; cf. also *Ad Herennium*, IV, 17.

<sup>31</sup> Quintilian, I, 5, 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 41 ff.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 16.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 35.

*corticis* as a barbarism rather than a solecism, because the mistake appears in only one word though it becomes a mistake only by the connection of this word with another word. There are also quite a few very pertinent additions to the theory of barbarism and solecism and to the history of this theory; so for instance, when he discusses the various meanings which the word barbarism had been given<sup>35</sup> or when he warns teacher and student not to take a pedantically superior attitude toward poets who deviate from established custom.<sup>36</sup> The students should rather be told that in poetry such deviations may be excused or even be praiseworthy if they are used to produce a certain effect.

It seems obvious then that in this section Quintilian is just as far from copying the work of one earlier author as he is in chapter 6. He has all the various theories at his finger-tips. He even cannot help having his own ideas about the matter. But since Cicero considered the whole subject not quite worthy of the attention of a rhetorician Quintilian touches everything very lightly and does not, as in the 6th chapter, make an attempt to arrive at a consistent solution of the whole question.

It is probably this fact that misled Nettleship and his followers to believe that in chapter 4 and chapter 5, 1-54 Quintilian had copied one author and in chapter 5, 55 to the end of chapter 6 another author, so that he failed completely to understand the arrangement of the various problems in the latter of these two main sections. It is quite true that there is an important difference between the two parts. In the first section the abstract and seemingly logically complete, but actually totally inadequate, divisions and subdivisions of certain earlier grammarians are in the foreground, and what Quintilian has to say to correct them is introduced in such a way as to appear to be a mere addition. The divisions and subdivisions used in the second section are not so abstract and do not have the same apparent logical completeness. They are therefore not quite so easy to understand at first sight. In compensation, however, they are much more concrete and express the linguistic phenomena much more adequately. It is exactly in this section, which, according to Nettleship, has no logical order at all, that the more adequate order of problems and principles is to be found.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 6 ff.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 11-12.

Since, then, in the first part of chapter 5 Quintilian appears to have dealt with his subject less adequately than in the succeeding sections, the question of what was to be taught in school and what is merely discussed for the benefit of the teacher is here somewhat more difficult to answer. In regard to the subject matter of the sixth chapter it was clear that even what Quintilian considered a wrong application of analogy and etymology as criteria of correct speech had at least to be mentioned in school since the students could hardly fail sooner or later to come in contact with men who advocated a much wider application of these principles than Quintilian considered justified and therefore they had to be warned against this doctrine. Pedantry, on the other hand, in the distinction between barbarism and solecism or in making up subdivisions of these categories of faulty speech could not, as would a faulty use of analogy, directly affect the ability of the student to speak correctly. They are merely a hindrance to sensible teaching. Hence, theoretically speaking, it would be sufficient to warn the teacher against such pedantry while the teacher himself need not tell his students very much, if anything, about these pedantic theories, much less discuss with them their application to concrete cases. But, in contrast to his discussion of the more advanced problems of correct speech, Quintilian in the beginning of chapter 5 has not carried his criticism to its logical conclusion. Consequently the theories which seem intrinsically at variance with Quintilian's own more enlightened views are not openly or completely rejected by him but criticised only where their application leads to patently absurd results. It would therefore seem that the teacher has either to take a more radical view than Quintilian does, in which case he can dispense in his teaching with a good deal of what Quintilian discusses, or, if he follows Quintilian closely, he will have to discuss most of what Quintilian discusses if he wishes to make the matter clear to his students.

In regard to chapter 4 the problem of what, in Quintilian's opinion, was to be taught in school and what belonged merely to the necessary equipment of the teacher must again be approached in a somewhat different way if the correct answer is to be found. On the face of it, it appears that Quintilian in this chapter makes a clearer distinction in this respect than

in the chapters discussed so far. For several times he says that the *grammarian* must know a certain point or matter or must concern himself with a problem,<sup>37</sup> while on other occasions he says that the *students* must learn or study a certain matter or problem.<sup>38</sup> Yet even under the second head he sometimes discusses matters that seem hardly fit to be discussed on the very first and most elementary level of instruction in grammar, although, in the opinion of most commentators, this is the level of instruction with which Quintilian in this chapter wishes to deal. Did Quintilian then merely try to show off his own erudition in mentioning these matters, disregarding the fact that they were hardly an appropriate subject of discussion on this level? In order to give a conclusive answer to this question it will be necessary to take up some other problems first.

## IV.

In the beginning of chapter 4<sup>39</sup> Quintilian divides grammar into *recte loquendi scientia* and *poetarum enarratio*. There is no doubt that in chapters five and six he deals exclusively with the first of the two parts mentioned. Then he adds a chapter on the *recte scribendi scientia* or *orthographia*, i. e. correct spelling and related problems. In chapter 8 he finally comes to the *poetarum* or *auctorum enarratio*. Here again, unfortunately, it appears necessary first to dispose of a wrong interpretation.

The arrangement of topics discussed by Quintilian under the head of *auctorum enarratio* seems very clear. First he speaks of the instruction in correct reading, i. e. reading aloud.<sup>40</sup> Here three points have to be observed: The first is correct punctuation, i. e. the reader must bring out the meaning by pausing in the

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 4, 7 and 10.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 4, 12 and 22. It may perhaps also be pointed out that the introductory sentence in I, 4, 6: *ne quis igitur tamquam parva fastidiat grammatices elementa, non quia magnae sit operae, consonantes a vocalibus discernere ipsasque eas in semivocalium numerum mutarumque partiri, sed quia interiora velut sacri huius adeuntibus apparebit multa rerum subtilitas, quae non modo acuere ingenia puerilia, sed exercere altissimam eruditionem ac scientiam possit* seems to leave the question open of whether these more subtle matters should actually be used also to sharpen the minds of the young or whether they are reserved for mature scholars.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 4, 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 1-3.

right place, he must distinguish between minor and major pauses, and he must not take breath except where a sentence or a part of the sentence comes to an end. The second point is correct intonation, which should be virile, pleasant, and dignified and must not degenerate into a chant or singsong, when poetry is recited. The third point is characterisation, of which there should be sufficient to indicate when different persons are speaking in a poem, but which must not be exaggerated in a theatrical fashion.

Following this Quintilian discusses the selection of authors and reading material by the teacher.<sup>41</sup> Then he has a section<sup>42</sup> on *praelectio* by the teacher and the practical exercises which are to be connected with it. These exercises are as follows: First the students are asked to point out the different parts of speech, which occur in the passage read,—nouns, verbs, conjunctions, prepositions, etc.—and to analyze the meter and rhythm. Then the teacher points out what words or combinations of words are used in disagreement with common usage. This, as Quintilian emphasizes, is done not in order to criticise the poet, who enjoys a certain poetic freedom, but in order to make the student aware of the artifices of poetic style. If words occur which have more than one meaning the teacher will discuss these meanings. He will carefully explain unusual words, so-called glossemes. He will discuss all the tropes and figures of speech which can be found in the passages read. Finally he will especially point out the beauty of composition, of subject matter, of characterization, of the thoughts expressed, of the choice of words, and of the style.<sup>43</sup>

The last section of the chapter finally deals with *enarratio historiarum*, i. e. "Sacherklärungr," the explanations of the subject matter itself as far as this is necessary.

Colson<sup>44</sup> has tried to relate Quintilian's arrangement to two lists of the different parts of *ars grammatica*, one of which is given by Dionysius Thrax,<sup>45</sup> while the other is attributed to Varro by Diomedes,<sup>46</sup> but in Colson's opinion has also a Greek origin. Dionysius' list is as follows: 1. ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβής κατὰ

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 4-11.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 18-21.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 13-17.

<sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 41 ff.

<sup>45</sup> Dionysius Thrax, *De Grammatica eiusque Partibus*, 1 (pp. 5-6 ed. Uhlig).

<sup>46</sup> Diomedes, I, p. 426 K.

*προσῳδίαν*, 2. ἔξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικὸς τρόπους, 3. γλωσσῶν καὶ ἴστοριῶν πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις, 4. ἐτυμολογίας εὑρεσις, 5. ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός, 6. κρίσις ποιημάτων, which, as Dionysius says, is the crowning achievement of the art of the grammarian. The "Varronian" list has only four divisions, namely *lectio*, *emendatio*, *enarratio*, and *iudicium*, which seem to correspond to the Greek terms: ἀνάγνωσις, διόρθωσις, ἔξήγησις, and κρίσις.

In his attempt to bring these two lists together with each other and with Quintilian, Colson states that in Dionysius, just as in Quintilian, but in contrast to "Varro," *emendatio* or διόρθωσις is missing, and draws from this the conclusion that Dionysius, like Quintilian, wrote for schools, not for scholars, and hence omitted *emendatio* since textual criticism has no place in school instruction, except inasmuch as the teacher may try to emend his text before he has it read in school; but he will not discuss his emendations with his pupils. Colson states further that the simple ἔξήγησις of Varro or his predecessor has been "developed" into explanation of uncommon or obsolete words and of allusions to facts unknown to the reader (γλωσσῶν καὶ ἴστοριῶν ἀπόδοσις) and of tropes and figures (ἔξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικὸς τρόπους). Then he tries to relate Dionysius' precepts for the teaching of grammar in school with those of Quintilian. He finds no difficulty in relating Dionysius' ἀνάγνωσις κατὰ προσῳδίαν to the first paragraphs of Quintilian's chapter, though prosody is not mentioned there. But this is a minor matter which may be taken up later. Dionysius' γλωσσῶν καὶ ἴστοριῶν ἀπόδοσις and ἔξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικὸς τρόπους are, of course, also easy to find in Quintilian's plan.<sup>47</sup> But the problem becomes difficult when it comes to ἐτυμολογίας εὑρεσις and ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός. Colson admits that ἐτυμολογίας εὑρεσις is missing from Quintilian's plan for the study of poetry, but considers the omission merely accidental. In reality, he believes, Quintilian must have considered the search for etymologies a part of the instruction in literature, though he does not mention it. On the other hand he thinks that ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός is covered by the exercise in determining the *partes orationis* mentioned in I, 8, 13, but "to the bare parsing of ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός is added scansion and the noting of *barbara* and *impropria verba* and the study of homonyms."

<sup>47</sup> Quintilian, I, 8, 14.

Here, then, the confusion is again complete. It is difficult to see how the identification of the various parts of speech in a given passage can be considered the same thing as ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός. But Colson's whole theory is but another attempt to reconcile two things of entirely different origin and purpose. True, Dionysius' *τέχνη* in the form in which we have it, and if one disregards the two introductory paragraphs which contain less than 25 lines, is not a discussion of what a *grammaticus* like Aristarchus did in his lectures. But it is not a school book either. It is a very brief survey of the tools which any grammarian who deals with problems of language must have and above all of the terms that he has to use. But we know also that Dionysius, like his teacher Aristarchus, gave lectures on literature for adults, and there can be no doubt that what he describes in the introductory paragraph is the method followed by the *grammaticus* who gives such lectures. It is not true either that διόρθωσις is really absent from Dionysius' list, though the word does not appear there. For the scholia to the passage rightly point out that ἐτυμολογίας εὑρεσις and ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός are parts of διόρθωσις; and if there should be any doubt as to whether the scholia are correct in this respect one has merely to point to the fact that, according to Herodianus,<sup>48</sup> Dionysius, in making up the text of the author about whom he lectured, used analogy to a much larger extent than his teacher Aristarchus had considered justified. The function of etymology and analogy in the textual criticism of grammarians like Aristarchus and Dionysius, then, was similar to, though not identical with, their function as criteria of correct speech in the preparatory exercises for the training in oratory. For they served to reconstruct what was supposed to be the correct usage of the author whose text was to be restored. But since textual criticism, as Colson rightly pointed out, has no place in the instruction of boys, etymology and analogy are naturally omitted from Quintilian's discussion of the teaching of literature.

Having disposed of the misunderstandings caused by the introduction of entirely extraneous considerations, it is possible to consider the 8th chapter of Quintilian's first book on its own merits. In the section in which he discusses instruction in correct reading or reciting of poetry, Quintilian does not mention

<sup>48</sup> Herodianus *ad Iliad.*, II, 262, II, 268, XII, 158; cf. also *Anecdot.* Paris., ed. Cramer, III, 285, 16.

prosody, and meter or rhythm, though both of them are undoubtedly a most important element in recitation; obviously because he was to mention them later in connection with the special exercises which accompany the *praelectio* by the teacher. But it seems also clear that *lectio* and *praelectio* cannot be completely separated from each other, but must often have formed part of the same lesson. On the other hand it appears hardly possible that the same students with whom the teacher discussed the most refined questions of style, composition, characterization, etc. were at the same time subjected to such primitive and elementary exercises as the determination and enumeration of the various parts of speech. Undoubtedly, therefore, the various exercises and topics of instruction mentioned in the short section I, 8, 13-17 were not meant to belong, all of them, to the same grade, while, on the other hand, the instruction in correct reading and recitation which is discussed in I, 8, 1-3 must have gone through all grades, even though in different stages of perfection. This is important because it shows that Quintilian, even within the same chapter, does not always follow the order in which the teacher in the course of the school curriculum will take up the various subjects or aspects of the matter one after the other. He rather takes up the various matters by groups and follows the chronology of the school curriculum only within each group, even then making it not always quite clear which of the elements mentioned belong to a lower grade and which are merely intended to precede, within the same class or even lesson, those which come next in his own discussion.

What has just been said concerning the arrangement of the various points within each chapter is self-evident if one considers the relation of the various chapters to one another. Nobody certainly can believe that the reading of literature began only after the instruction in correct speech had been brought to a conclusion, though Quintilian discusses the former only after having finished his discussion of the latter. Likewise the elementary composition exercises which are discussed in chapter 9 must have begun in school long before the instruction in correct speech or the study of literature had reached the higher stages. If this is taken into consideration the difficulties which the 4th chapter of the first book seemed to present disappear for the most part.

Quintilian has divided the subject matter of school instruction according to topics and types of exercises. So he deals first

(chapter 4) with grammar in the narrower sense, that is with the analysis of language as such, then with the problems of correct speech (ch. 5 and ch. 6), and correct writing (ch. 7), then with the study of literature (ch. 8), then with composition exercises (ch. 9), and finally with special subjects like music, and mathematics (ch. 10). It is clear that the problems of correct speech cannot be successfully discussed before the instruction in grammar has reached a somewhat advanced stage. This may, at first sight, create the impression that Quintilian, from chapter to chapter, was following the chronological sequence of the school curriculum. But the later chapters show very clearly that such is not the case. The study of literature and composition exercises start very early and, in the lower grades, are supposed to be connected with grammatical exercises of a rather elementary kind. Vice versa, then, there is no reason to assume that chapter 4 was meant to confine itself to the grammatical problems and exercises which belong to the lowest grades.

If this is taken into consideration it will no longer seem surprising that Quintilian in the 4th chapter deals also with what at his time must have been rather advanced problems of grammar, and that of some of these problems he says expressly that the boys should be made acquainted with them. For we need no longer conclude that he wished them to be discussed at the same time at which the students learned the first elements of grammar. Finally, on the basis of these observations it becomes rather doubtful whether Quintilian, when using expressions like *etiam in ipsis vocalibus grammatici est videre an . . . or . . . apparebit multa rerum subtilitas, quae non modo acuere ingenia puerilia, sed exercere altissimam quoque eruditionem ac scientiam possit*<sup>49</sup> meant to say that the teacher, in order to be a good teacher, must be acquainted with these problems but that he must not discuss them with his pupils, as most scholars have assumed. In fact, if one takes into consideration what Quintilian expects the very young boys to learn while they are still struggling with the alphabet one may suspect that he wished to "sharpen" the minds of the young by the discussion of such "scholarly" problems at a rather early stage, even if not when they were just learning the very first elements of grammar.<sup>50</sup>

In conclusion, then, it may be said that, as far as subject matter and problems are concerned, there is probably very little

<sup>49</sup> Quintilian, I, 4, 10 and 6.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 1, 34.

in Quintilian's first book that he did not consider proper for discussion in school, i. e. in that stage of their schooling through which the boys had to go before they entered upon the study of oratory proper. Of course when Quintilian says<sup>51</sup> that certain types of literature and of authors must not only not be read in school but that their very existence should remain unknown to the students he does not wish the teacher to mention these works in any way. There are some other instances of such purely negative advice to teacher and parents in the first book. It is equally clear that the long discussion of the usefulness of music and geometry in chapter 10 is meant for the general public, including teachers and parents, and is not to be repeated in school. But apart from these obvious exceptions one may safely assume that Quintilian considered nearly everything that he mentions in the first book if not as a necessary part of school instruction yet certainly as a proper subject for it.

This result may perhaps seem surprising. For even an enthusiastic modern linguist who is utterly convinced of the value of instruction in linguistics in school will probably admit that, at the stage which linguistics had reached at the time of Quintilian, a good deal of the material and problems which Quintilian discusses in the first book was rather sterile, and of course, even more so when considered as part of the education of boys. However, in any kind of established education one will find elements which are preserved only by the force of tradition though they have lost their meaning, others which have become part of school instruction only because someone wanted to teach them and was able to persuade the public that this should be done, and finally still others which could and should be vital parts of a living education if they were taught properly but which have become sterile because most often this is not the case.<sup>52</sup> It would be a most interesting task to analyze what Quintilian has to say about ancient instruction from this point of view. But this much more interesting question can hardly be attacked successfully unless those much less interesting problems which the present paper has tried to solve have first been settled.

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 6.

<sup>52</sup> I need hardly say that I do not believe that the classics belong to the first or the second of the categories mentioned.

## ON EDITING THE HOMERIC POEMS.\*

Ordinarily the edition of a classic text is an attempt to reconstruct what its author put forth—or, if you can go so far, what he wished at various times to put forth. For the Homeric poems it is obvious that there can be no such goal. Even those who claim that there was a single author<sup>1</sup> for either or both poems think of him as singing or declaiming his work—now this way, now that; and followed for a period of undetermined length by others doing likewise. Evidently there is here no target for an editor to aim at.

An editor must confine himself to the written tradition. It is long and copious. We have quotations from the 5th century B. C. on; papyri fragments<sup>2</sup> start in the 3rd century B. C. and continue to the end of the papyrus period in the 7th century A. D.; extensive scholia<sup>3</sup> give information about the editions of Aristarchus (*ca.* 160 B. C.) and about his predecessors and successors; manuscripts of the complete text range from the 10th to the 16th century, and are to be counted by the hundreds;<sup>4</sup> the last stage, printing, starts with the edition of Demetrios Chalcondylas, Florence 1488, and has not yet ended.<sup>5</sup>

Through all this time there has been constant change. Once there was belief in the sacrosanctity of the text; but modern linguistics has shown that the continual modernization of a text thus transmitted is inevitable. To exemplify for the Homeric

\* In the preparation of this article I have had research and clerical assistance provided by a Minor Grant of the American Council of Learned Societies, which is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

<sup>1</sup> What do they mean by the term? Cf. J. Whatmough, *A. J. A.*, LII (1948), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Nearly 400 are listed for the *Iliad* by Collart, *Introduction à l'Iliade* (Paris, 1942), pp. 39-59. I shall cite by the numbers of this list, which up to 104 coincide with those of Allen.

<sup>3</sup> On the history of their formation, cf. René Langumier, *ibid.*, pp. 74-88.

<sup>4</sup> The most copious report of their readings in T. W. Allen's major edition of the *Iliad* (Oxford, 1931).

<sup>5</sup> For a list of later editions, cf. W. Schmid, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.* (München, 1929), p. 192. For the *Iliad* the latest additions are the Budé edition and that of Allen (cf. notes 2 and 4); for the *Odyssey* that of von der Mühl (1946), cf. *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 210-213.

text is tedious rather than difficult. The word for "lung" occurs twice ( $\Delta$  528,  $\Upsilon$  486) and the manuscripts always write  $\pi\nu\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$ —a popular etymology for  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$ . As late as the 9th century Photius had  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$  in his Homer. In the second century Moeris knew that  $\pi\nu\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$  was Hellenistic, in contrast to the Attic  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$ . A papyrus of the 2nd century B. C. has now turned up with  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$  in M 188b. The only question that remains is just when did this late form printed by all recent editors begin to get into the tradition. Meister has pointed out<sup>6</sup> that the use of EY to designate what resulted from the contraction of EO starts in the Ionic inscriptions only in the 4th century, and cannot be earlier in Homer, where examples can now be found on almost every page.

Faced with this situation an editor must realize that the first thing he should do is to make up his mind as to what stage of the tradition his text is to represent. Surely, he will not wish to reproduce the text of an early stage defaced by later modernizations here and there; nor that of a late stage with earlier readings sewn on now and then like purple patches. His choice must be guided by a knowledge of the history of the tradition.

Its starting point is now clear and should have been so long ago. All that we know about Homer comes from a single manuscript written in Athens in the sixth century. Such an opinion was put forward by Lachmann<sup>7</sup> over a century ago: "Die schriftliche überlieferung der homerischen gedichte im griechischen altertum beruhte einzig auf der arbeit des Pisistratus und seine gefährten." The idea was attacked and ridiculed, but vainly. At present it is sufficient to quote Rhys Carpenter:<sup>8</sup> "Yet the true situation seems rather to be that if antiquity had neglected to record for us the Peisistratean recension of Homer, we should have to invent it for ourselves as a hypothesis essential to explain the facts." "There is nothing here for laughter or for learned gibe, but a historic fact beyond price and beyond invention."

The natural assumption is that a manuscript written at Athens

<sup>6</sup> *Die Homerische Kunstsprache* (Leipzig, 1921), p. 85.

<sup>7</sup> *Betrachtungen ueber Homers Ilias mit Zusatzen von Moriz Haupt* (3te Aufl., Berlin, 1874), p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946), pp. 12, 14.

in the sixth century was written in the Old Attic alphabet. From that it follows that some people—*οἱ μεταγράψάμενοι*—must in the 5th century have transliterated it into the Ionic alphabet. That is another idea that has been ridiculed in vain. The Alexandrians believed (and used) it; in modern hands its usefulness has increased, especially since Meillet has suggested that doubled letters might be written only once no matter whether they represent vowels or consonants.<sup>9</sup>

For earlier scholars the trail broke at this point: the quotations were still uncollected, and the accumulation of evidence from the papyri was still in the future. They had nothing at their command but the scholia and the manuscripts.

The manuscripts are very much alike: each has “surface corruptions” in plenty; yet a tolerable text can be got from any two, and it will not differ greatly from that which could be got from any other two.<sup>10</sup> Such a text may be spoken of as a Vulgate; and the question arose, where did this Vulgate come from, or more narrowly how was it related to the edition of Aristarchus.

The first answer was that the Vulgate was the edition of Aristarchus itself. That opinion was advanced by Giphanius (Hubrecht van Giffen) in 1572<sup>11</sup> at a time when he could have had access only to the so-called Scholia of Didymus and the commentary of Eustathius. After the discovery in 1779 by Villoison of codex Venetus A with its copious scholia, it was clear that the answer was oversimplified. The most that could be claimed was that the Vulgate rested on the edition of Aristarchus. How much that implied was disputed. Had Aristarchus’ text been canonized in later times; and if so, was that something for which we should be grateful or not?

Method obviously demands that the first steps should be to reconstruct the edition of Aristarchus, and separately the earliest form of the Vulgate whatever its date may be. The second of

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik* (3te Aufl., Leipzig, 1921), pp. 99-110; Meillet, *R.E.G.*, XXXI (1918), pp. 280 ff.; Schwyzer, *Gr. Gram.* (München, 1938), p. 102.

<sup>10</sup> “Recte enim dixit Leaf, posse si non e quovis codice, at certe e duobus quibusvis forte fortuna arreptis textum confici qui sine offensa legeretur. Quippe lectio haec quam vulgatam seu receptam nuncupamus ita invaluit usu ut codicibus prope omnibus communis sit.” Preface to Oxford text (Monro), p. viii.

<sup>11</sup> According to Monro, *loc. cit.*

these tasks has never been undertaken; the execution of the first was promised by Adolph Roemer, but the promise was never fulfilled.<sup>12</sup> Instead editors strove to get the "best" text by choosing eclectically now the reading of Aristarchus, now that of the Vulgate.

Just what the procedure was to produce could not have been very clear. In 1898, however, Ludwich undertook to show that the Vulgate had been in existence from the 5th century on; and had "passed through the cleansing fire of Alexandrian criticism by and large unharmed, but also unpurified."<sup>13</sup> That is the point at which documentary evidence ceases, and Ludwich would consider no other; for him this was the ultima Thule. He would hear nothing of the *μεταγραψάμενοι*, nor of the Peisistratean edition; those who were trying to go further on the ground of linguistic evidence were simply rewriting the poems in "ur-griechisch." They were to be ridiculed as "Knightianer," a term afterwards adopted as a badge of honor.<sup>14</sup>

The supporting evidence was an excellent collection (*op. cit.*, 71-133) of the quotations, and the positive side of his belief met with success. Leaf, the wisest of the editors of Homer, explicitly<sup>15</sup> defines his text as an "endeavour to reconstitute the Attic text as transliterated into the new alphabet"; but adds: "I have not hesitated in many cases to give a reading in the text which is described in the notes as clearly wrong—a corruption, that is, as old as the fifth century, of an older form which we can confidently restore." Monro too was enthusiastic when he wrote in 1902 the preface to the Oxford text. Ludwich had proved, "libros nostros non ex Alexandrina aliqua fabrica, sed e vetustissimis exemplaribus fluxisse." The readings of Aristarchus rest on good manuscripts far older than ours and are to be adopted even when all our manuscripts differ. As for the dialect: a complete restoration is impossible, so no attempt at it is best. We will end with a text (p. xiii): "si non optimum—ut qui ipsius

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Cauer, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>13</sup> *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen* (Leipzig, 1898), p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> The epithet derives from Payne Knight, who published in 1820 an edition of the poems, cf. Cauer, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>15</sup> *The Iliad*, ed. Walter Leaf (2nd ed., London, 1900-1902), I, pp. xxiii-xxv.

poetae manum contingeret—attamen in optimis Graeciae saeculis vulgatum."

An editor has two kinds of problems, both essential, but differing greatly in magnitude: for instance, (1) to read ἐγὼ ιδέειν or ἐγὼν ιδέειν; (2) to put the Theseus line (A 265) in the text or in the critical commentary. Hitherto problems of the first type had largely monopolized attention; the accumulation of papyrus evidence was about to bring the second type into the foreground.

In 1906 Grenfell and Hunt noted<sup>16</sup> that ca. 150 B. C. a striking change in the transmission of the Homeric text took place abruptly and with almost absolute completeness. Naturally what impressed these scholars most was the quantitative difference between the texts written before and after that date. I mention, however, first two smaller differences, because they show editorial activity at that time.

The Ptolemaic papyri have no division of the poems into books. Some are of course unsuited to reveal the fact; but three others pass from Α to Μ, from Χ to Ψ, and from ι to κ without interruption.<sup>17</sup> Of the papyri written after 150 B. C. (I shall call them the Alpha papyri) those that have stichometric marks or the end of a book show the book division precisely as do the manuscripts and our printed texts. There is but one exception: P339 (1a) passes from Γ to Δ without interruption. It contains only five lines and is best regarded as a belated continuant of the Ptolemaic tradition too short to give other indication of the fact.<sup>18</sup>

Our recent printed texts show movable nu at the end of a line when and only when the next verse begins with a vowel. This is said<sup>19</sup> to be supported by the consensus of the manuscripts. Three of the earliest Alpha papyri—P13 (1a), P104 (1p), P10 (1p)—follow the rule 135 times, fail to write the ν six times, and write it against the rule twenty times. The Ptolemaic papyri show no acquaintance with such a rule. Two of them write (with very rare slips) the ν everywhere; the others are too fragmentary to show anything clearly.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *The Hibeh Papyri*, Part I, 67-75.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *A. J. P.*, XLII (1921), p. 258; *C. P.*, XL (1945), pp. 183-184.

<sup>18</sup> Other such stragglers are P51 (1a), P53 (1p), both markedly different from the Vulgate.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. La Roche, *Homerische Untersuchungen* (1869), pp. 160-163.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *C. P.*, XL (1945), pp. 181-183.

The point properly stressed by Grenfell and Hunt was that in their contents the Ptolemaic papyri contain a text longer than that established by Wolf as our printed Vulgate. The differences run from 20% down;<sup>21</sup> one (P41) seemed close to the Vulgate in length and similar ones (P Jouget of the *Odyssey*, and P217) have since been found, but the latter shows a text greatly different from the Vulgate in spite of the similarity of length.<sup>22</sup> In contrast the Alpha papyri are in "substantial" agreement with the Vulgate.

The slight difference here implied between the Alpha papyri and the Vulgate manuscripts needs investigation. I have observed a close correlation among three sets of facts: (1) absence of a line from the Alpha papyri; (2) absence of solid support for the line in the Vulgate manuscripts; (3) absence of the line from the edition of Aristarchus. The correlations are not perfect, and could not be expected to be such, but the residues are small and admit of explanation. To put what results historically: about 150 B. C. some publisher issued a new text, which contained the lines of Aristarchus and the editorial improvements I have mentioned. The edition was a great success, so much so that all rivals were killed. In its transmission a few interpolations were made almost immediately, and during the papyrus period a few others were added; by the time of the manuscripts their number had increased, and we can see that the invaders are fanning out. Wolf picked up about<sup>23</sup> 85 of these lines for his edition. Subtract these lines from our printed Vulgate and you have the lines of the Alpha text and those of Aristarchus.

Still more important is the insight gained into the procedure of the transmission of the text. Whenever two manuscripts differ—bar "surface corruptions"—by the presence or the absence of a passage (never more than three lines long in the manuscripts of the *Iliad*) the passage has not been excised in the manuscript that lacks it, but has been added in the manuscript that contains it. It seemed reasonable to assume that before 150 B. C. the procedure was the same and I tested the idea.

<sup>21</sup> Calculations are given in my *External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford, 1925), p. 45.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *J. E. A.*, XIV (1928), pp. 78-81. Both of the others also show important deviations.

<sup>23</sup> For a few lines the evidence is inconclusive.

Opposed to this is the theory that the Vulgate was not something new in 150 B. C., but something that had existed at least since the 5th century. To maintain this was possible in 1898 when the Ptolemaic material was rather slight—the Petrie papyrus (P8) with parts of Α, the Geneva papyrus (P5) with parts of ΑΜ, a small fraction of P7 with parts of Θ, and a small fraction of P12 with parts of ΦΧΨ. Ludwich could brush that evidence off by doubts about their date, by questioning the possibility of restoring them, by regarding them as at best examples of "wild" "expanded" texts the existence of which need occasion no surprise. But by 1906 the papyrus material had increased greatly, and since then it has continued to grow.

We now have for the *Iliad*<sup>24</sup> some scraps (P266: A 485-491, P317: Z 448-55, P59: Π 484-9) so small (6-8 lines) that they cannot be expected to yield any information; a somewhat longer fragment (P269: A 539-48, 561-74) that does not diverge greatly from the Vulgate. Also we have in addition to the two papyri (P5,8) known to Ludwich, a great increase of his fractional knowledge of P7 and P12, and later discoveries: P40 with parts of ΒΓ, P41 with parts of ΓΔΕ, P217 and P342 with parts of Μ, and another papyrus in Hamburg said to come from an expanded text of the same book. All eight of these differ clearly from the Alpha text, and there is nothing to contrast with them. To brush this evidence off is no longer possible, and speaking of "eccentric" texts seems now rather quaint.

The quotations—Ludwich's chief reliance—are not suited to yield much information about the lines in the quoter's text, and thus show whether it was vulgate or "eccentric." I plan to speak of this in the introduction to my forthcoming edition of the *Iliad* and shall here say merely that what indications there are favor the no-excisions hypothesis I advocate.

To test this hypothesis I assembled in my *External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford, 1925) all the passages for which there exists evidence that there once were manuscripts that lacked them. The hypothesis stood the testing well, and I drew the conclusion that a reconstitution of the Peisistratean text must not contain them. I noted also (p. 253) that there must be others of the sort, undetected because of the fragmentary nature

<sup>24</sup> For the *Odyssey* conditions are similar, cf. especially P. Jouguet, ed. Guéraud, *Rev. de l'Ég. anc.*, I, pp. 1 ff.

of our information, and that some of these might "lurk among the lines athetized by the Alexandrians."

In 1933 there began in India under the leadership of V. S. Sukthankar the first critical editing of the *Mahābhārata*—an enormous task and carried out in exemplary fashion. It brought to light the fact that the procedure in the tradition of the *Mahābhārata* was the same as that which can be observed in the transmission of the lines of Homer from Aristarchus through the Alpha papyri to the Vulgate manuscripts, and which I had posited for the period before Aristarchus. In the introduction to his edition of the second book Edgerton says of passages such as I deal with: "these are not 'omissions' in the recension that lacks them, but secondary insertions in those that contain them."

Meanwhile I had been hunting among the athetized lines for other possible interpolations. In doing this I came to appreciate better an idea of Sengebusch and of Ludwich that Aristarchus would not athetize a line unless he had manuscript evidence against it; and furthermore to see that the same was true of Zenodotus. In other words an athetesis by any of the great Alexandrians permits us to infer the existence of manuscripts with and manuscripts without the passage athetized. In that case it must—bar surface corruptions—be interpolated, and must be excluded from a reconstitution of the Peisistratean text. In this way we reach for the sixth century a text of the *Iliad* about 1000 lines shorter than that of Aristarchus, with the probability that some lines of this sort are still undetected. It seemed worth while to pause at this point and present the result in a text of the *Iliad*.

Then problems of the type I have been keeping in the background came to the front. How are the Peisistratean lines to be worded? The selection of a target of definite date has rendered the answer to that question in some ways easier. Obviously all post-Hellenistic, all Hellenistic, all Attic forms not created before the 5th century must go out. The new understanding of the history of the tradition helps likewise. All our manuscripts reduce practically to a single manuscript written about 150 B. C. Aristarchus' edition is but slightly older; before that was the edition of Zenodotus (who has turned out to be a conservative critic) and the indirect tradition—the quotations and the imitations. All of these can give only what *οἱ μεταγράψαμενοι* made out

of the older writing that was before them. We can put it back into the archaic alphabet, and when that is ambiguous (as it frequently is) we are free to interpret it in whatever way seems best. That is not making an emendation.

The great difficulty that remains is how far was the Peisistratean text Atticized. To some extent certainly; for there are, to use Wackernagel's phrase, "Atticisms of the poet"—that is, Attic forms not brought into the text in the course of its transmission but in it from the start. I am far from believing that I have succeeded in a complete solution of this and other problems. I hope that the working at them will continue and will meet with greater success.

With the constitution of the Peisistratean text the task of an editor—in the strict sense—is completed. Much remains for others to do. The poem is there and its existence must be accounted for. That demands two things: an analysis of the composition of the poem; and an understanding of the development of the speech it records. The two must go hand-in-hand. Wilhelm von Humboldt was right in calling the language the *cardo rerum*. With the language one must begin, and with the language one must end; for no analysis can be regarded as satisfactory unless it leads to an orderly picture of the development of the language. It should be possible to recognize various compositional units—sources of our poem—and to assign them to the proper linguistic stage. They can then be written in the form they once had.<sup>25</sup> That is the ultimate goal, but one far beyond strictly editorial activity.

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<sup>25</sup>This has been attempted repeatedly: for single passages by many scholars; for connected texts cf. Bechtel's *Ur-Ilias* and "*Ektropos 'Avalpeōs*," ap. Robert, *Studien zur Ilias* (Berlin, 1901).

## PLAUTINE CHRONOLOGY.

The following remarks may be regarded as complementary to Charles H. Buck's Johns Hopkins dissertation *A Chronology of the Plays of Plautus* (Baltimore, 1940). Apart from the positive results obtained, the writer does excellent service in summing up previous work, so that one stands on sure ground for further investigation. Perhaps his most striking discovery (pp. 14 f.) is what I think is the certain explanation of the *instauraciones* recorded by Livy, i. e. that they represent a response to the popular demand for the repetition of a successful play, and that the religious motive was a mere pretext. This is strongly supported by Dio, LX, 6, 4, who mentions as many as ten repetitions, and says that Claudius put a stop to the practice. (The repetition of the *Eunuchus* on the same day [Donatus, *praef. ad Eun.*], however, may have been merely in the nature of an encore.) I agree that the unprecedented number of seven in B. C. 205 was certainly due to the success of the *Miles*, which must have been a landmark in Roman comedy (p. 16). Apart from this case, however, these records do not help to date the plays, though Buck makes the attractive suggestion that the great increase in the number of days on which plays were performed in the period 214-200 (145, including *instauraciones*) was due to Plautus' own popularity (p. 17) — his only serious rival was Naevius. (The only other comic poets known in this period are Livius Andronicus and probably Licinius Tegula [apparently identical with Licinius Imbrex, of whom Ribbeck gives three fragments],<sup>1</sup> who Livy [XXXI, 12,10] says wrote the hymn to Juno in 200.)

After the Punic wars, Plautus must have been for some time the *only* comic poet at Rome of any note (there may have been others, e. g. Luscius Lanuvinus, the *vetus poeta* of Terence). Now, however keen he may have been *nummum in loculos demittere*, it is too much to expect he could have written more than say three plays *per annum*, whereas five at least must have been needed, not to count special occasions—votive and funeral games, etc. The natural inference is that to fill the gap plays were *revived*. On what grounds Buck (p. 5) denies this I do not know; from *Bacch.* 214 f.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Teuffel, *Röm. Lit.*<sup>6</sup>, § 107. 4.

etiam Epidicum, quam ego fabulam aequa ac me ipsum amo,  
nullam aequa invitus specto, si agit Pellio

it seems a certain inference that the *Epidicus* was revived several times; while the parallel scenes in *Stich.* and *Poen.*, besides much evidence of retraction in other plays,<sup>2</sup> also point to revival (sometimes, no doubt, after Plautus' death). The *Casina* prologue, however (137 B. C.? cf. *C. Q.*, 1930, p. 106) shows that by that time revivals had ceased for many years—there had been no lack of poets to produce new plays.

The lines from the *Bacchides* lead to some interesting speculations. Obviously at some time between the production of *Epidicus* and that of *Bacchides* Plautus had broken with Pellio. *Bacchides* is known to have been produced in 189 (Buck, p. 41): is it possible to date *Epidicus*? Buck points to the reference to colonies in line 343, which I agree is a quite definite contemporary allusion, and quotes Velleius to show that for some time after the Punic wars there were no new colonies, but in 194 eight—which is a clear indication of date. I find another indication in line 33: referring to *ριψάσπιδες* the speaker says *ante alios fuit* (sc. *honori*), a very striking expression, which I think refers to the state of things mentioned by Livy (XXXIII, 36 f., 196 B. C.): Marcellus was surprised by the Boii, and several distinguished men killed: *triumphus ei magno consensu patrum est decretus* (over the Insubres and Comenses): *Boiorum triumphi spem colleague reliquit*. Similarly, 25-27: the pro-consul Tuditanus was routed and killed in Spain with many distinguished men; at the same time his predecessor Blasio received an ovation.<sup>3</sup>

These considerations lead us to a date about 195—the reference to colonies could come before the actual colonisation (cf. *Pseud.* 1100)—and under the circumstances the reference to the “new look” (*ut nove*, line 222), long ago referred to the repeal of the Lex Oppia, may be accepted.<sup>3a</sup> It seems clear to me that there

<sup>2</sup> Cornelia C. Coulter, “Retractatio” in the Ambrosian and Palatine Recensions of Plautus (Baltimore, 1911).

<sup>3</sup> There is a similar reference in *Trin.* 1034, which Ritschl (*Parerga*, p. 339) showed not to be before 194, when the Megalesia first became scenic: the reference to the new aediles would be most apposite the first year in which it could be made. Topical jokes depend for their point upon novelty, a fact not without weight in these investigations.

<sup>3a</sup> If we date *Epidicus* 195, we may, with Ladewig, find in lines 166 f.

must have been a longish interval between *Epidicus* and *Bacchides*, but Buck puts *Epidicus* in 190, apparently for the sole reason that in *Bacchides* there is no reference to the *Pseudolus* of 191, an infinitely better play. But if Plautus had quarrelled with Pellio, Pellio would not have acted in *Pseudolus*. *Epidicus* may well have been the last play of Plautus in which Pellio acted. It is possible that Pellio had bought the *Epidicus* from Plautus (as actor-manager), and by repeating it, had to some extent queered the pitch for Plautus' new plays. Note that the words *si agit Pellio* imply that others than Pellio had taken the part. (The lines in the *Bacchides* would gain in point if Plautus himself took the part of Chrysalus [Buck, p. 14, note 11] but by 189 he would be rather old for the exacting work of a comic actor: cf. Terence, *Haut.* 35-45.)

While we are on the subject of Pellio, attention must be called to *Men.* 404: *quasi supellex pellionis, palus palo proximust.* It will hardly be denied that the audience cannot have failed to see a pun in the line, with a side-reference to the wardrobe in which Pellio kept his costumes; if so, this too will be before the quarrel. I would put it *ca.* 194, which would agree with the comparative fewness of lyrics and personal allusions.

With regard to the early group, *Asinaria-Stichus*, 207 (212?)—200, it can be taken as certain that *Asinaria* and *Mercator* are the earliest, while the dates 205, 203-2, 200 are definitely established for *Miles*, *Cistellaria*, *Stichus* (*Asinaria* was probably 207 rather than 212: Enk finds affinities with *Mercator* [in his edition of that play], F. W. Hall [*C. Q.*, 1926, p. 20] with *Miles*).

*Asinaria* and *Mercator* are connected 1) by the name Maccus in the prologue (the only two cases), 2) by runs of iambic octonarii without diaeresis (cf. Lindsay, *Early Latin Verse*, p. 108). *Cistellaria* and *Stichus*, both from Menander, are each introduced by a highly lyrical scene between women, and marked by a sentimental tone, in *Stichus* at the beginning only (it soon gives way to farce), but no doubt further maintained by Menander, to whom the play we have probably bears little relation (cf. *C. R.*, 1925, pp. 55 ff.) (The extensive Plautine addition

an echo of Cato's famous speech of that year on the Lex Oppia (Livy, XXXIV, 4, 16). The reference to parricides, *Epid.* 349 ff. (cf. Plutarch, *Rom.*, 22 *ult.*) offers rough confirmation.

tions in *Miles* and *Stichus* show that at a comparatively early stage in his career Plantus was capable of writing long stretches of independent work.) The earliness would account for some at least of the peculiarities which led Havet to deny Plantus' authorship of the *Asinaria* (see the Budé edition). Indeed Havet proves too much: on his showing the play can hardly have been old at all, and if not, it would not have been accepted by *all* Roman critics.

Turning to the rest of the plays, i. e. those after 200, I think Buck's date of 186 for *Persa* may be taken as established, and *ca.* 191 for *Poenulus* as highly probable. The remainder I consider not proven, though I think 193 for *Curculio* (reference to usurers) is very likely (Buck, p. 64). For *Aulularia* I consider the most likely date 191, the first *ieiuminium Cereris* (Buck, p. 37), borne out perhaps by the reference to the plump *tibicina* in line 332 (cf. *Poenulus* 1416). In *Truculentus* the reference to lying accounts of alleged victories might connect either with Cato's speech *De Falsis Pugnis*, 190 B. C. (Bergk), or Tenney Frank's identification of *Homeronida* with Ennius, making the date 186 (Buck, p. 103). But as *Rud.* 994 = *Truc.* 119, and like *Pseudolus* (of 191) refers to the Lex Plaetoria, the balance of evidence is on the whole in favour of 190 for *Truculentus*, especially as it has verbal similarities to *Bacchides* of 189. *Rudens* would be soon after 190, but as it has very striking verbal similarities to *Amphitruo*, we should have to put *Amphitruo* about the same time (Buck's very ingenious arguments for 187-6 do not convince me). Reference to the Boii puts *Captivi* after 191, and the reference to corners in food suggests 189. The date of *Mostellaria* is quite uncertain, though Pasquali (*Riv. Fil.*, LV [1927], p. 30) sees affinities with the *Captivi*, and it bears every mark of Plautus' latest technique.

We thus get a series approximately as follows: *Epidicus* 195, *Trinummus* 194, *Menaechmi* 194, *Curculio* 193, *Poenulus* 191, *Truculentus* 190, *Bacchides* 189, *Rudens* 189, *Captivi* 189, *Amphitruo* 188, *Persa* 186, *Casina* 184. If these dates are even approximately correct, which I think is undeniable, we are faced with the remarkable fact that, of the twenty plays, there are five from 207 to 200, fifteen from 195 to 184, and none at all from 199 to 196 (or 195 according to Buck). Any attempt to explain this must be highly speculative, but certain points are worth considering.

Our 21 Varronian plays are not the only plays Varro thought genuine, but those whose authenticity was admitted by all (Teuffel, § 96. 4). Plautus must have written many more, even if we confine his activity to the period 207-184, several a year in all probability when he was the only notable comic poet at Rome.<sup>4</sup> Many plays would be accepted or rejected by Roman critics on purely subjective grounds of style, etc., and while we can place some confidence in the judgment of expert scholars like Stilo and Varro, many critics, like Volcatius Sedigitus and, I suspect, even Accius would be mere dilettanti. On the whole, then, we may accept with some confidence the extra 19 plays admitted by Varro, which bring the total up to 40, still far fewer than Plautus must have written.<sup>5</sup>

The question arises what credit we can give to the *didascaliae*, and this resolves itself into the question of their origin.<sup>6</sup> It is usually thought that they represent the result of the investigations of ancient scholars, especially Varro's *De Actis Scaenicis*, and that they are based on the records of the magistrates; but the contents rather suggest that they came from the stage-managers. It is unsafe to argue from the Terentian *didascaliae*, which date from a time when records were more systematically kept (yet even these contain mistakes, e. g. the *Hecyra* is attributed in the Bembinus to Menander). For the *Stichus*, the only complete example for Plautus, we have, besides title, author's name, and Greek original, (1) date of production, (2) composer of music, (3) nature of music (instruments required), (4) original actor—followed by *Personae* (which must have been added when masks were introduced, after the time of Terence), a list of masks required, much as in modern theatrical catalogues we find 5 M, 3 F, and so on. (So too the scene-headings meet the requirements of the producer, rather than of the reader.)

Now this strongly suggests not state or any official records, but information for the use of the producer, quite different from what we have in Greek, compiled for readers by scholars, and based on public records.

<sup>4</sup> *Saturio* and *Addictus* are known to be before 207 (Gellius, III, 3, 14). Cf. Buck, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> The *Hauptwerk* is Ritschl's *Fabulae Varronianae (Parerga*, pp. 71 ff.).

<sup>6</sup> See especially Michaud, *Sur les Tréteaux Latins* (Paris, 1912).

In Plautus' time magistrates were no more interested in what they paid the proprietor of a play than the proprietor of gladiators or *funambuli*. That is why the records of Plautus and his contemporaries were so ill-preserved. If a play held the stage, there was some prospect of the stage-records being preserved; if not, they would almost inevitably get lost. Hence the hopeless confusion of Accius about early chronology (Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*,<sup>2</sup> p. 66), and the uncertainty of attribution of plays to Plautus in the time of Varro (Teuffel, pp. 168 f.): it is probable that by then most extant copies would have no original *didascalia* at all. The priestly records used by Livy, or his sources (Buck, p. 7, note 11), would be concerned only with the religious aspect, the *instauratio*, and quite probably did not even mention the poet. The aediles would give the name of the poet, and perhaps of the play, the price paid, and little or nothing else—they dealt with the producer, not the poet (at Athens, owing to competitions, conditions were quite different). In such circumstances, some of the details of a *didascalia* could not be supplied by ancient scholars, and numerous revivals with consequent retraction would add to the confusion. This is borne out by the Ambrosian palimpsest, which had *didascaliae* for *Stichus*, *Pseudolus*, *Vidularia* and probably *Rudens*, but apparently not for *Mercator*, *Trinummus*, and *Persa*—for the rest it is impossible to say (Lindsay, *Anc. Editions of Plautus*, p. 88). In some cases it may not have been possible even to identify the Greek original: Athenaeus (336 D) says he had read more than 800 plays of the Middle Comedy alone—I doubt if Varro had access, for example, to Demophilus' *Onagos* (*Onagros*?). It was the enormous number of Greek comedies and Latin adaptations which gave plausibility to Terence's statement (*Eun.* 34) that he did not know the *Colax* of Menander had already been translated.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>2</sup> We are apt to overlook the scantiness of our knowledge of ancient literature. But for Plautus we should have known nothing of Demophilus or the *Achilles* of Aristarchus, and nothing of the comic poet Plautius, had not Varro mentioned the confusion caused by the similarity of names; nor of Luscius Lanuvinus but for Terence. Several comic poets in Ribbeck are known only by two or three fragments. (The alternative titles also were confusing: *Syra* in Festus for the *Cist.*, however, seems not a third title, but a misreading of the first letters of *Synaristosae*.)

I should say that down to about 195 B. C. the records existing in Varro's time were very scanty—the *Stichus* may have been a lucky accident. *Asinaria* and *Mercator* mention Plautus' name in the prologue; *Miles* was famous; about *Cistellaria* we do not know. (Still the choice of attribution in the early period would lie practically only between Naevius and Plautus.) From 202 (or earlier), then, to 195, apart from *Stichus* there was apparently no external evidence in Varro's time guaranteeing Plautus' authorship of any particular play, so that, however certain he felt about it, he could not count it among the "universally accepted." Finally, combining all the results known to me, I suggest as very nearly correct the following chronology:<sup>8</sup>

<i>Asin.</i>	207	<i>Men.</i>	194	<i>Rud.</i>	189
<i>Merc.</i>	206	<i>Curc.</i>	193	<i>Capt.</i>	189
<i>Mil.</i>	205	<i>Poen.</i>	191	( <i>Most.</i> )	188?
<i>Cist.</i>	203-2	<i>Aul.</i>	191	<i>Amph.</i>	188
<i>Stich.</i>	200	<i>Pseud.</i>	191	<i>Persa</i>	186
<i>Epid.</i>	195	<i>Truc.</i>	190	<i>Cas.</i>	184
<i>Trin.</i>	194	<i>Bacch.</i>	189		

Referring to the metrical tests which I suggested in the *Class. Review*, 1925 and *Class. Quarterly*, 1930, it will be seen that they hold their ground in the definitely early group 207-200 (except for the badly mutilated *Cistellaria*) and in the late *Persa* and *Casina*. I noted at the time that *Poenulus* had far fewer lyrics than we expected for its date, pointing out that the double ending indicated extensive retraction; likewise I suggested that the high proportion in *Epidicus* was due to the shortening it has evidently undergone. But the whole group, *Epidicus* to *Amphitruo*, 195-188, thirteen plays in eight years, is much too close together for the lyric test to carry much weight.

When I wrote, I hoped that someone would approach the problem from a new angle: this Buck has done, and done well, and I think we have now reached a stage at which we can point to

<sup>8</sup> This list roughly agrees with that of J. H. Hough in *A.J.P.*, 1934, pp. 346 ff. (and *C.P.*, 1935, pp. 43 ff.) except for *Poenulus* and *Menaechmi*. I think *Poenulus* at least must be put much later than Hough puts it: Plautus could hardly have staged such a sympathetic Carthaginian till some considerable time after the war. See also E. V. Arnold on the development of Plautine anapaestics, *C.R.*, 1925, pp. 7-8 (cf. F. W. Hall in *C.Q.*, 1926, p. 1).

definite results, and a chronology which can claim to be in the main established with only a small margin of error. Many "eccentric" datings have, it may be hoped, been finally put out of court, though one which had been thought among the most eccentric, Radermacher's of *Asinaria* in 212 (Buck, p. 32) has been surprisingly vindicated (I would refer it, however, with Buck [*loc. cit.*], to a Scipio of 207, not 212). It still remains to establish details, but we can now study the plays in groups, which should produce some interesting results, and throw fresh light on Plautus' workmanship.

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## HERACLITUS AND DEATH IN BATTLE (FR. 24D).

Heraclitus, fr. 24 (Diels), is quoted by Clement in the course of a long discussion of the compensations for martyrdom: *Stromateis*, IV, 16, 1 (II, p. 255, Stählin): *εἴτα Ἡράκλειτος μέν φησιν· ἀρηψάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι. καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας γράφει· τῶν δὲ δῆ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὃς ἀν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ, ἀρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;* Another version of the fragment occurs in Theodoretus, *Therap.*, 8, 39, where it is separated only by the words *καὶ πάλιν* from an inaccurate reproduction of fr. 25D, also quoted in its most original form by Clement: *μόροι [γὰρ] μείζονες μείζονας μοίρας λαγχάνονται.* There is indeed a close connexion in sense between the two fragments, but no significance should be attached to the juxtaposition in Theodoretus, since it is quite clear that he has culled both quotations straight from Clement, on whom he largely depends for his own discussion in this section of the honour gained by martyrs. More important is the Platonic passage, *Rep.*, V, 468e, reproduced in Clement's quotation above. The observation is of course a commonplace in Greek literature, but the restrictive clause *ὅς ἀν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ* is in sharp contrast with the inclusiveness of Heraclitus; Plato (who typifies the usual Greek sentiment on this point) holds that he *who has distinguished himself* in battle, and so meets his death, is raised above the rest of men, but Heraclitus asserts that "Gods and men honour the slain in war," without stipulating valour or otherwise. This distinction would appear to be too nice a one, in view of the conciseness and economy of the Heraclitean style, if there were not other evidence to show that Heraclitus is not on this occasion simply re-echoing a popular sentiment, but intends to emphasize the suddenness rather than the seemliness of death in battle, and to ground this commendation upon his general theory of the nature of the soul.

A scholion on the Bodleian codex of Epictetus, 157a (*vide* Teubner edition of Epictetus, 1916, ed. Schenkl, p. lxxxiii) reads as follows: *Ἡρακλείτου· ψυχὰ ἀρηψάτοι καθερώτεραι (sic) ἡ ἐν νούσοις.* Disregarding a somewhat naive and unreasoned acceptance of this verse as Heraclitean by K. Praechter, *Philologus*,

LVIII (1899), pp. 473 f., Diels held it to be merely a Byzantine play upon this fragment 24, and classed it among the doubtful and false fragments as no. 136 (22B136 in *Vors.*<sup>5</sup>, ed. Kranz). Certainly the general similarity and especially the recurrence of the epic word ἀργίφατος show that the author of the verse had this fragment, or conceivably a different but similar saying of Heraclitus, in mind: but should the author be put as late as the Byzantine period? Interest in Heraclitus was certainly still alive then, but so far as I know there is no other evidence for any Byzantine verse version or commentary on his work, and it is rather unlikely that a reading of the *Stromateis* would inspire anyone, even a Byzantine scholar, to the composition of hexametrical exegeses of Clement's sources. This point is important, for Clement, just before quoting our fragment, had reproduced a contrast between death in battle and death in sickness which he attributes not to Heraclitus but to "the ancients," and it might just be maintained that this is the reason for the mention of νούσους in the verse quoted by the scholiast: *Strom.*, IV, 14, 4 (II, p. 255, 3, Stählin): *καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ δὲ τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων τὴν τελευτὴν ἐπαινοῦσιν, οὐ τὸ βιαίως ἀποθήσκειν συμβουλεύοντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ κατὰ πόλεμον τελευτῶν ἀδεῆς τοῦ θανεῖν ἀπήλλακται, ἀποτμηθεὶς τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ προκαμὼν τῇ ψυχῇ οὐδὲ καταμαλακιθείς, οἷα περὶ τὰς νόσους πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι. ἀπαλλάττονται γὰρ θηλυκενόμενοι καὶ ἴμειρόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ καθαρὰν ἀπολύνουσιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μεθ' ἑαυτῆς φερομένην, εἰ μή τινες τούτων ἔλλογιμοι κατ' ἀρετὴν γεγόνασιν. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ μετ' ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀποθήσκουσιν, οὐδὲν οὕτοι διαφέροντες <ἢ> εἰ καὶ νόσῳ κατεμαραίνοντο.* I shall return to this passage later.

There are preserved at least three other phrases attributed to Heraclitus and cast in a hexameter form: fr. 3D, from Aetius: εὗρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείον; fr. 100D, from Plutarch: ὥρας αἱ πάντα φέρουσι; and fr. 137D, from Stobaeus: εἰμαρμένα πάντως. On the other hand metrical endings to continuous prose fragments must be explained by the strong influence of epic phraseology on the earliest Greek prose: so Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, p. 88, n. 1 (cited by Heidel, "On Certain Fragments," etc., *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XLVIII [1912-13], especially pp. 709 ff., who deals well with verse commentaries on Heraclitus). The most striking case of this is the final words of fr. 5D: οὐ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδὲ ἡρωας οἴτινές εἰσι. Now the case of

fr. 100D gives Plutarch's time as a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of a hexameter version of Heraclitus, while the *ειμαρρένα* of fr. 137D suggests Stoic influence. We know from the account given by Diogenes Laertius, IX, 1-17 that several works on Heraclitus were composed during this period, and at IX, 15 we hear of two Stoic commentators: πλείστοι τέ εἰσιν ὅσοι ἔξηγηνται αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα· καὶ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Ἡρακλεῖδης ὁ Ποντικὸς, Κλεάνθης τε καὶ Σφαιρός ὁ Στωικός, πρὸς δὲ Πανσανίας κτλ. Diogenes says elsewhere that Cleanthes composed four books of *ἔξηγήσεις* on Heraclitus, apparently his longest work. He does not mention verse commentaries, but in view of the pronounced Heraclitean echoes in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, written in hexameters, the possibility suggested by Heidel, *loc. cit.*, that Cleanthes was the author of a hexameter version which may have been the source of extant metrical phrases cannot be ignored. Scythinus, the iambic poet, certainly produced a metrical version of Heraclitus: Diogenes, IX, 16: Ιερώνυμος δέ φησι καὶ Σκυθίνον τὸν τῶν Ιάμβων ποιητὴν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον διὰ μέτρον ἐκβάλλειν. Of course "iambic poets" did occasionally employ hexameters, and the trochaic lines quoted from Scythinus by Plutarch, *De Pyth. Or.*, 16, p. 402a, might come from a poem on Stoicism as much as from one on Heraclitus.

It seems therefore permissible to conclude that a hexameter line attributed to Heraclitus by a Byzantine scholiast may have been, and probably was, composed during the centuries which followed the revival of interest in Heraclitus fostered by the Stoics; and that the author of it, if not actually Cleanthes or Scythinus, may well have been roughly contemporary with them and stimulated by their example. This means that the content of the hexameter line, if it be not entirely reproduced from an extant fragment, is likely to be based either on some unknown saying of Heraclitus or on conventional Stoic doctrine. Now it is obvious that the statement "souls slain in war are purer than those which perish in diseases" is mainly based upon our fr. 24 from which, as has been observed, it takes the archaic word *ἀργίφατοι*; but that fragment only deals with death in war, and does not mention disease. Is this additional matter to be considered Stoic or Heraclitean? It may be said at once that there is no trace of any Stoic contrast between death in war and in sickness; and popular belief, while it held the former to be more

admirable, did not postulate any special effect on the *ψυχή*. The deduction is that the author of the hexameter verse is referring to a doctrine of Heraclitus about which we have no other direct information.

I believe that it is possible to deduce from other Heraclitean fragments about the soul what this special doctrine was, and that this contrast between sudden and protracted deaths confirms the only hypothesis on which Heraclitus' psychological pronouncements have any consistency. Fr. 36D asserts that it is death to souls to become water: *ψυχῆσιν θάνατος ὑδωρ γενέσθαι*. Here *θάνατος* has its special Heraclitean meaning of change from one basic form of matter to another. We are also told that the dry soul is the wisest and best: fr. 118D, *αὕη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. Conversely stupidity and inefficiency mean that the soul is moist; in fr. 117D the drunken man is characterized as *ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων*. It is not too much to deduce that Heraclitus considered the soul to be made of fire, or a form of fire: in fr. 36D the sequence of "deaths" is soul-water-earth, while in fr. 31D, which is concerned with material change on the cosmic scale, the *τροπαῖ* are fire-water-earth; thus soul in the one fragment fills the place taken by fire in the other. Now it is tempting to assume that on the death of the body the soul always undergoes its own "death" of becoming water; but having become water it is no longer soul, yet in some fragments Heraclitus definitely assumes a continued existence, after the death of the body, for some souls at any rate: fr. 98D, "souls use smell in Hades"; fr. 25D, "greater deaths gain greater portions"; fr. 63D, ". . . they become guardians, awake, of living and dead." Fr. 27D, "there await men when they are dead things which they neither expect nor suppose" could mean anything, and fr. 62D, "immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, etc." might be taken as a further example of the coincidence of opposites rather than a conscious doctrine of the soul: but the total agglomeration of evidence is convincing. One fragment in particular is important as a possible clue to the nature of this survival: fr. 98D, *αἱ ψυχαὶ ὁσμῶνται καθ' Αἰδην*. In speaking of "Hades" Heraclitus is making a concession to the established phraseology of Homeric religion, and it is conceivable that the intention of the whole fragment is simply to recapitulate the ancient view that the *ψυχή* is breath; the sense of smell involves breathing in through

the nose, and so this sense might be retained by souls after separation from the body. Yet although Heraclitus often used the language of popular religion, and even maintained that it unintentionally contained a degree of truth, I do not believe that he was ever content simply to reproduce its more naive beliefs, especially when his own views were inconsistent with them. (It is possible that the intention here is ironical; but direct attacks on religion, especially when phrased in picturesque terms, seem to have been carefully recorded as such during this period, as in the case of Xenophanes.) The key word is *όσμανται*; and if we examine the evidence for early views on the nature of the sense of smell, we discover that it is normally associated with dryness. Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, 30, attributed to Anaxagoras the theory that smell is a form of air, and that it is intensified by rarity and heat: *ὅζειν μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα, θερμανόμενον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μανούμενον ὅζειν*. Plato and Aristotle held a similar view; but most important is the evidence of the Hippocratean work *περὶ σαρκῶν*, which, although it may not be earlier than the early fourth century, may represent the common medical view: *π. σαρκῶν*, 16: *όσφραινεται δ' ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ὑγρὸς ἐών ἀντὸς τῶν ξηρῶν . . . καὶ ὅταν μὲν ξηρὰ ἢ τὰ κοῖλα τῆς ρίνος, ὁσμᾶσθαι τῶν ξηροτέρων αντὸς ἐώντον ἀκριβέστερός ἔστι. ὑδατος γὰρ οὐκ ὄσμᾶται*. Here it is clear that *ὑγρὸς ἐών* must mean *relatively moist* (to the object smelled) from the words, “it is more accurate in smelling the things drier than itself.” Perhaps too much importance should not be attached to Aristotle’s specific attribution to Heraclitus, at *De Sensu*, 5, 443a21 ff., of the supposedly general view that smell is connected with the dry exhalation: for Aristotle is reading this view into fr. 7D, which he then quotes, and this fragment clearly presents a purely hypothetical case—“if everything were smoke”—to show that unity and diversity can coexist in the same subject; it is not concerned with the actualities of sense-perception at all. This is not the place to demonstrate that the *ξηρὴ οὐ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις*, which Aristotle in the *Meteorologica* firmly attributes to Heraclitus, is in fact his own invention and merely corresponds with some aspects of Heraclitus’ fire; but I believe this to be the case. Plutarch appears to combine this belief with another opinion ascribed to Heraclitus by doxographic sources, that the heavenly bodies are nourished by the *moist ἀναθυμίασις*, for in quoting this fr. 98D at *De Fac.*, 28, 943d, he

says that the blessed souls which rise to the region round the moon are strengthened by the aether there, ὅστε ὑπὸ τῆς τυχούσης ἀναθυμάσεως τρέφεσθαι· καὶ καλῶς Ἡράκλειος εἶπεν ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ ὁσμῶνται κτλ. Now it is possible, as Mr. W. Hamilton has observed to me, that the context of Plutarch's quotation to some extent corresponds with and gives a clue to the context of Heraclitus' saying as he found it; if this is so, it supports the main contention that some souls at any rate survive the death of the body in a fiery state. (Rohde's theory, *Psyche*, Eng. trans., pp. 393 f., that the souls in fr. 98D have already turned to water, earth, and water again, and are now breathing in fire in the process of being reconstituted as souls, postulates an inaccurate use by Heraclitus both of *ψυχή* and of *ὁσμᾶσθαι*.)

Assuming that Heraclitus may have held some such view, the fragment in question takes on a new significance: souls use smell in Hades because they are surrounded by dry matter, than which they are but little less dry. When one recalls that the soul in life was by implication characterized as a form of fire, it is not difficult to deduce that Heraclitus' "Hades" is a realm of fire, in which the disembodied souls are themselves fiery. But what of fr. 36D, "it is death to souls to become water?" The answer must be that this statement is not inclusive: becoming water does in fact mean "death" to souls, but not all souls suffer this "death" on the death of the body. Some retain their fiery character and rejoin the mass of pure fire in the world; and since dryness, i. e. greater fieriness, was in life held to be the condition of wisdom and excellence, it follows that those souls which remain fiery and do not undergo the death of becoming water are the souls of the virtuous, and that the association with pure fire is the after-life which Heraclitus seems to promise in the fragments already quoted. This is indeed approximately the view reached years ago by Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed., pp. 153 f.), and subjected to ridicule ever since; admittedly Burnet's conclusion was reached intuitively rather than rationally, and nevertheless proposed somewhat dogmatically; but I believe that in essence it is correct (what is not correct is that the soul can suffer a "death" of becoming fire: there can be no excess of fire for souls), and that it is substantiated by the considerations I have put forward here. The criticisms of other scholars have been based mainly upon their misinterpretation of *θάνατος* in fr.

36D, and upon the arguments advanced by e. g. Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 392 f., against the possibility of survival of the *individual* soul in Heraclitus. With these arguments I should entirely agree, merely observing that for Heraclitus fire is apparently a more primary and "better" kind of matter than water, and that therefore even non-individual survival as fire is preferable to survival as water, quite apart from the consideration that the world-mass of fire (of which souls are a part) may be thought of as percipient and intelligent, which water certainly is not. While it is not necessary to assume with Burnet (*op. cit.*, p. 154, n. 2) and others that Heraclitus is guilty of a major inconsistency on this point, it is certainly probable that he had not fully worked out the implications of his doctrine of the soul, or, for that matter, of his views on material change in general: thus the good souls which remain as fire on the death of the body must *at some time* undergo the *τροπή* to water from which no fire is exempt.

If, then, when the body dies the soul either becomes water or remains fiery, and becomes more fiery still, what is the factor which determines this issue? Clearly, the composition of the soul at the moment of death; the soul in life contains varying proportions of fire and moisture, according as it is wise or foolish, percipient or unpercipient; if the amount of water at the moment of death exceeds the amount of fire, presumably the soul as a whole suffers the "death" of turning to water: but if the soul is predominantly "dry," then it escapes the "death" of becoming water and joins the world-mass of fire. This is deduction, but I think permissible deduction.

To return now to the verse in the scholion on Epictetus: if souls slain in war are called "purer" than those which perish in sickness, their purity must consist in their dryness or fieriness; *καθαρός* applied to the soul must be non-Heraclitean, and dependent upon the development of the Orphico-Pythagorean idea of *κάθαρος*, by which Heraclitus was apparently unaffected. The question immediately presents itself, why souls in sickness become moist. Again a partial answer is fairly plain: that sickness for Heraclitus *necessarily* involved a moistening of the soul. This may be deduced from one of the most difficult of all the fragments, 26D (this is not the place to discuss the textual difficulties, which are indeed irrelevant to the point in question; the text given is that proposed by Wilamowitz and followed by Kranz and Rein-

hardt) : ἀνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαύτῳ ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις· ξῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεῶτος εῦδων, ἐγρηγορώς ἄπτεται εῦδοντος. The point is that in sleep a man's vision (which depends, like all the senses, upon the operation of the soul) is extinguished, and he touches death, which in this case involves the soul becoming water; it is not too much to assume therefore that the soul is to some extent extinguished and its fire diminished by an increase of water—this is why he touches death, because the soul is approaching the completely watery state which means its *θάνατος*. The man is kindled as an inferior deceptive light for himself, and lives in a private world of dreams in which he is out of contact with τὸ ξυνόν but has an *iδιάν φρόνησιν* (fr. 2D); he sees things peculiar to himself alone (fr. 17D, *ἔωντοῖσι δὲ δοκέονσι*) since he has turned away from the apprehension of the plan of all things (fr. 89D, *εἰς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι*). When Heraclitus refers in fr. 1D to the foolish generality of men who do not know what they are really doing when awake, he says they do not differ from their sleeping state: in both cases, we may observe, their souls are moist.

This may suffice to establish that for Heraclitus sleep involved a temporary extinction of a part of the fire in the soul, and its replacement by water. Now compare sleep and sickness; in both cases the subject is midway between life and death: in sickness a man suffers delirium, and retires into a private and unreal world, as in sleep; in sickness a man is weak, he may be unable to move, he is like one dead, just as the sleeper resembles the dead. On *a priori* grounds then there is good cause to believe that Heraclitus held sickness, like sleep, to involve the extinction of part of the fire which is the soul. This belief may be confirmed by the consideration of the clearly unhistorical story current in Diogenes' time, that Heraclitus died of dropsy: Diogenes, IX, 3 f.: καὶ μέντοι καὶ δὰ τοῦτο (*sc. πόας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας*) περιτραπές εἰς ὕδερον κατῆλθεν εἰς ἀστυ καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐπυνθάνετο, εἰ δύναντο ἔξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιήσαι . . . οὐδὲν δὲ ἀνύνων οὐδὲ οὐτως ἐτελεύτα βιοὺς ἔτη ἔξηκοντα . . . "Ἐρμιππος δέ φησι λέγειν αὐτὸν τοὺς ἰατροῖς, εἴ τις δύναται τὰ ἔντερα κεινώσας τὸ ὑγρὸν ἔξερᾶσαι (so Diels: . . . δύναται ἔντερα ταπεινώσας ὑγρὸν ἐ. MSS). Now it is plain that all the stories of Heraclitus' life, in this part of Diogenes' account, are nothing but trivial fictions based upon Heraclitus' own sayings; thus fr. 36D, "it is death to souls to become water,"

obviously lies behind this story. H. Fränkel, *A.J.P.*, LIX (1938), pp. 309 ff., regards these tales as motivated by malice, a kind of revenge of posterity: thus the preacher of the dry soul gets dropsy, the critic of doctors has to consult the doctors, etc. Yet in this particular case there is an element in the story that is strange to any of our extant fragments, and this is the riddle which Heraclitus put to the doctors. We have two forms of this, one of which is attributed by Diogenes to Hermippus; the phrase "to draw off the moisture" may just be based upon common medical terminology (cf. Hippocrates, π. νούσων, II, 61: ἐπὴν ἔξεραστις τὸ ὕδωρ), but it may really refer to a well-known saying by Heraclitus on the nature of sickness. The other version, according to which the question was how "to make drought out of wet weather," is much more the kind of thing that would be invented to substantiate Heraclitus' reputation as *aἰνεῖμαρώδης*.

It is now at last possible to explain why souls that perish (i. e. are involved in the death of the body) in war are purer than those that perish by disease: it is because the death is a sudden one, so that the soul at the moment of death is in its normal condition, and has not been debilitated and moistened by the experience of sickness, which like sleep, only more permanently, is accompanied by a predominance of water over fire. Admittedly the sudden death does not guarantee that the victim's soul should continue its existence as fire—it only ensures that its fate should depend solely on *ἡθος*, and not on purely external physical circumstances. Similarly one must presume that it is possible for the really virtuous and thus fiery soul to resist the onset of moisture caused by illness; other things being equal, however, it is better to die in battle, especially because this is normally a noble activity which, unless cowardice be shown, tends to increase the fire in the soul. These necessary restrictions vividly recall the language of Clement in *Strom.*, IV, 14, 4 f. quoted on p. 385. There he explains the ancient admiration for death in battle by reasons which are by no means classical, nor yet representative of Clement's own Christian viewpoint: ". . . it is not the violence of the death that they recommend, but the fact that he who dies in war is gone without fear of dying, cut off from the body, and without previous sickness and debility in the soul, which men suffer in diseases. For then they depart in a womanly way and longing to live on. For this reason they release the soul in no

pure (*καθαράν*) state, but carrying its desires with it like weights of lead—except some among them who have become notable concerning virtue. And there are some too who die in war with desires still upon them; their state in no way differs from that of wasting away by disease.” In this passage I detect two strata: one of Platonist interpretation, according to which the soul in sickness longs to live on and is weighed down by desires for life, and the other of a more ancient view by which the victim of disease is literally *προκαμψόν τῇ ψυχῇ . . . [καὶ] καταμαλακισθείς*, while death in battle is praised not for its violence but for its suddenness. It seems at least conceivable that this last stratum represents the views of Heraclitus, and that it is chiefly to him that Clement’s *οἱ παλαιοί* refers. In this case the verse in the scholion would receive remarkable confirmation.

Whether or not one accepts the new interpretation of fr. 24D outlined above depends largely on the view one takes of Heraclitus’ utterances as a whole. Was he content simply to repeat, in graphic form, the traditional beliefs of the people? We know of course that in the sphere of practical ethics his remarks were occasionally indistinguishable from those of other sages of his time, e. g. fr. 43D: *ὑβριν χρὴ σβεννύαι μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊν*. But life and death formed a problem in which he was particularly interested and of which his treatment was normally original and highly individual. The words of fr. 24 are unoriginal, in fact *ἀρηφάτους* and the inclusive phrase *θεοὶ καὶ ἀνθρώποι* are taken from the language of epic; the sentiment, too, seems to have a close parallel in e. g. the lines of Heraclitus’ earlier fellow-citizen Callinus (fr. 1, 18 f. Diehl): *λαῷ γὰρ σύμπαντι πόθος κρατερόφρονος ἄνδρος / θνήσκοντος, ζώων δ' ὅξιος ημιθέων*. Nevertheless the evidence offered, some of it admittedly conjectural and some but briefly discussed, shows a way in which the fragment can be fitted as a positive contribution into a fairly consistent doctrine of the soul, and in which it can escape the improbable and un-Heraclitean vice of banality.

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## THE TEXT OF GAIUS' INSTITUTES AND JUSTINIAN'S CORPUS.<sup>1</sup>

Until Niebuhr's discovery of the Verona palimpsest our exact knowledge of the text of Gaius' *Institutes* rested on the precarious foundation of the quotations of that work in the *Digest* of Justinian. The editors of the *Digest* were known to have had and exercised the right to change and emend the texts they included, and there was no objective test that could be applied to determine the extent of such change. Nearly identical passages occur in the *Institutes* of Justinian, but as that work also had been subjected to the same kind of editing we were scarcely better off with two versions than with one. But the decipherment of the palimpsest gave us a text apparently earlier, if not much earlier, than the time of the *Corpus* and one which had certainly not been subjected to the hands of Justinian's editors. There were not lacking difficulties in the new version, and some inconsistencies gave warning that it could not be regarded as the perfect record of Gaius' own words. Nevertheless, it was generally taken for granted that where the text varied from that of Justinian the palimpsest was to be preferred unless some obvious flaw of law or grammar showed the contrary. It was discovered how very deeply indebted were the *Institutes* of Justinian to the older work and we were pleased with the feeling that we now had a purer source of the Roman law than had previously been available. With the comparative merits of the two works I am not here concerned, but the question of the relation of the various versions to Gaius will repay some attention. There are twenty-eight sections of Gaius' *Institutes* as now published which also occur in whole or in part in both the *Digest* and the *Institutes* of Justinian. In three cases the versions are identical. They are:

G., II. 12 = D., I. 8. 1. 1 = I., II. 2. pr. A single sentence.

<sup>1</sup> This paper is one result of a study of the language of the *Institutes* of Justinian carried on in the Yale Graduate School with Mr. Lawrence Richardson in 1943-44.

G., II. 50 = D., XLI. 3. 37. pr. = I., II. 6. 5 Furtum . . .  
non committitur.

G., III. 135 = D., XLIV. 7. 2. pr. = I., III. 22. pr. A single sentence.

All the others show variations of different degree, and these variations I reproduce in parallel columns as a basis for comparison of the texts. For Gaius I have used the readings of Bizoukides (Thessalonica and Leipzig, 1937), but I have always preserved the words of the palimpsest without regard to the cogency of the editor's emendations. For the *Digest* I have used the Eighth Edition of Mommsen and for Justinian's *Institutes* the Fifth Edition of Moyle (Oxford, 1912). His device, first used by Holland, of printing in bold-faced type the words of Justinian taken from Gaius is a convenience but something of a snare. Perfect consistency in such a matter is almost impossible to attain. The black type sometimes gives exactly the reading of the palimpsest and sometimes, as the Preface frankly states, "what passages are 'substantially' from Gaius." Phrases are sometimes so printed which do indeed occur in the palimpsest but which are so slight or so inevitable that the implication of literal indebtedness is hardly justified. Take, for example, I., III. 2 where in two whole pages the words "quod ad feminas" alone are in bold-face. It is hard to believe that this represents an indebtedness to Gaius worth recording. Moreover, any typographical device to show Justinian's omission of a word or two from a quoted passage or the inversion of words would have been so complicated that Dr. Moyle was wise enough not to attempt it. I have no desire to cavil at an extremely useful book or to reproach the editor for not doing what he never intended, but I remark merely that this use of type is a little misleading as expressing the relations of the two *Institutes*. Among other things, when you come upon a light word in a bold-face passage it is a natural conclusion that Justinian's editors put that word in. It is this assumption which I wish to investigate.

## PARALLEL PASSAGES.

1.

G., I. 1

—nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur—

G., I. 8

Omne autem ius—

G., I. 9

Et quidem summa divisio de iure personarum haec est—

G., I. 11

—libertini, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt.

G., I. 48

Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. Nam—

G., I. 50

Videamus nunc de iis, quae alieno iuri subiectae sint: nam si cognoverimus, quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sint.

G., I. 52

In potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum—  
—potestatem esse—

G., I. 53

—neque civibus Romanis nec ullis aliis hominibus, qui sub imperio populi Romani sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa in servos suos saevire—

D., I. 1. 9

—nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur—

2.

D., I. 5. 1

Omne ius—

3.

D., I. 5. 3

Summa itaque de iure personarum divisio haec est—

4.

D., I. 5. 6

Libertini sunt, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt.

5.

D., I. 6. 1. pr.

De iure personarum alia divisio sequitur, quod—

6.

D., I. 6. 1. pr.

Videamus itaque de his, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt: nam si cognoverimus quae istae personae sunt, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sunt.

7.

D., I. 6. 1. 1

Igitur in potestate sunt servi dominorum—  
—potestatem fuisse—

8.

D., I. 6. 1. 2

—nullis hominibus, qui sub imperio Romano sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa legibus cognita in servos suos saevire—

I., I. 2. 1

—nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur—

I., I. 2. 12

Omne autem ius—

I., I. 3. pr.

Summa itaque divisio de iure personarum haec est—

I., I. 5. pr.

Libertini sunt, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt.

I., I. 8. pr.

Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. Nam—

I., I. 8. pr.

Videamus itaque de his, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt: nam si cognoverimus quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sunt.

I., I. 8. 1

In potestate itaque dominorum sunt servi—  
—potestatem esse—

I., I. 8. 2

—nullis hominibus, qui sub imperio nostro sunt, licet sine causa legibus cognita et supra modum in servos suos saevire—

—sacratissimi (? Codex: s.) imperatoris Antonini— —non minus teneri iubetur— Sed et maior quoque asperitas dominorum per eiusdem principis constitutionem coercetur.	—divi Antonini— —non minus puniri iubetur— Sed et maior asperitas dominorum eiusdem principis constitutione coercetur.	—divi Pii Antonini— —non minus puniri iubetur— Sed et maior asperitas dominorum eiusdem principis constitutione coercetur.
9.	D., I. 6. 3	I., I. 9. pr.
G., I. 55  Item in potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri, quos iustis nuptiis procreavimus.	Item in potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri, quos ex iustis nuptiis procreaverimus.	In potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri, quos ex iustis nuptiis procreaverimus.
10.	D., I. 7. 2. pr.	I., I. 11. 1
G., I. 98  Adoptio autem duobus modis fit, aut populi auctoritate aut imperio magistratus veluti praetoris.	Generalis enim adoptio duobus modis fit, aut principis auctoritate aut magistratus imperio.	Adoptio autem duobus modis fit, aut principali rescriptio aut imperio magistratus.
11.	D., I. 7. 2. pr.	I., I. 11. 1
G., I. 99  Populi auctoritate adoptamus eos qui sui iuris sunt— Imperio magistratus adoptamus eos qui in potestate parentium sunt—	Principis auctoritate adoptamus eos qui sui iuris sunt— Imperio magistratus adoptamus eos qui in potestate parentis sunt—	Imperatoris auctoritate adoptamus eos easve qui quaeve sui iuris sunt— Imperio magistratus adoptamus eos easve, qui quaeve in potestate parentium sunt—
12.	D., I. 7. 2. 2	I., I. 11. 11
G., I. 107  Illud proprium est eius adoptionis quae per populum fit— —non solum—sed etiam—	Hoc vero proprium est eius adoptionis quae per principem fit— —non solum—sed et—	Illud proprium est illius adoptionis quae per sacrum oraculum fit— —non solum—sed etiam—
13.	D., XXVI. 4. 7	I., I. 15. 1
G., I. 156  Sunt autem agnati per virilis sexus personas cognitione iuncti— —patrui filius et nepos ex eo.	Sunt autem agnati qui per virilis sexus personas cognitione iuncti sunt— —patrui filius neposve ex eo.	Sunt autem agnati per virilis sexus cognitionem coniuncti— —patrui filius neposve ex eo.
14.	D., I. 8. 1. 1	I., II. 2. 1
G., II. 13  Corporales hae sunt—	Corporales hae sunt—	Corporales eae sunt—
15.	D., I. 8. 1. 1	I., II. 2. 2
G., II. 14  Incorporales sunt— —quae iure consistunt— —et fructus— —ius successionis—  Eodem numero sunt iura—	Incorporales sunt— —quae in iure consistunt— —nam et fructus— —ius successionis—  Eodem numero sunt et iura—	Incorporales autem sunt— —quae in iure consistunt— —nam et fructus— —ius hereditatis—  I., II. 2. 3 Eodem numero sunt iura—

## 16.

G., II. 86

Adquiritur autem nobis—  
—quos in potestate manu  
mancipiove habemus—  
—diligentur dispiciamus.

D., XLI. 1. 10 pr.

Adquiruntur nobis—  
—quos in potestate habe  
mus—  
—diligentius dispiciamus.

I., II. 9. pr.

Adquiritur nobis—  
—quos in potestate habe  
mus—  
—diligentius dispiciamus.

## 17.

G., II. 87

Igitur quod liberi nostri  
quos in potestate habemus,  
item quod servi nostri  
mancipio accipiunt vel ex  
traditione nanciscuntur sive  
quid stipulentur vel ex  
alialiquid causa adqui  
runt, id nobis adquiritur:  
ipse enim qui in potestate  
nostra est, nihil suum ha  
bere potest; et ideo si  
heres institutus sit, nisi  
nostro iusu hereditatem  
adire non potest; et si  
iubentibus nobis adierit,  
hereditas nobis adquiritur,  
proinde atque si nos ipsi  
heredes instituti essemus;  
et convenienter scilicet le  
gatum per eos nobis ad  
quiritur.

D., XLI. 1. 10. 1

Igitur quod servi nostri ex  
traditione nanciscuntur sive  
quid stipulentur vel ex  
qualibet alia causa adqui  
runt, id nobis adquiritur:  
ipse enim, qui in potestate  
alterius est, nihil suum  
habere potest; ideoque si  
heres institutus sit, nisi  
nostro iusu hereditatem  
adire non potest; et si  
iubentibus nobis adierit,  
hereditas nobis adquiritur,  
perinde atque si nos ipsi  
heredes instituti essemus;  
et his convenienter scilicet  
legatum nobis per eundem  
adquiritur.

I., II. 9. 1

Igitur liberi vestri utri  
usque sexus quos in po  
testate habetis—  
I., II. 9. 3  
Item vobis adquiritur,  
quod servi vestri ex tradi  
tione nanciscuntur sive  
quid stipulentur vel ex  
qualibet alia causa adqui  
runt—Ipse enim servus qui  
in potestate alterius est  
nihil suum habere potest;  
sed si heres institutus sit,  
non alias nisi iusu vestro  
hereditatem adire potest:  
et si iubentibus vobis adie  
rit, vobis hereditas adqui  
ritur, perinde ac si vos  
ipsi heredes instituti esse  
tis; et convenienter scilicet  
legatum per eos vobis ad  
quiritur.

## 18.

G., II. 89

—proprietas per eos quos  
in potestate habemus ad  
quiritur nobis—  
—cuius enim—  
—id nos possidere videmur;  
unde etiam per eos usuca  
pio procedit.

D., XLI. 1. 10. 2

—proprietas per eos quos  
in potestate habemus ad  
quiritur nobis—  
—cuiuscumque enim—  
—id nos possidere videmur;  
unde etiam per eorum ion  
gam possessionem domi  
nium nobis adquiritur.

I., II. 9. 3

—proprietas per eos quos  
in potestate habetis ad  
quiritur vobis—  
—cuiuscumque enim—  
—id vos possidere vide  
mini; unde etiam per eos  
usucapio vel longi temporis  
possessio vobis accedit.

## 19.

G., II. 91

—habemus—  
—re nostra—  
—nobis adquiratur—  
—quod vero extra eas  
causas, id ad dominum  
proprietatis pertineat—  
  
—iste servus—  
—quod ei datum fuerit,  
non mihi—

D., XLI. 1. 10. 3

—habemus—  
—re nostra—  
—nobis adquiratur—  
—si quid vero extra eas  
causas persecuti sunt, id ad  
dominum proprietatis per  
tinet—  
—is servus—  
—quid aut ei donatum  
fuerit, non mihi—

I., II. 9. 4

—habetis—  
—re vestra—  
—vobis adiciatur—  
—quod vero extra eas  
causas persecuti sunt, id  
ad dominum proprietatis  
pertineat—  
—is servus—  
—quid aut ei donatum  
fuerit, non usufructario—

20.

G., II. 92

Idem placet de eo, qui a nobis bona fide possidente—  
—sive liber sit—  
—idem probatur etiam—  
—ad dominum—

D., XLI. 1. 10. 4

Idem placet de eo, qui nobis bona fide possidetur—  
—sive liber sit—  
—idem probatur etiam—  
—ad dominum eius—

I., II. 9. 4

Idem placet et de eo, qui a vobis bona fide possidente—  
—sive is liber sit—  
—idem placet et—  
—ad dominum—

21.

G., II. 93

—ex omni causa—  
Usufructarius vero usuca-  
pere non potest—  
—deinde quia scit alienum  
servum esse.

D., XLI. 1. 10. 5

—ex omnibus causis—  
Usufructarius vero usuca-  
pere servum non potest—  
—deinde quoniam scit ser-  
vum alienum esse.

I., II. 9. 4

—ex omnibus causis—  
Fructarius vero usucapere  
non potest—  
—deinde quia scit servum  
alienum esse.

22.

G., II. 133

—ut ecce si filium—ha-  
beam—

D., XXVIII. 3. 13

—ut ecce si filium—ha-  
beam—

I., II. 13. 2

—ut ecce si quis filium—  
habeat—

23.

G., II. 134

—rumpatur mihi testa-  
mentum—  
—exheredare debeo—  
  
—ex eo necesse est mihi  
vel heredem instituere vel  
exheredare ne forte, me  
vivo filio mortuo—  
—nepos neptisve—rumpat  
testamentum—

D., XXVIII. 3. 13

—rumpat mihi testamen-  
tum—  
—exheredare nominatim  
debeo—  
—ex eo necesse est mihi  
vel heredem instituere vel  
exheredare ne forte, me  
vivo filio mortuo—  
—nepos neptisve—rumpat  
testamentum—

I., II. 13. 2

—rumpatur eius testamen-  
tum—  
—nominatim exheredare  
debet testator—  
—ex filio necesse est ei vel  
heredem instituere vel ex-  
heredare ne forte, vivo eo  
filio mortuo—  
—nepos neptisve—rumpant  
testamentum—

24.

G., III. 136

—consensu dicimus obliga-  
tiones contrahi, quod neque  
verborum neque scripturae  
ulla proprietas desidera-  
tur—  
—sufficit eos qui negotium  
gerunt, consensisse.  
  
—per epistolam aut per  
internuntium—

D., XLIV. 7. 2. 1

—consensu dicimus obliga-  
tionem contrahi, quia neque  
verborum neque scripturae  
ulla proprietas desidera-  
tur—  
—sufficit eos, qui negotia  
gerunt, consentire.

I., III. 22. 1

—consensu dicitur obliga-  
tio contrahi, quia neque  
scriptura neque praesentia  
omnimodo opus est—  
  
—sufficit eos, qui negotium  
gerunt, consentire.

I., III. 22. 2

—per epistolam aut per  
nuntium—

25.

G., III. 137

—de eo—

D., XLIV. 7. 2. 3

—de eo—

I., III. 22. 3

—in id—

This is not a large body of material, and some of it is of very slight value, but it will serve our purpose.

We may begin by disposing of a class of variations whose character is certain. In spite of the composite nature of the *Institutes* of Justinian, the book as a whole preserves the fiction

that it is actually the words of the Emperor addressed to the students. The first person, therefore, is reserved for the emperor, and where the first person occurs in a text that is being quoted it is changed to the second or third. Illustrations of the change are found in the preceding passages, Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23. Lapses sometimes occur, as in Nos. 9, 11, and 16, but these are mere oversights that do not affect the general rule which explains a large number of differences in reading between the *Institutes* and the *Digest*, and the *Institutes* and Gaius. Let us consider the differences which are not capable of this solution and the general relation of the three versions.

Since the *Digest* was compiled first, its readings cannot be influenced by the *Institutes*. On the other hand, though the *Institutes* are later in time and in some ways depend on the *Digest*, it is clear that individual quotations cannot have been copied from that source. The great bulk of the *Digest* and the differences in arrangement would have made it a tremendous labor to run down each section of Gaius which the editors wished to include and take the passage from the compilation rather than the original. In addition, so much more of Gaius has been included in the *Institutes* than in the *Digest* that the unlikelihood of any such procedure is increased. Since nothing could have been gained thereby we may take it for proven that the editors of the *Institutes* had, like those of the *Digest*, direct recourse to a MS of Gaius.

What is the relation of their source to the palimpsest? Since that is our only independent text of Gaius it is tempting to assume that it preserves the true reading and that where the *Digest* and the *Institutes* disagree with it they show changes either of intent or of carelessness. But there are a dozen instances where D and I agree on a reading different from G and where the variation is best to be explained by the hypothesis of a different source. Perhaps the best instance is No. 9 where G has "iustis nuptiis procreavimus," D and I, "ex iustis nuptiis procreaverimus." This is one of the exceptional cases where I retains the first person in a general sense, which is very strong evidence that the verb is exactly what it was in I's source: if any change were to be made it would be a change of person. The substitution of future perfect for perfect is a finesse characteristic of neither D nor I, nor is the added preposition a

particularly symptomatic change. To assume that two minor changes were made independently in D and I but the regular change in I omitted is stretching probability.

A somewhat different instance is No. 1. "Ipsiū" in Gaius clearly refers to "populus," and the sentence means that the law of a particular "populus" is the law of a particular "civitas" or "ius civile." D and I add "civitatis" after the first "proprium" and "ipsius" after the second. The first addition is wrong because it misunderstands the meaning of "ipsius"; the second is wrong because it makes the second clause merely identical repetition. One cannot guess when or by whom the changes were made, but they cannot have been made independently by two sets of editors copying from the same MS which had the true reading.

Most of the instances are cases of the usual type of MS variation where there is really nothing to choose between readings; e. g. No. 13 where G has "et nepos," D and I "neposve." Some may be real changes, such as No. 8, G "teneri," D and I "puniri," but the number of those where no reason for the change can be imagined is large enough to justify the conclusion that the source of D and I is not the MS of G which we possess.

But did D and I have the same source? There are, as a matter of fact, a number of instances in which G and I agree against D where no reason for intentional change in D is to be found, e. g. Nos. 2 and 5 and No. 12, G and I "sed etiam," D "sed et." There are also cases of agreement of G and D against I, e. g. Nos. 14, 15, G and D "Incorporales sunt," I "Incorporales autem sunt," G and D "ius successionis," I "ius hereditatis," 20, G and D "Idem placet de eo," I "Idem placet et de eo," 20, G and D "idem probatur etiam," I "idem placet et." And the second phrase of No. 21 is an instance of three versions identical in meaning but different in wording. The only explanation of these phenomena is that we are dealing not with two MSS of Gaius, but with three.

Of course, there are cases of intentional change. In No. 8 the law in Gaius is given for Roman citizens and all other men in the empire. Since the distinction had been abolished for the most part by the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, D omits the phrase "civibus Romanis" while I substitutes "imperio nostro" for "imperio Romano." In Nos. 10, 11, and 12 the rule for adopt-

ing "populi auctoritate" given by G is, of course, obsolete by Justinian's time, but the substitution of imperial for popular authority is differently worded in D and I. No. 17 is an instance of a passage that has been thoroughly rewritten in two different ways. In such cases we see unmistakably the hand of Justinian's editors. But the proportion of these to the cases of MS variation is less than might have been expected.

If the result of this experience is applied to the *Institutes* in general, it will be found that a surprisingly large number of variants from the text of the palimpsest may be explained—and best explained—by the use of a different MS, and the scorn with which the accuracy of the editors of the *Institutes* is sometimes regarded may be somewhat abated. On the other hand, though we have no proof, we may have somewhat more confidence in the general verbatim accuracy of quotations in the *Digest*. Of course, this by no means lays the ghost of interpolation. The editors certainly did change the text when there was reason to do so, but some enthusiastic searchers for interpolation seem almost to have come to the conclusion that the editors preferred to change if they could, and that is a position hardly to be maintained.<sup>2</sup>

What is to be our practice with respect to the text of Gaius? Editors like Bizoukides have frequently emended the reading of the palimpsest, when emendation is needed, on the basis of the reading of the *Digest* and the *Institutes*, but they do not go to the length of printing those versions as variants where the text

<sup>2</sup> Reference to E. Levy and E. Rabel, *Index Interpolationum quae in Justiniani Digestis inesse dicuntur* (Weimar, 1929, 1931, 1935) produces only two places where the question of interpolation touches the passages under discussion.

1) Most of them, but not all, are treated by E. Grupe ("Die Gaiischen Institutionen fragmenta in Justinians Digesten," *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, XVI [1895], pp. 300-319). He assumes and does not attempt to prove that the reading of the palimpsest is that of Gaius, and that when this disagrees with the reading of the Digest Gaius has been changed. (He wrongly attributes the reading *dicitur* to Gaius, III, 136.)

2) Fritz Pringsheim, "Bonum et aequum" in the same journal, LII (1932), pp. 122-124, suggests that in Gaius, III, 137 the words "de eo . . . oportet" are a gloss. In spite of I's reading "in id" he considers it likely that G, D, and I are all descended from a single MS which contained the gloss.

It will be seen that neither of these suggestions is supported by the evidence presented in this paper.

of the palimpsest is sound. Yet that, I think, would be the better practice, as the readings of Gaius are recorded in the apparatus of the *Corpus*. Except in cases where there is evidence of intentional change, we are really dealing with three independent sources of the text of Gaius. Which is closest to the original we shall probably never know. We are not assisted here by any such reverence for the *ipsissima dicta* as protects the tradition of works of art. If the law was correctly reported it made very little difference whether the scribe wrote "aut" or "vel," "et" or "etiam," "velut" or "veluti," and that kind of variation must have set in early. Further study of the language of Gaius and further study of the language of Justinian may give us a means of discrimination which is not now apparent, but there is every reason to believe that Tribonian and his colleagues had good MSS available for their work of compilation and that they knew the difference between a good MS and a bad one. Their readings should be treated with respect.

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#### ADDENDA TO PAGES 301, 302 AND 304.

At the beginning of footnote 5 on p. 301 add: The reference to the gymnasiarch in *Hesperia*, XI, No. 7 should read [γν]μνα-σιαρχού[τος - - - - <sup>name</sup> - - - | τοῦ] τῆς ἐξ Ἀρε[ίου πάγου βουλῆς κήρυκος].

To footnote 7 on p. 302 add: With the letters *μερισμον* at the beginning of line 14 it is interesting to compare Plato, *Laws*, VI, 771 d, θυσιῶν πέρι συνόδους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ποιώμεθα δύο τοῦ μηνός, δώδεκα μὲν τῇ τῆς φυλῆς διανομῆ, δώδεκα δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πόλεως διαμερισμῶ.

To the list on page 304 add (*Σουλπίκιος*) Ἐλευσείνιος Μακαρέως (*Αχαρνεύς*) attested as eponymus of the tribe Οἰνηίς by *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 2199 for the archonship of Cassius Apollonius (207/8 A. D. or shortly before) and perhaps Βειτάλιος Ἀριστείδον (*Σφήγτιος*) attested for the tribe Ἀκα[μαν]τίς by *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3680 from the archonship of Φλάβιος Εἰαχ[χαγωγό]ς (at the beginning of the third century).

J. H. OLIVER.

## THE FAMILY OF CRITIAS.

In the year 1914 John Burnet, in an unobtrusive footnote, advanced a notion which appears to have been widely accepted among British and American scholars.<sup>1</sup> Discussing the Critias who is one of the *dramatis personae* of Plato's *Timaeus*, Burnet feels that it is "perfectly clear that this Kritias is not the Kritias who was one of the Thirty, but his grandfather, though the two are hopelessly confused by modern writers. He is a very old man (?),<sup>2</sup> who can hardly remember what he was told yesterday (?), but remembers the scenes of his boyhood clearly. At that time the poems of Solon were still recent. It seems clear to me that most of the poetical fragments ascribed to the younger Kritias are really his grandfather's." And on another occasion: "It is hard to understand how he was ever supposed to be the oligarch, though Diels, Wilamowitz, and E. Meyer seem to have felt no difficulty in the identification."<sup>3</sup>

The two passages in the *Timaeus* which lie at the bottom of Burnet's difficulty both belong to the tale of Critias; 20 E: "Now Solon—as he says himself in many of his poems—was a relative and very dear friend of our great-grandfather Dropides; and he<sup>4</sup> told our grandfather Critias—as the old man himself, in turn, related to us—that the exploits of this city . . . ."

<sup>1</sup> J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy Part I, Thales to Plato* (London, 1928), p. 338, note. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 23 ff.; also his *Plato: The Man and His Work* (New York, 1936), p. 437; F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937), pp. 1 ff.; H. Herter, "Platons Atlantis," in *Bonner Jahrbuecher*, CXXXIII (1928), pp. 28 ff.; H. Raeder, "Platons muetterliches Geschlecht," in *Hermes*, 1937, p. 406; Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), merely quotes Burnet's view in his notes. L. Robin, *Platon* (Paris, 1935), p. 2, follows Burnet.

<sup>2</sup> The question marks in the quotation are mine, to indicate the weak points of Burnet's argument.

<sup>3</sup> J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*<sup>3</sup> (London, 1920), p. 203, note 3.

<sup>4</sup> R. G. Bury, whose translation in the Loeb series (*Plato*, VII [London, 1942]) I have taken the liberty to change somewhat, here translates: ". . . and Dropides told our grandfather Critias . . ." Similarly R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato* (London, 1888), p. 67. But the text does not justify a change of subject; cf. 25 D: *κατ' ἀκοήν*. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 13, translates "he," thus leaving it to the reader to decide whether Solon or Dropides is meant.

And 21 A: "It is an old tale, and I heard it from a man not young. For Critias was then, as he said himself, close to ninety years of age, while I was about ten."

Plato thus allows for only three generations to separate Solon from his Critias. Diogenes Laertius who on the basis of the *Timaeus* establishes a family tree for the oligarch unwittingly reveals the faults of Plato's scheme.<sup>5</sup> J. Kirchner was quick to recognise that one, perhaps two additional links were required to bring order into the system of generations, and he proposed a tree which featured the intercalation in the sixth century of an added Dropides and Critias, father and son.<sup>6</sup> Burnet accepted Kirchner's stemma, but its implication that Plato had made a mistake was intolerable to him. If it is true, he concluded, that there is space for five generations between Solon and the oligarch, then the Critias of the *Timaeus* cannot be the oligarch; he must be his grandfather. The fact that we know next to nothing about this grandfather should not disturb us; we simply proceed to draw him into prominence by attributing to his authorship "most of the poetical fragments ascribed to the younger Kritias."<sup>7</sup>

Dorothy Stephans, the writer of the latest and best monograph on the oligarch, accepts the reasoning of Burnet's attempt to

<sup>5</sup> Diogenes Laertius, III, 1.

<sup>6</sup> J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, s. vv. "Dropides," "Kritias," and "Platon." A stemma is supplied for the latter under no. 11855. Burnet, *Gk. Phil. I*, Appendix, p. 351, provides a family tree of his own which is more or less identical with Kirchner's. W. Nestle, "Kritias," in *Neue Jahrbuecher*, 1903, p. 84, note 7, notes that Plato is wrong; he refers to Mueller-Struebing, in *Philologus*, Supplement IV, p. 102.

<sup>7</sup> Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1934-38), II, pp. 375 ff., does not acknowledge Burnet's proposal, nor does Miss Stephans (see following note), pp. 50 ff.—Taylor, *Comm.*, p. 24, suggests that Aristotle in his *Rhetic*, III, 1416 b 26-9 means to refer to the older Critias, the grandfather, when he says that his deeds are not generally known. "This can hardly refer to the 'oligarch.' It is not true that *oi πολλοὶ* did not know what his *πράξεις* were. Everyone knew them only too well." I think, on the contrary, that the citizens of democratic fourth century Athens knew little more of Critias' career than the events following the collapse of the city after Aegospotami. The very fact that we have so little information about the earlier years of Critias' life can only mean that after the debacle of 404-3 all parties concerned decided to forget as much as they could about the accomplishments of the leader of the Thirty.

"save Plato," and tries to consolidate their position with further details.<sup>8</sup> Among other arguments, she repeats Burnet's statement that the Critias of the *Timaeus* is an old man, so old that he forgets what happened on the previous day.<sup>9</sup> Now a careful reading of the passage in question will show that Critias says nothing of the sort. Critias says 26 B: "Marvellous, indeed, is the way in which the lessons of one's childhood grip the mind, as the saying is. For myself, I do not know whether I could recall to my mind everything that I heard yesterday; but as for this story which I heard quite some time ago, I should be immensely surprised if a single detail of it has escaped my mind. At the time I listened to it with a great deal of pleasure and amusement, and the old man was eager to tell me . . ." There is nothing in this passage which would characterise Critias as an old man; "quite some time ago" is to be understood as contrasting with "yesterday"; and he certainly does not say that he "can hardly remember what he was told yesterday." On the contrary, by permitting him to refer to his grandfather as "the old man" (cf. also 25 D) Plato suggests quite clearly that Critias himself is, at most, a middle-aged man.

20 A: "As to Critias, all of us here know that he is no novice in any of the subjects we are discussing." Taylor who follows in Burnet's footsteps has this to say about the words of Socrates:<sup>10</sup> "The words are of themselves enough to show that the Critias of the dialogue has a long career of eminence behind him and is known to all Athenians at once as a public man and a *σοφός*. This would not be true of Critias ὁ τῶν τριάκοντα, whose public career seems to have begun in 411." Taylor does not notice that in the *Charmides* 162 DE Socrates addresses Critias in a similar vein: "but you, I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and studies." The traditional date for the dramatic setting of the *Charmides* is reckoned near the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>11</sup> The traditional dating of the

<sup>8</sup> Dorothy Stephens, *Critias: Life and Literary Remains* (Cincinnati, 1939), pp. 4-8. She herself admits, however (p. 86), that we have absolutely no evidence of philosophical activity on the part of the elder Critias.

<sup>9</sup> P. 4.

<sup>10</sup> *Comm.*, p. 49.

<sup>11</sup> The historical allusions of *Charm.* 153 AB point to 432 B.C.

oligarch's birth is about 460 B. C.<sup>12</sup> The oligarch (and there is no doubt whatever concerning his identity in the *Charmides*) was thus in his late twenties when Socrates saw fit to address him with so much respect.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, in spite of our professed ignorance about the earlier part of Critias' political career, Taylor's view cannot be upheld.<sup>14</sup>

What are the dates of the oligarch? Before Burnet introduced his heresy, the year of his birth was approximated from two directions. For one thing, he died in 403 B. C. on the field of battle, fighting vigorously to the end.<sup>15</sup> At the moment of his death, therefore, he cannot have been an old man, a point fully utilised by Burnet and Taylor. 460 B. C. may be adopted as a *terminus post quem* for his birth. The other datum rests on the old interpretation of *Timaeus* 21 A: Critias there says that he was about eighty years younger than his grandfather. The one fact we have about the grandfather's life is a bit of gossip reported by the scholiast on Aeschylus' *Prometheus* 128; the elder Critias, he says, was loved by the poet Anacreon.<sup>16</sup> If Anacreon, as Hesychius tells us, was born about 572 B. C., 540 may safely be considered the latest possible date for the birth of his favourite. This would again yield 460 B. C., this time as a *terminus ante quem*, for the birth of the oligarch.

Miss Stephanis subscribes to the traditional date 460 B. C.; but since Plato's span of eighty years lies for her, not between the oligarch and his grandfather, but between the latter and the protégé of Solon, she is compelled to narrow down the space provided for

<sup>12</sup> W. Diehl in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, XI, col. 1902; Stephanis, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> I assume that Socrates' remark is meant in all seriousness. If it is considered ironical, the corresponding passages in the *Timaeus* are of course equally subject to such an interpretation.

<sup>14</sup> The Critias of the *Protagoras* (336 DE) plays the rôle of a mediator between two debaters; thus he is again characterised as a man of mature understanding. The fact that Xenophon consistently mentions Alcibiades side by side with Critias (cf. *Memor.*, I, 2, 12-25 *et al.*) makes it likely that Critias achieved political prominence as a very young man. For the possibility of political activity on the part of Critias as early as 434/3 and 430/29, see Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I (Princeton, 1939), p. 195 and p. 456.

<sup>15</sup> Xenophon, *Hell.*, II, 4, 19; Diodorus, XIV, 33.

<sup>16</sup> The traditional dates for the life of Anacreon are based on Hesych. (Suidas), V.

the generations in the fifth century to make room for two generations of forty years each in the sixth. The unexpected result is that the grandfather, the beloved of Anacreon, now appears slated for birth about 510 B. C. I suggest that not even Anacreon was man enough to be in his prime in his late seventies, and to love a boy more than sixty years his junior.<sup>17</sup>

It should by now be amply clear how reliable Plato is as a chronicler of his family's fortunes during the early sixth century. The value of his chronology may be gauged from *Charmides* 157 E where Socrates says: "For your father's house which derives from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets . . ." The juxtaposition of the names shows that in Plato's eyes the Critias who was loved by Anacreon was the son of Dropides who was a friend of Solon. In other words, Plato telescoped the happenings of the sixth century; Solon, for his purposes, lived just before Anacreon, and Anacreon in turn was active in the early fifth century. It is indeed difficult to see how Plato could have managed to keep apart the various bearers of the names Dropides and Critias who alternated on the family roll without repeatedly referring to the city archives.

In the *Charmides* passage, two of the oligarch's ancestors, Dropides and Critias, are quoted by name for their friendship with famous men of letters. In the *Timaeus*, Critias similarly cites the names of his ancestors Dropides and Critias, and extols their literary connexions. The conclusion is self-evident: the Critias of the *Timaeus* is identical with the Critias of the *Charmides*, i. e. he is the oligarch. To quote, as Burnet and Miss Stephans have done, the Roman numerals which Kirchner attaches to the various men named Dropides and Critias will only confuse us. Plato himself, writing two hundred years after Solon, and more than two generations after Critias, neglected to inquire into the exact number of generations intervening between Solon and the oligarch.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> D. Stephans, *op. cit.*, p. 7, paragraph 2.

<sup>18</sup> D. Stephans says on p. 5: "Plato's errors, wherever deliberate, are not purposeless." This I do not understand. We may, however, follow Athenaeus, V, 218 b, who charges Plato with committing serious anachronisms. J. S. Morrison, in *C. Q.*, 1941, p. 2, attempts to refute Athenaeus on individual points, but the charge as such must be allowed to stand. Cf. G. Rohr, *Platons Stellung zur Geschichte* (Berlin, 1932),

There still remains Critias' remark that his grandfather used to sing the poems of Solon in his youth because they were then new (*Timaeus* 21 B). This difficulty has been cleared up by Linforth.<sup>19</sup> "The explanation probably is to be found in the fact that these poems would have been thought of as modern in contrast with Homer and Hesiod. Plato may also have been led to speak as he does by the fact that in his own day Solon's poems were no longer recited on such occasions, having become old-fashioned in the midst of the abundant Athenian poetry of the fifth century." We might add to this what we have pointed out above, that Plato seems to have considered Solon an immediate forerunner of Anacreon. To his telescoping turn of mind, the poetry of Solon was new in the days of Critias' grandfather.

Is it possible to fix a dramatic date for the *Timaeus*? Burnet and Taylor had based part of their argument against the oligarch on a date close to the peace of Nicias: "At the time of the peace of Nicias this Critias must have been a very young man who had as yet played no part in public life."<sup>20</sup> For the logic of Taylor's argument we once more refer to *Charmides* 162 DE discussed above. But what is more, Cornford, following Hirzel, has suggested that the dramatic date of the *Republic* (if there is one) should not be used to determine the date for the *Timaeus*.<sup>21</sup> Socrates' "yesterday" (17 C) is to be understood as a token of Plato's own trend of thought rather than as a pointer to any external setting. The figure of Hermocrates, on the other hand, is much too problematical to help us in the matter. Thus, the meeting of Socrates, Critias, Timaeus, and Hermocrates may be imagined to have occurred at any time in the late fifth century prior to the return and death of Hermocrates.<sup>22</sup> The dramatic setting, as so often in Plato's later dia-

pp. 120 ff.; also H. Raeder, *op. cit.*, pp. 407 f., and his *Platons philos. Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1920), pp. 300 ff.

<sup>19</sup> I. M. Linforth, *Solon the Athenian* (Berkeley, 1919), p. 11. Linforth apparently was not aware of Burnet's theory.

<sup>20</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Comm.*, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> F. M. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 4; cf. P. Friedlaender, *Platon*, II (Berlin & Leipzig, 1930), p. 600, note 2, who refers to Hirzel, *Dialog*, I, 257.

<sup>22</sup> If we admit that the dating is uncertain, there is no reason why we should not, as against Taylor, *Comm.*, p. 25, take up the notion of Dercylides, viz. that the unnamed absentee (*Timaeus* 17 A) is Plato himself. Cf. H. Raeder, *Platons philos. Entwicklung*, pp. 375 ff.

logues, is far removed from historical reality, and so are the actors in it, including Critias. Whatever detail there is is the detail of an ideal world, the forms of a Socratic conversation which belong to no epoch in particular.

The value of our reaffirmation of the oligarch's identity is this: we may now attempt the long overdue business of establishing the relationship, which no doubt exists,<sup>23</sup> between the myth related in the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*, and the little we know of the oligarch's views.

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<sup>23</sup> W. Nestle, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-87: ". . . aber es ist doch wohl erlaubt, wenigstens fuer die Leitmotive, die dem Kritias von Platon in den Mund gelegten politischen Anschaeuungen heranzuziehen." Nestle proceeds to fix upon prehistoric Athens as a projection of Critias' political ideals. I suspect that the relationship is much more complicated.

EURIPIDES, MEDEA, 160-172. A NEW  
INTERPRETATION.

MH.	ῳ μεγάλα Θέμι καὶ πότνι' Ἀρτεμί <sup>1</sup> λεύσσεθ' ἀ πάσχω, μεγάλοις ὥρκοις ἐνδηταμένα τὸν κατάρατον πόσιν; ὃν ποτ' ἐγὼ νύμφαν τ' ἐσίδοιμ' αὐτοῖς μελάθροις διακναιομένους, οἵ τ' ἐμὲ πρόσθεν τολμῶσ' ἀδικεῖν. ῳ πάτερ, ὡς πόλις, ὡν ἀπενάσθην αἰσχρώς τὸν ἔμὸν κτείνασα κάσιν — κλύεθ' οἴα λέγει κάπιβοᾶται	160
TP.	Θέμιν εὐκταίαν Ζῆνά θ', ὃς ὥρκων θνητοῖς ταμίας νενόμισται; οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἐν τινὶ μικρῷ δέσποινα χόλον καταπαύσει.	170

The discrepancy between lines 160 and 169 has vexed the commentators, both ancient and modern. Medea invokes Themis and Artemis, yet the Nurse says to the Chorus, "Do you hear her cries to Themis and Zeus?" The text seems secure; if there is any corruption it is pre-Alexandrian. While a few scholars, such as Elmsley, have found the discrepancy unobjectionable, there have been numerous attempts made either to eliminate the difficulty or to minimize it, but so far no single solution has been generally accepted. It is my purpose in this note to suggest that the discrepancy is real, but that it is also intentional; that the reason for it is to be found in the dramatic situation; and that its presence heightens the dramatic effect.

Although at least eight solutions have been proposed,<sup>1</sup> it is

<sup>1</sup> These may be summarized under three headings. I. *Emendation.* a) Weil emends 160 to: ὡς μεγάλε Ζεῦ καὶ Θέμι πότνια. b) Nauck, more ingeniously, reads Ζῆνδος δς for Ζῆνά θ' δς in 169. II. *Other textual changes.* a) Apollodorus of Tarsus assigned the appeal to Zeus in 148 to Medea. This disregards the strophic arrangement. b) Murray interprets 148 as an echo of Medea's words, and so supplies ὡς Ζεῦ καὶ γᾶ καὶ φῶς after the *alai* in 143a. This is attractive, but does not solve our problem; as Page notes, 169-170 must refer to 160 ff., not to something so remote as 143. c) The final sentence in the Σ to 169 records the proposal that δυνηθει be understood in 169, thus eliminating the reference to Medea's actual words. III. *Interpretation.* a) Didymus found an allusion to Zeus in Medea's prayer (144-145) that a thunderbolt strike her. This is too remote, and does not suit the definition of Zeus in

obvious, and curious, that none of them takes into account the broader aspects of the dramatic situation. Medea, deserted by Jason, has reacted with intense emotion; the Nurse has expressed her fears that Medea may commit suicide and has hinted at possible danger to the children. The Paidagogos enters, with news of a fresh calamity, Creon's decree of banishment. This is indeed serious, for the Nurse has made it clear why Medea cannot look either to home or to Iolkos for help or friendship. Then, while Medea is heard lamenting within, the chorus of Corinthian women appears to express their sympathy for her. This, the one possible source of aid and comfort, must not be alienated. But in the speech beginning at 160 Medea calls on the gods to witness Jason's infidelity, and then (unconscious that she is being overheard) prays for the utter destruction of Jason and his royal bride. This must surely make the Nurse uneasy, for the women are presumably loyal Corinthian subjects. And when Medea then refers bluntly to the murder of her brother, the most shocking incident in her past, and one that seems not to have been commonly known at Corinth,<sup>2</sup> it is only too clear that she risks losing their goodwill.

At this point there is a curious and apparently unparalleled metrical irregularity: Medea's speech does not close with the usual paroemiac. This had been noticed earlier, but Murray was the first to see its significance. Medea has not finished speaking, she is interrupted by the anxious Nurse ("festinat Nutrix sermonem periculorum interrumpere").<sup>3</sup> It is a tense moment. Somehow, anyhow, the Chorus must be distracted. They must

169-170 as ὅρκων ταυτας. b) On the basis of τὰν Ζηνὸς ὁρκλαν Θέμιν in 208, the scholiast at that point suggests that Medea's invocation of Themis in 160 in itself implies an appeal to Zeus. c) Following Paley, Page feels that Medea's reference to Jason's oath justifies the Nurse in calling this an appeal to Zeus "as long as she defines Zeus at once as the ὅρκων ταυτας." This is, I think, substantially correct, but the dramatic reason for this oblique reference still needs to be made clear.

<sup>2</sup> Note lines 257-258, where she tells the Chorus that she has no brother to protect her. This would hardly do if she thought that they knew the story.

<sup>3</sup> Page accepts Murray's interpretation, but adds: "Medea's mind must not be allowed to dwell on kindred-murder." Medea, however, is within the house; the Nurse is outside talking to the Chorus. It is with the effect of the statement on *their* minds, not on Medea's, that the Nurse is at this moment concerned.

not be allowed to realize the implications of Medea's words. The Nurse must talk, loud and fast. Any words will do, provided they drown out the voice of Medea.

Murray apparently failed to see that this anxiety of the faithful Nurse is the only explanation needed of the "discrepancy" between the two speeches. Frantically the Nurse harks back to the safe ground of Medea's opening words. "Do you hear," she says, "how she calls upon Themis?" But she is seriously rattled. The reference to oaths suggests Zeus,<sup>4</sup> but when she goes on to explain sententiously that "mortals consider Him the steward of oaths," it is not her words that matter but simply that she should find something to say. To refer to Medea's bitter anger (171-172) may seem ill-advised,<sup>5</sup> but at least it holds the attention of the Chorus on the present situation and away from Medea's criminal past. And no doubt the Nurse heaves a sigh of relief when the Chorus fails to inquire about the remark that was interrupted.

Seen thus, there is no question of textual corruption, much less of a careless slip on the part of the poet. On the contrary we are given a fine dramatic touch, which enlivens and gives point to the scene. Even his critics admit that Euripides is a master of dramatic effect. Had there been here a simple stage direction to indicate that the Nurse was meant to display agitation and confusion, no one would have questioned the passage.<sup>6</sup> Lacking stage directions, we too often forget that these plays were meant to be acted, and we miss the dramatic movement. With good acting this passage could undoubtedly be highly effective.

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<sup>4</sup> There is certainly no reason why she should deliberately suppress the name of Artemis. Artemis is a perfectly reputable goddess, rightly invoked by Medea as a protector of women and patron of marriage. Nothing in the context would suggest an identification with Hecate.

<sup>5</sup> In any case, the Chorus does not object to her punishing Jason.

<sup>6</sup> Stage directions would also be welcome at 184-203. The Nurse's garrulity seems to be inopportune, but Grube suggests that it reveals her reluctance to approach Medea.

## REVIEWS.

FRITZ WEHRLI. Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar.  
Heft III: Klearchos. Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co., 1948. Pp. 85.

The first two fascicles of this work, containing the fragments of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, were reviewed in volume LXIX (October, 1948), pp. 455-457, of this Journal. The description there given of those fascicles applies as well to this, the third, which contains the fragments of Clearchus of Soli in thirty-two pages, a brief bibliography, and forty pages of commentary. Like the earlier parts this one has no index of any kind, but the advertisement on the cover now gives the reassuring news that the last fascicle of the work will contain exhaustive indices. Until those indices have appeared, scholarly use of the edition will be seriously limited; such use will be facilitated if among the indices the editor will include a table by means of which one can quickly find in his collection fragments to which reference has hitherto been made by the numbering of earlier editions such as Müller's for Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, and Clearchus.

To Müller's collection of the fragments of Clearchus Wehrli has added about half a dozen passages, most of which had been indicated by Kroll in his article in *R.-E.*, XI, 580-583. He has rearranged and renumbered the fragments and frequently prints a more extensive text than Müller did; these changes are usually improvements upon the older collection. Wehrli also gives an *apparatus criticus* for his text as he did in the two preceding fascicles, but unfortunately this *apparatus* is neither complete nor accurate, as a few samples will demonstrate.

In fragment 2a (Diogenes Laertius, III, 2), for example, Wehrli prints Ἀναξιλίδης, ascribing it to "editores Basilienses" although it was the reading of Stephanus; he does not in his *apparatus* mention the form Ἀναξιλάτίδης, the form printed by Cobet and by Hicks and adopted by Schwartz in *R.-E.*, I, 2083, although this is the form of the name that he employs in his note on p. 46. In fragment 4 (Plutarch, *De An. Proc.* 1022 E = p. 10, 12 [Wehrli]) he prints συμπληρούντων and in his *apparatus* calls συμπληροῦν "varia lectio"; but συμπληροῦν is in fact the reading of both E and B, and Bernardakis properly prints it in his text without attested variant. In fragment 7 (Proclus, *In Platonis Rem Publicam*, II, p. 123, 3-4 [Kroll] = p. 11, 23 [Wehrli]) ὄμοιον ἀψύχῳ is printed without comment, although Kroll has on this phrase the note: "ὄμοιῶν ἀψύχων Morus, corr. Bernays qui ὄμοιως." In fragment 11 (*Schol. Platon. Leges* 739 A) Wehrli prints without comment περὶ παροιμίας φησὶ κτλ., which is also given without any critical note in Greene's *Scholia Platonica*, p. 321, although both Müller (fragment 44a) and Hermann (*Platonis Dialogi*, VI, p. 379) print παρὰ παροιμίας φησὶ κτλ.; παρὰ appears to me to be more reasonable ("The source of his remark is the proverb," etc.), but in any case a critical note is called for at such a point. In fragment 24 (Athenaeus, XV, 670 e — p. 17,

24-25 [Wehrli]) *τοῦ ἐμποδόν* is printed without mention of Edmonds' *τῷ ἐμποδῷ* which Gulick adopts and apparently without cognizance of Gulick's note on the passage. The text and apparatus of fragment 97 (Plutarch, *De Facie* 920 F [not E]) are misleading. No indication is given that in the MSS there is a lacuna before *καὶ πρὸς Κλέαρχον* at the beginning. ὁ ἀνήρ, *'Αριστοτέλους* is ascribed to Müller, who had simply copied it from Dübner, *'Αριστοτέλους* having been the emendation of Turnebus. The impossible *ἴτυς* is printed without even a mention of the emendation, *όψις*, of Turnebus and Kepler. *ἴ<ριν>* is ascribed to "editores" instead of Turnebus. Xylander's *<σύντηξις>* is adopted without mention of other proposals, although here Raingeard's *πηξίων* is certainly correct.

Wehrli's text at several points raises more substantial questions, however, questions which involve his interpretation rather than the adequacy of his editorial technique. In fragment 14 (Hesychius, s. v. *Μαέρως* — fragment 29 [Müller]) he adopts the alteration of *παρὰ Μάγων* to *παρὰ Μονοσῶν* and supposes that with these words Clearchus intended to ascribe the invention of music to the Egyptian; but the combination of the facts that Clearchus made the Hindu gymnosophists "descendants of the Magi" (fragment 13 — Diogenes Laertius, I, 9) and the Jews "descendants of the philosophers among the Hindus" (fragment 6 — Josephus, *Adv. Apionem*, I, 22 ff.) and that Aristotle, as Wehrli himself observes, is said to have declared in the *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* that the Magi were older than the Egyptians (Diogenes Laertius, I, 8) seems to me to speak in favor of retaining the MS reading, *παρὰ Μάγων*, in Hesychius and to see here the possibility that Clearchus may have traced all "philosophy" back to a single ultimate source in Persia.

Wehrli calls ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ the work which Müller entitled ΕΡΩΤΙΚΑ and argues (p. 57, note on fragment 35) that it must have been in the form of a dialogue. According to Athenaeus, II, 57 ε ἐκάλονν δὲ καὶ τὰ νῦν τῶν οἰκιῶν παρ' ἡμῖν καλούμενα ὑπερῶν ὡά, φησὶ Κλέαρχος ἐν ἔρωτικοῖς. Since according to Scholion T on *Iliad*, XVI, 184 it was the Spartans who used ὡα for the μετέωρα οἰκήματα, Wehrli, assuming that this notice derives from Clearchus, concludes that παρ' ἡμῖν in fragment 35 means Sparta, that Clearchus could not have said this in his own person as a Cypriote, and that therefore the words of the fragment are proof that the work was a dialogue. The speaker does not say, however, that the upper chambers are or were ever called ὡὰ παρ' ἡμῖν; to the contrary, he says: "They used to call ὡά the parts of the houses that are now in our country called ὑπερῶν," which rather sounds as if the speaker, whether Clearchus in his own person or not, were distinguishing his countrymen from the subject of ἐκάλονν. So this provides no evidence for the form of the work; and as for the title, all the references to it, ἐν ἔρωτικοῖς as here, ἐν τοῖς ἔρωτικοῖς, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἔρωτικῶν, ἐν δευτέρῳ ἔρωτικῶν imply the ΕΡΩΤΙΚΑ assumed by Müller or ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΙ rather than Wehrli's ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ.

The punctuation in fragment 41 and the note on p. 60 appear to involve a misconstruction of Sappho's lines (Athenaeus, XV, 687 a-b; Sappho, frag. 65 A, 25-6 [Diehl] — frag. 118 [Edmonds]). *ἔρος τἀελίω* is the subject of λέλογχε of which τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν is object; and so Clearchus construed it, interpreting ἡ τοῦ ζῆν

*ἐπιθυμία τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἰχεν αὐτῇ.* Wehrli should not then have set off *ἔρος τἀλείω* by commas, nor is there justification for his note: "Die Dinge zu welchen Sappho sich bekennt, ἀβροσύνη, Liebe zur Sonne oder Lebensfreude und *καλόν* werden alle gleichgesetzt, woraus K. folgert, für die Dichterin berge Lust als solche einen ethischen Wert."

In fragment 76 b (Suidas, s. v. *νεοττός*) Wehrli omits the sentences introduced by the words *Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ περὶ οἴνων συγγράμματι φησιν*, which Müller prints as fragment 74 a, and assigns to Clearchus the subsequent story which is introduced by *μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Χρύσιππος*, assuming that "Chrysipp ursprünglich als zweiter Gewährsmann für die Erzählung hinter K. genannt, in dem durch Kürzung verwirrten Text des Suidas allein stehen geblieben ist" and that Clearchus combined the fragment of Menander which appears at the beginning of Suidas' article with the story which is ascribed to Chrysippus not only by Suidas but also by Cicero. I think Wehrli is probably right in suspecting that *περὶ οἴνων* in the text of Suidas is a mistake for *περὶ παροιμιῶν*; for the rest of his treatment of this fragment there is no foundation whatever. The sentences which he omits are in Clearchus' manner, for they would explain, as the story ascribed to Chrysippus makes no attempt to do, *why* people had called the yolk *νεοττός* though mistakenly, as he points out according to good Peripatetic doctrine (cf. Aristotle, *De Gen. Animal.* 751 B 4-7, 752 B 23-28, 753 B 10-12). The story ascribed to Chrysippus, on the other hand, is, *pace* Wehrli, a testimonial to divination and not an *αἴτιον* of the proverbial expression, for the point of the story assumes the currency of the expression in order that the finder of the treasure may understand the rebuke of the diviner.

A problem of like nature but with more serious implications is involved in the treatment of fragment 53 (Athenaeus, XII, 530 c = fragment 13 [Müller]). Wehrli prints as part of the fragment the sentence, *διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Ξενοκράτην τὸν Χαλκηδόνιον σκώπτων . . . ἔλεγεν "χείρες μὲν ἀγνάι, φρὴν δὲ ἔχει μίασμά τι,"* and in his note says: "die üble Anwendung des Euripideszitats gehört zum Klatsch, der sich an den Gegensatz zwischen Aristoteles und der Akademie hängte; K. ist nicht Peripatetiker genug, um diesen Gegensatz sachlich zu begreifen." It is by no means certain, however, that this sentence belongs to Clearchus; Müller did not print it; and its form following the indirect discourse, *Κλέαρχος . . . Σάγαριν φησι . . . προενέγκασθαι*, suggests that Athenaeus did not mean to ascribe it to Clearchus. In fact, the remark of Aristotle and the habit of Xenocrates to which it refers have nothing to do with the motive of Clearchus' story about Sagaris but only a superficial verbal connection with *οὐ πάποτε δὲ τὴν χείρα κατωτέρω τοῦ δυμφαλοῦ προενέγκασθαι*. The following *διὸ* therefore probably belongs to Athenaeus himself, who not infrequently uses this means of lending a specious logical connection to the quotations and stories that he strings together. Another example of this habit is provided by the verses of Anaxilas, introduced by *διὸ πρεπόντως ἦν τις εἶποι τῷ σοφῷ τούτῳ φιλοσόφῳ* (Athenaeus, XII, 548 c), which are Athenaeus' own addition to the preceding quotation from Clearchus, though Wehrli prints them as part of his fragment 60 (pp. 26-27).

If Clearchus is responsible for the story of Aristotle's insulting

gibe at Xenocrates, however, his attitude towards the Academy must have been one of personal animosity; and this one would reasonably suppose to be the meaning of Wehrli's remark that Clearchus was "not Peripatetic enough to have an objective understanding of the opposition between Aristotle and the Academy," were it not that in his note on fragment 2, to which he here refers, he suggests that Clearchus openly opposed the animosity of Aristoxenus towards the Academy (p. 46). By lack of "objective understanding" does Wehrli then mean that Clearchus was too stupid to understand the implications of the slander that he supposes him to have repeated in fragment 53? However that may be, Wehrli sees Clearchus as more of a Platonist than an Aristotelian. Indeed, in his commentary on fragment 73 (Athenaeus, XIII, 555 e = fragment 49 [Müller]) he says: "Als Platoniker wird er die spartanischen Massnahmen als Erziehungsmittel bewundern" (p. 71), although there is nothing in the fragment to indicate either a tendency towards Platonism or approval of the Spartan custom there reported. The Platonism of the *περὶ ὑπνου* (fragments 5-10) is established hardly any more firmly. According to Wehrli (p. 47) "Das gemeinsame Thema Schlaf interessierte K. als der Zustand, der Sonderexistenz und damit Unsterblichkeit der Seele offenbart. K. bleibt damit seinem Platonismus treu, wofür er sich auf den aristotelischen Eudem berufen kann"; but then he must suppose (cf. *apparatus* to fragment 9, p. 12) that *Κλέαρχος* is a mistake for *Δικαιάρχος* in Theoderet, *Graec. Affect. Curatio V*, 18: *Κλέαρχος δὲ τῶν τεττάρων εἶναι στοιχέιων τὴν ἀρμονίαν* (*scil. τὴν ψυχήν*), for, if this correctly states the opinion of Clearchus, fragments 7 and 8 (Proclus, *In Plat. Rem Pub. II*, p. 122, 22 ff. and p. 113, 19 ff. [Kroll]) and fragment 38 (Athenaeus, IV, 157e) do not. It should be observed that in none of these passages does Proclus or Athenaeus say that Clearchus asserted his own belief in the separability or immortality of the soul. Proclus says that he represented Aristotle as having been so persuaded, and Athenaeus says that he ascribed the opinion expressed in fragment 38 to Euxitheus the Pythagorean; and lacking knowledge of the contexts from which these reports or excerpts come we can hardly guess what relation they bore to Clearchus' own conclusions or even be sure that he expressed any dogmatic conclusion at all. To Wehrli, however, the ascription of a *Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον* to Clearchus (fragment 2 = fragment 43 [Müller]; Diogenes Laertius, III, 2) means that Clearchus wrote a "philosophical confession" and as a Peripatetic could appeal in support of his tendency towards Plato to the "platonizing early works of Aristotle, for whose later movement away from the Academy he obviously had no understanding" (p. 45). He does not mention the fact that there are strong grounds for suspecting the soundness of the text which ascribes this *Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον* to Clearchus instead of to Speusippus who is mentioned in the same passage (cf. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici Scriptis*, pp. 32 ff.). What is stranger still, he does not in this connection take cognizance of Plutarch's assertion that Clearchus *πολλὰ τοῦ Περιπάτου παρέτρεψεν* (*De Facie* 920 E); and neither here nor in his notes on that passage (pp. 79-80 on fragment 97) does he consider the implications of that statement, the context of which (*ὑμέτερος γὰρ ἄνηρ . . . εἰ καὶ πολλὰ . . . παρέτρεψεν*) suggests in fact that the Peripatetics sought to disown Clearchus. Wehrli might have argued that in so

doing they were disowning the "early Aristotle"; but this would raise the embarrassing question why they did not also directly disown the "early Aristotle" whose works, after all, were known to them. The fact is that the remains of Clearchus' writings are so meagre that we are unable to determine with any assurance what his philosophical position, if he adopted any definite position, really was.

One further point concerning the interpretation of fragment 97 must be mentioned, for it illustrates the danger of interpreting passages as isolated fragments. Wehrli in his note (p. 80) takes the theory of the rainbow mentioned in p. 36, lines 27-28 (Plutarch, V, p. 404, 22 ff. [Bernardakis]) as that of Clearchus ( . . . "so wie nach K's Meinung das Licht des Regenbogens nach der Wolke"). The theory is Aristotle's and in that sense Peripatetic (cf. Aristotle, *Meteorology* 373 A 32-375 B 12 and Areius Didymus, fragment 14 = *Dox. Graec.*, p. 455, 14 ff.) ; but, as *οἰεσθ' ἴμεῖς* addressed to Apollonides shows, Plutarch intended to ascribe it to mathematicians generally (cf. *καὶ καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὴν ἥριν . . . λέγουσι . . .* in the similar passage, *De Iside* 358 F). For the notion that the sea is reflected in the moon cf. also Lucian, *Icaromenippus*, § 20. Wehrli is mistaken in supposing that Clearchus assumed the reflection of the sea in the moon to be "indirect"; both he and the "Pythagoreans" of Aëtius, II, 30, 1 had in mind simply the phenomenon of "seeing around a corner" by means of a mirror and not a reflection from sea to sun or central-fire(!) and thence to the moon.

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GIUSEPPE MORETTI. *Ara Pacis Augustae*. Rome, La Libreria dello Stato, 1948. Text, pp. 325 with 13 plates and 202 cuts; portfolio of 39 plates.

This outstanding monument of Augustan Rome has now been rendered accessible by means of an impressive *édition de luxe*. In view of the restriction to 500 copies, and the high price, it is fortunate that a small portable volume, *L'Ara Pacis Augustae*, from the same press and author, appeared some years ago in the series *Itinerari dei Musei e Monumenti d'Italia*.

The present publication follows almost four centuries of intermittent discovery and study; it is the outcome of the activities of the Italian State, as represented by the late *Soprintendente alle Antichità di Roma e Lazio*. A prefatory note by the son, Mario Moretti, states that the text and plates thus presented embody in all respects the views of his father, who was able to follow the undertaking up to and including the correction of the final proofs.

The *Rendiconti* of the Pontifical Roman Academy of Archaeology, XXII (1946-7), pp. 17-22, contain a commemoration of Giuseppe Moretti (1876-1945), by Roberto Paribeni: he exemplified the best qualities of an archaeological functionary, and the culmination of his career was the carrying to completion, in 1937-8, of that pecu-

liarily difficult enterprise, the recovery from among the foundations of the Palazzo Fiano, in the ancient Campus Martius, of the remains of the *Ara Pacis Augustae* which earlier discoveries had suggested might still lie buried in the vicinity, and then, in the years following, the reassembling and re-erection of that monument at a site between the Mausoleum of Augustus and the Tiber.

The complexity of the final undertaking was partly due to the nature of the waterlogged subsoil and the presence in and near the area concerned of various Renaissance and modern buildings, the stability of which would have been compromised by a lowering of the flood-level: for the constant pressure of the water serves to hold their foundations in place. Pp. 56-68 and pls. XXXVI, XXXVII, show how the awkward technical problem of isolating the required area was eventually solved by the ultra-modern expedient of a chemical freezing apparatus, thus forming a watertight compartment.

The actual material reconstruction of the monument makes use of (1) original blocks, slabs, and fragments; (2) for the substructure, marble from quarries at Carrara—not demonstrably those used by the Augustan builders; (3) for certain parts of the friezes and decorative elements, the originals of which are preserved elsewhere, plaster casts taken from those originals; (4) for some of the missing decorative parts, further casts, made from details already used elsewhere in the restoration, and arbitrarily introduced here for a second time in order to assist in giving a general impression of the sculptured bands; (5) also, in some instances, newly modelled plaster details. With few exceptions, no fresh restoration was applied to the figured friezes, in contrast with the decorative floral elements; but portions of the figures, and especially many heads of the personages forming the procession on the north side of the enclosing wall, had already been restored in marble in Renaissance times, and it proved necessary to retain these restorations even at the cost of tolerating painful dissonances. Moreover, as already stated, the whole structure was re-erected at a point remote from its original location, and it was actually set at an orientation some 90 degrees divergent from the ancient one. Hence, for various reasons, the *Ara Pacis Augustae* in its present form cannot lay claim to complete authenticity as embodying either the symbolism or the artistic achievement envisaged by its makers.

The publication is highly informative. Commendation is due the skill and conscientiousness of the draftsmen who prepared the restored designs of the monument as it now is: a most helpful feature of the volume of plates, although, not even when used in connection with the indications afforded in the text, invariably helpful in distinguishing between what is original and what is due to restoration. It does not appear possible, however, to extend the same degree of praise to the photographic plates and text-cuts: these were taken partly from the original marble, partly from casts; in general, the lighting appears to have been conditioned by the present location, and cannot be considered ideal for the purpose. Moreover, in most instances the printing has been executed in a uniformly muddy brownish tint and upon paper which absorbs the surface values, themselves already somewhat diffused and diluted at earlier stages

of the process; the cuts in the text show everywhere the rippling lines of the fabric of the paper; the contrast with the small illustrations in Morelli's earlier volume is by no means entirely in favor of the more ambitious presentation. But—when all due recognition has been accorded to some veritable triumphs of reproduction in this and other volumes issuing from the same press—we have by now become accustomed, in the luxurious official or semi-official publications of the present time, to the falsification of tone qualities; and the surfaces of the *Ara Pacis Augustae*, which in any case no longer show the appearance in which the makers left them, have probably fared not much worse than those of the waxy encaustic paintings of Pompeii and the sharply struck metallic issues of the Sicilian mints.

When so much is generously given, more, perhaps unreasonably, is desired. The boukrania, paterae, and festoons of the upper register of the interior face of the enclosing wall appear in the restored designs, pls. VI-IX, and in nine text-cuts, figs. 1, 10, 66, 136-141: but they are not represented photographically and in detail on the plates. This omission will be regretted by those who see, in the garlands at least, not only one of the artistically most admirable features of the whole monument but, from the standpoint of cult practice, one of the most essential: they are the sublimated rendering in sculpture of the actual garlands which fulfilled a more than decorative function at the moment of thanksgiving and devotion.

It is not our intention to repeat here the information regarding this monument which, as the result of earlier discoveries and learned treatment, is accessible in the manuals and text-books and may be assumed to be common knowledge. The proverbial schoolboy has probably seen the name, his eye has been caught by an illustration or two, and he has formed some more or less definite associations in his mind. The campaign of 1903, however,—to be brief—had revealed the presence of an entrance at the eastern, back, end of the structure, corresponding to that already assumed, and in that same campaign actually found, at the front, to the west (p. 48); and this discovery had necessitated the elimination from consideration of the "Della Valle" reliefs (pp. 28-30, 33, 119-131), for which there was no longer room available and which therefore must have formed part of another structure. The outstanding result of the most recent campaign itself was the finding of enough of the essential elements of the actual cult altar that stood within the enclosure (figs. 85, 142-3 represent its tufa core; figs. 61, 63, 64, 144-7, 151-2, and pls. XXVIII-XXXV some of its sculptured adornment, to which may be added the further fragments discussed on pp. 81-6) to justify its reconstruction (figs. 99, 140-1, 158), thus revealing the functional and organic nature of the ensemble.

The volume of text embodies an account of the successive phases of discovery and interpretation, a description of the recent finds and of the re-erection of the monument, and a hermeneutical and aesthetic appreciation. The first two-thirds thus possess much of the fascination of a mystery novel—they form both a presentation of evidence and a study in deduction. But it must be observed that this method has entailed sacrifices as well. We hesitate to criticise an arrangement which the peculiar nature of Moretti's task may have rendered inevitable. But, as executed, it has led to a distribution of

material which taxes the agility and the energies of those endeavoring to make use of the publication, and—in the absence of a subject-index—occasionally it falls to the plates rather than to the volume of text to present the monument as an organic whole. In the text, the several features do not always appear where they might, *a priori*, have been expected. Certain sculptured details recur in widely-scattered plates: thus Mars, in figs. 54, 110, 124, as well as pls. XVI, XXI, and pp. 30, 241-2 of the text. The valuable observations as to polychromy (pp. 176-8) form an incident in the treatment of the restoration of the inner face of the enclosing-wall. The cuttings for clamps and dowels, also the lewis-holes—a matter of prime importance for the builders' technique—are clearly shown on pl. V, which is supplemented by figs. 88 and 118, with a few words of text on pp. 92 and 143; but they deserved a place in a coherent treatment of construction, which might then have been extended to include the—seemingly quite unexplained—horizontal cuttings appearing at regular intervals on the outer face of the topmost course of the podium of the enclosing-wall (pls. I, III, IV), which can hardly be due to later readjustment.

We must not linger in detail over the interpretation, and the aesthetic appreciation, of the several friezes of the enclosing-wall and the altar, which, in general and within fair limits, have been treated in the work under review: especially as the nature and importance of this monument will doubtless evoke varied appraisal from numerous scholars in the next few years. A publication such as this, while marking the end of one period of investigation, may well serve as the starting-point for further interpretation.

One matter, however, appears to call for a few words. Moretti (pp. 232-7) gave generous consideration, though not acceptance, to our own effort (*J. R. S.*, III [1913], pp. 134-41) to interpret the familiar panel with the matronly figure flanked by *aurae velificantes*. But apparently our subsequent endeavor (*A. J. A.*, XLI [1937], p. 651) to express more clearly the implications of this interpretation was not known to him. This appears regrettable, if, as we feel, it has led him to fall somewhat short (pp. 310-11) of a full comprehension of the significance of the *Ara Pacis Augustae* as a logically conceived whole, and a full recognition of its cosmic import as conceived by its makers. For us, equilibrium is restored to the main frieze only with the recognition that, just as its west front exhibits the balance between Aeneas, the bringer of civilization to Italy, to the south of the entrance way, and Romulus, the founder of Rome, to its north; and just as the procession of the Julian House and its attendants on the south side finds its corresponding element in the Roman procession on the north side; so the eastern entrance was flanked to its south by Italia and to its north by Roma: the whole series of representations on the great frieze forms a coherent and closely reasoned system. The two parallel processions leave the rear portal to the care of the two divine guardians, and on reaching the front at the west they will find their respective ancestral representatives of the heroic age.

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W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT and O. NEUGEBAUER. *The Calendars of Athens.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press for the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1947. Pp. xii + 115. \$5.00.

The last generation has witnessed a series of thoughtful studies which have carried our knowledge of the Athenian calendar far beyond what earlier scholars might have dreamed was possible. For the fruitfulness of the results, which aim at providing for Greek history a sound chronological basis in general and a sharper perspective in its particulars, we are indebted primarily to the inscriptions, especially to the rich yield of the Athenian agora, and to the persistent and ingenious work of such men as Meritt, West, Ferguson, Dinsmoor, Pritchett, and Dow. Now, at just the right time, comes an important book by Pritchett and Neugebauer which takes stock of progress, evaluates method, and issues a few needed words of caution to the epigraphists, whose dexterity sometimes carries them beyond the credible limits of the evidence.

Although the authors admit the double datings *κατ' ἄρχοντα* and *κατὰ θεόν* as their point of departure, they were soon led to survey all the epigraphic material bearing on the calendar from the fifth to the second centuries B. C. and thus to examine the now familiar puzzles, e. g., intercalation, length of prytanies, calendar cycles, backward or forward count. What has obviously impressed them most is the correctness of Aristotle's statement concerning the rigid prytany calendar.

A major virtue of this book is that the problems are clearly put and the terminology is precisely defined. As the authors recognize, all do not belong to the small circle of chronological experts; yet most Greek historians are interested in the difficulties and the methods. The first chapter (Problems of the Athenian Calendar) will be instructive to the experts as well as to others, for here the leading arguments are anticipated without the usual assumption that the reader is intimate with the evidence and with the previous literature. So, for example, the nature of a lunar (astronomical) calendar is described as are the character and purpose of cycles constructed by a system of intercalation. The same principle is adhered to throughout the volume. An illustration is the table of Athenian monetary symbols presented in note 10, p. 97, which, elementary as it may be to epigraphists, will earn praise from non-specialists; cf. the useful list of the days of the Athenian month on pp. 30-31, with the illuminating Notes (pp. 31-33).

The basic assumptions of this book are significant enough to present here:

- (1) Aristotle's report of a rigid prytany calendar is certainly true of his own day; probably a rigid prytany calendar was the real civil calendar "in all periods which concern us" (p. vii).
- (2) The Metonic cycle cannot be employed for the distribution of ordinary and intercalary years; all such cycles should not be presumed to have contained seven intercalations.
- (3) The months of the civil calendar do not necessarily alternate

between full and hollow; years may have  $354 \pm 1$  days (ordinary) or  $384 \pm 1$  (intercalary).

- (4) The count in the last third of the month ( $\phiθίνοντος$  or  $\muετί$   
 $εικάδας$ ) is always backward and only the 29<sup>th</sup> day varies  
according to the nature of the month, full or hollow, i.e.,  
the 22<sup>nd</sup> is always ἐράτη and δευτέρα (29<sup>th</sup>) does not occur in a  
hollow month.
- (5) The archons, as the  $\kappa\alpha\tau'$  ἀρχοντα dates imply, felt free to  
tamper with the true (lunar) calendar ( $\kappa\alpha\tau\bar{a}$  θεόν).

"... the Athenian calendar seems to us to be the combination of a rigid prytany calendar and a civil calendar having the normal irregularities of lunar reckoning, and subject to arbitrary modification on certain occasions" (p. 4).

Chapters II to V are devoted to a demonstration of the validity of the above convictions. Here the calendrical equations from 341/0 to 100 B. C. are methodically listed, restorations are tested, some are rejected, possible substitutions are offered. This thorough year-by-year examination does not, so far as I can determine, damage the basic assumptions. It is true that Pritchett and Neugebauer are forced to posit scribal errors; their predecessors posit rather more to establish their systems. They conjecture dislocations of formulae and irregularities in stoichedon order; so do their predecessors. In any case, such disturbances are attested in the extant portions of the documents. The sheer weight of the evidence corroborates the belief that throughout this period the prytanies conformed to a pattern and that the civil calendar was often arbitrarily retarded.

In the final chapter the authors turn to the fifth century in an attempt to discover if equality in the length of prytanies was then the rule. Their conclusion is positive, that each prytany year (to judge from the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2) contained 366 days, the first six prytanies comprising 37 each, the last four 36. With typical conservatism they set out the evidence first on the basis of those texts which do not depend upon restoration. They then tackle the broken sections of the vital inscription, *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324, and show that these do not vitiate their assumptions.

In their treatment of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324 they make certain noteworthy criticisms of the present restorations. Meritt (*The Athenian Calendar*, especially p. 33), in computing the interest on loans, had stated that "fifths and tenths were avoided, as were also the odd fractions 1/7, 1/11, 1/13, 1/14, 1/15, 1/17, etc." Pritchett and Neugebauer now point out that this method works both ways, i.e., it must be also employed in the restoration of a principal sum. If both 1/5 and 1/7, as amounts of interest, are calculated as 1/6, then a given interest of 1/6 may correspond to any principal between 714 2/7 and 1000 drachmae. "The maximum error permitted in any given method of computing interest should likewise be allowed in computing the principal" (p. 100). The authors utilize this thesis and other epigraphical characteristics of the document to prove that *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324 may be restored so as to produce a regular pattern in the length of prytanies. But, they emphasize, "the preserved portions are the only part which may be used for historical evidence" (p. 105).

The volume is brought to a conclusion by an Appendix on

Athenian coins of the second century which have been thought to concern the calendar, and by an Index of Greek Inscriptions Cited.

In the course of the argument Pritchett and Neugebauer make a good many sensible observations; I can select only a few. "For the restoration of the character of any particular year, the Metonic cycle, even in its emptiest form, is without any value" (p. 9). "... the age of Meton had not yet reached fundamental insight into the astronomical conditions governing the movements of the sun, much less that of the moon . . ." (p. 11). The ambiguity occasioned by a concurrent employment of forward and backward count "is to say the least very puzzling. The reader of a prescript with a date  $\mu\epsilon\tau'$   $\epsilon\kappa\acute{a}d\alpha s$  had to know whether the month in question was hollow or full and whether the counting was backward or forward when he wanted to establish a specific date. Furthermore, the character of a month as full or hollow must always have been decided in advance . . ." (p. 24).

My belief is that this study is of fundamental importance and must be very seriously considered by all who work on these problems in the future. To my mind, we shall require more evidence than we possess today to prove the authors' basic assumptions wrong. Some, it will be noted, are negative; but a negative result is often to be preferred to a positive theory that is erected upon insufficient and contradictory evidence; in calendaric matters such a theory is propped by restorations. When the quarry is elusive the road is beset with Loreleis.

The epigraphic determinations in *The Calendars of Athens* (and, as the authors tell us, the emphasis is placed upon the epigraphical aspects) are firmly conservative. Absolute reliance is never placed upon restoration, and readings that could not be controlled are regarded with suspicion; see, for example, p. 51 and cf. pp. 52-53, where Wilhelm is chided for his sparing use of dots. Such wariness is laudable and the reader, who is taken fully into the authors' confidence, need never feel that a theory is being built upon hazardous supplements.

In their study of the calendar of the fifth century Pritchett and Neugebauer, maintaining their principles, deliberately refuse to deal with the badly worn inscription catalogued as *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 304B, on the ground that they cannot at this distance control the readings. They believe, however, that the document can be restored in accordance with a prytany pattern on the assumption of arbitrary interference with the civil calendar. Examination of the stone in Paris may compel them to agree with Meritt's readings and to modify their conclusions; this, I think, they recognize.

The book has been prepared with typical care and I suspect that some of the flaws mentioned in this paragraph are not the responsibility of the authors. Distortions of spelling occur on pp. vii ("conviction"), 26 ("is" has become "it"), 34 (read "Sandys'" for "Sandy's" in n. 1), 45 and 74 ("unnecessary"), 66 ("which"), 72 ("he" has become "the" in n. 9), 77 ("dittography" in n. 28), 90 ("occurred"), 106 ("parapegma" in n. 27).  $\Lambda\acute{y}\epsilon\tilde{\delta}\oslash$  has a wrong accent on p. 46, [ $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\nu$ ]  $\nu$  has lost its accent on p. 44. Punctuation is faulty on p. 31 (in the second Note), a metathesis has gone unnoticed in the heading of the table on p. 97, and a symbol is miss-

ing from the table in n. 10 on the same page. A few errors in English usage disturb the reader: the third sentence on p. 18 needs rewriting; the antecedent of "it" is not clear in the second paragraph of p. 23; "Panathenaia" is treated as singular on p. 73, n. 14; "implied" is used for "inferred" on p. 108. The reference in n. 52 on p. 59 should be to *I.G., I<sup>2</sup>, 63* (not 304); the same mistake is to be found on p. 31. The Greek font is not always attractive; the final sigmas seem ugly to me and in Chapter VI epsilon beneath the circumflex has suffered shrinkage (e.g., p. 101).

This study is carried out in an expert manner and with scrupulous honesty. The epigraphic responsibility is Pritchett's, the astronomical contributions are Neugebauer's. Both are scholars of reputation and this impressive performance will enhance both reputations.

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ERNST ROBERT CURTIUS. *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*. Bern, Francke, 1948. Pp. 601.

The scholarly development of Professor Curtius is remarkable for the wide range of the pendulum of his interests: a pupil of Gröber's, that is of the most factual-minded and the most rigorously positivistic spirit of an age that has gone, he started by editing an Old French text (*Li quatre livres des Reis*, 1911), suddenly to shift his interests to contemporary French literature, publishing a monograph on Brunetière and, after the first World War, the volume *Die literarischen Wegbereiter des neuen Frankreich* (1919), which, with its—sometimes not too critical—emphasis on most recent French literature, with its acceptance of the then fashionable philosophies of Scheler and Bergson, with its intelligent aesthetic appraisal of new literary techniques, with its brisk, elegant, near-journalistic style, was to provoke a storm of indignation from the *vieux grognons* school of German philologists, and to be enthusiastically received by the public at large, and, finally, to usher in a new era (coinciding with that of the Weimar Republic) for the German university curriculum: now was begun the study of contemporary foreign literatures as a means for the understanding (and this was thought to lead toward the political understanding) of the national genius, the national moral and aesthetic ideologies of other peoples. The *Wegbereiter* was followed by studies on Valéry and Proust, by books on Barrès and Balzac, and by that *Essai sur la France* (the German title is "Frankreich," 1930) in which France is portrayed as a partner with Germany in that dialogue on occidental civilization which the two nations had pursued for centuries. (The English and Spanish partners in that conversation were not forgotten: studies on Joyce and the generation of 1898). Thus Curtius had, by 1930, acquired the international position of a European "critic of civilization" on a par with Thomas Mann, T. S. Eliot, Ortega, and Madariaga. Charles Dubos devoted to him one of his searching essays and greeted him as a Goethe *redivivus*.

In 1932, with the publication of the book *Deutscher Geist in*

*Gefahr* and the study *Jorge Manrique und der Kaisergedanke*, a sudden change of interest manifested itself on the part of the "modernist" Curtius. In the first, he issued a warning to Germany, on the verge of turning Nazi, and called her back to Humanism and her cultural past; in the second, we see an abandonment of all aesthetic, philosophic and modernistic tendencies, only historical and philological questions being treated: the late medieval Spanish poet studied here was only considered as a link in a thousand-year-old tradition which can be retraced to the rhetorical exercises of late antiquity and which is reflected in medieval Latin historiography. Curtius was here interested not in the poetry of Manrique as a whole, nor even in the single poem, the *Coplas en la muerte de su padre*, which he treats: he is concerned only with the *topos*: "catalogue of pious Roman emperors," which happens to be found therein and which he traces back to antiquity. The judgments of Miss Burkart in her study of Manrique that this catalogue is an inorganic ("bildungbeweisend") and therefore unpoetic section of the *Coplas*, was rejected by Curtius, who declared such aesthetic scruples to be irrelevant, given the position of this *topos* in tradition. Thus, by now, the pendulum had swung back to Curtius' philological beginnings: and since 1932 he has published more than a score of philological articles (about 1000 printed pages) on medieval Latin poetry, always stressing the continuity of poetic tradition from (late) antiquity up to the Romance and European literatures. All these studies have been reworked, compressed or enlarged, to form the impressive book under discussion which faithfully illustrates the program announced in its title.

How should we explain, in the later work of a great scholar and critic, the repudiation of his earlier work: the prophet of a new Europe become "a prophet turned backward," a historian of the Europeanism of the Middle Ages; the aesthetic and cultural critic become a philologist; the acolyte of Bergson's intuitionism and of Scheler's phenomenology become a "neopositivist"? The obvious political explanation (that under the Nazi regime a European point of view on cultural questions was dangerous) is too superficial: the change in Curtius had come from within. As early as 1932, he had become aware of the "perils" for the German mind which lay in its too easy, too lovingly-fostered irrationalism and which was able to engender a barbarous movement such as Hitlerism. With his flair for the duty of the hour, Curtius turned toward "solid philology" and toward medieval philology where sobriety and discipline of mind had reached their greatest triumphs. It was logical that an aristocratic mind such as Curtius' should, before the onslaught of the plebeian hordes, retreat into the Latin past of Germany, into a difficult subject matter, one inaccessible to minds of the Rosenberg stamp, and should limit itself to strictly rational methods that could have a sobering effect on the ideology- and word-drunken Germans, thus avoiding the pitfalls of a Karl Vossler whose vague irrational or idealistic categories ("the struggle against materialism, positivism and specialism") seemed, ironically enough, dangerously close to those of Hitlerism. The "European" Curtius could thus still preserve his scholarly integrity and also survive—in medieval garb. I even suspect that Curtius may have become surfeited, not only with

the vague intuitionism of his fellow Germans, but with his own, his own cultural speculation and his journalistic vein, and I distinctly sense in his new disillusioned attitude a bitter note of iconoclasm directed against himself, a will to matter-of-fact, ascetic, philological aridity, as if to chastize his former nature. Just as he had formerly suppressed in himself the marvelous philologist he had always been, he is now suppressing the marvelous essayist in him. Such suppression, now of this, now of that half of his nature, will, of course, never result in a Goethe-like balance.

Thus the positivistic approach of his teacher Gröber (the medievalist who had treated—separately, it is true—both medieval Latin and French literature in that forbidding bulky *Grundriss* which bears his name), was revived in Curtius, who not only fuses the two literatures, but extends the scope to include European medieval literature, and adds to its treatment his personal gift of form, his elegant essayistic style with its sharp epigrammatic formulae and the wide perspectives it is able, at any moment, to open up before the reader, with his power of organizing and mastering an overwhelming source material which, while embracing the classical languages and all the occidental vernaculars, is compressed into a readable book (of 18 chapters and 25 appendices, with generously comprehensive indices). This encyclopedic book offers a collection of *topoi* (traditional patterns of expression and artistic devices) followed through in all occidental languages from antiquity to the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, with the greatest stress on the literary period between the third and the tenth century, for which Latinist and Romance scholars alike have generally shown little interest (Curtius is the only living scholar in Romance who has read all the medieval Latin texts listed in Manitius' compendium). The great poets are mentioned in this book under the particular *topoi*, as links in the uninterrupted chain—Curtius proceeds, even more systematically than such predecessors as Faral or Scheludko, like a grammarian or rhetorician (he calls his book a *Nova Rhetorica*) who draws his examples from great authors (*auctoritates*) in order to illustrate suprapersonal developments; if he allows himself appreciations of their whole work he does so only for the sake of placing them within his European-Latin framework. Thus his book has become an inexhaustible mine of uncontroversial facts about the ultimate sources of European poetry. How happy must we be to possess such a vast grammar (or dictionary) of *topoi* in which a glance at the index may enable us to find all that is known to a unique connoisseur of classical, Neolatin and Romance philology about such topics as the Muses in the Middle Ages, the medieval concept of poetry, number symbolism and *Zahlenkomposition*, the concept of the "book" or of the landscape, the formulae of humility, *armas y letras, puer senex*, etc., and about the semantic development of many technical terms of modern literary history, terms that Curtius succeeds generally in antedating considerably! Page after page is devoted to the enumeration of texts intended to demonstrate a particular conviction of the author on the historical continuity in the expression of a thought or in an artistic device; and the quotations from Shakespeare, Milton, Calderon, or Goethe, when appearing against the medieval background are made to appear in a new

light—as less original, more traditional, at least as concerns their content. The wealth of material that is unfolded in every chapter or appendix produces in us a particular elation: that aroused precisely by the realization of the historical continuity of our European civilization. When the seventeenth-century writer Gracián's concepts of *ingenio* and *concepto* are retraced to a passage of the fifth-century writer Martianus Capella in which their Latin equivalents *ingenium* and *conceptus* are found side by side, one feels as though the world-clock stood still: man appears here as a being consisting in continuity. And is not the insight into such basic conservatism of man an antidote against the feeling of helplessness engendered by the vista of chaotic dismemberment and of the crumbling of tradition that the world of today offers us? Before the forces of barbarism that encircle us, Curtius has found an escape by immersing himself in the necropolis of a past that was alive as late as the eighteenth century (this is for Curtius the dividing line between his Middle Ages and modernity).

No comprehensive book on medieval literature in the last fifty years is more epoch-making than this: it seems to me to surpass in solidity, in wealth of material and range of interest Wechssler's *Kulturproblem des Minnesangs*, Vossler's *Göttliche Komödie*, and C. S. Lewis' *The Allegory of Love*. For here speaks an historian of Romance (and European) literature who sees the unity of Latin and Romance ("European") in a manner paralleled only by the linguistic comparatists, a Diez or a Meyer-Lübke (it is the linguists who, in the demonstration of their vision of unity, have preceded the literary historians by 100 years). No wonder that Curtius should at times himself turn comparative linguist or semanticist.

Shall I say that with Curtius' insistence on the "topological" and rhetorical in medieval poetry a new era of medieval studies has begun, similar to that initiated for modern literary studies by his *Wegbereiter*? Curtius, with his characteristic absolutism, tells us as much, implying at times that his historical-philological method should take the place of history of ideas (to which it obviously contributes), of the study of national temperaments, of aesthetic criticism, of investigation as to the interrelation between the arts in a given period ("classic—baroque period")—in short, most of the recent trends in literary scholarship seem now superfluous or obsolete to him. But Curtius seems here to be throwing out the baby with the bath: because Hitlerites and pre-Hitlerites twisted history of ideas, history of ideas as such must not be abandoned; because some acolytes of Wölfflin twisted his idea of the baroque, this historical category must not be declared useless.

I do not believe that, by tracing some of the "mannerisms" of seventeenth-century poets to late Latin poetry, Curtius (who would have us replace the term "baroque" by "manneristic") has destroyed forever the category of baroque poetry; or that the use of this term testifies to "Unwissenheit und pseudokunstwissenschaftlicher Systemzwang." If, let us say, the *Summations-Schema* (what Hatzfeld has called the "Calderonian résumé") is found already in Tiberianus (4<sup>th</sup> cent.) and Walafried Strabo (10<sup>th</sup> cent.)—in each of the two in one example only—the pullulation of this very device in seventeenth-century poetry is a fact, not negligible in itself, which in turn should be linked with other literary features of the latter period and which, in the totally different

climate of the post-Tridentine world, acquires a new meaning, different from the one it may have had in the fourth and tenth centuries: while materially the same, the device of *Summationsschema* represents something spiritually different in the new complex of phenomena it helps form. Similarly Gracián is not Martianus Capella. The adages of Sancho Panza, although sometimes textually identical with the *Proverbes au vilain*, mean something different in the new context, etc. The idea of a "baroque style"—as of any "style" is no less "scholarly" than, for example, Ascoli's idea of a "dialect" (which has not yet encountered valid objections from linguists): a dialect, like a "style" (which could be called "the dialect of a period") is a compound formed by elements which can be found elsewhere, but whose coexistence will hardly repeat itself in any other surroundings.

Personally, I am not convinced that topology is a new *method*—it is only a new, and very rich, source of historical information which finds its place within the age-old inquiry into outward sources—it represents indeed a more systematic approach to the ultimate outward sources. But it is also platonically true that the sum total of the sources does not explain the inward form of a particular work of art. Does Curtius forget that the great work of art is always unique and that art strives for uniqueness? Any great feeling tends toward the unrepeatable and the unparalleled, it is in its nature to feel what no one has ever felt before; the words of everyone become new words for the poet, they acquire indeed the quality of proper names. The "common-place" in a poetic work is the prepoetic, that which has been dissolved and reworked into a new, the poet's idiom.

It is, for instance, to take a personal experience, quite correct for the philologist to point out that the simile in the *Poema de Mio Cid* in which the tie between the protagonist and his family is compared to nail and flesh is commonplace in the Middle Ages: nevertheless the attitude of the naive Spanish admirer of the *Poema* who insists (against philological evidence) on considering the simile as unique, is still valid: in the moment that we enjoy the *Poema* we should forget our philological parallels and the commonplace character of its devices. Is it sufficient (to take some of Curtius' examples), whenever, in Provençal troubadour poetry, we come upon the metaphor "the eyes of the heart," to label the particular passage as an example of "Körperteil-Metaphern" (p. 144) which go back to the "etwas gewagte Bildersprache" of Plato—has Plato, when he first used this metaphor, done all the "daring" once for ever? Again, should we see in Dante's *O voi che siete in piccioletta barca* only an ancient "Schiffahrts-Metapher," in Guinizelli's *Al cor gentil ripara sempre amore* only the "commonplace" ("Gemeinplatz") of the nobility of the mind? Should we truly read Dante only as a medieval Latin rhetorician (no new discovery, especially after Schiaffini's investigations; and was it really necessary to enumerate on p. 279 all the 150 rhetorical paraphrases of Dante's, which are so easily found in Toynbee's *Concise Dante Dictionary?*), simply because the poetries of Dante's time (and of Boccaccio's) confused rhetoric and poetry?

Is it not insufficient to be told of the *Chanson de Saint Alexis* (p. 387): "Deren Perle, das 'Alexiuslied' . . . ist die wohl abgewogene Komposition eines gelehrten Kunstdichters, der die rhetorischen Mittel kannte und Virgil gelesen hatte"? It would seem as though this "gem" of Old French hagiographic poetry were a gem only because it conforms to school precepts and reveals its author's acquaintance

with Virgil. How can one identify that grandiose poem with clichés that could be found as well in Berceo's Spanish poetry as in any hagiographic literature? Again, the *Libro de Buen Amor* is defined (p. 390), in Gröber fashion, in terms of its borrowings from the *Ars amandi* and *Pamphilus de Amore*: Juan Ruiz, we are told, had added only Spanish names, that is "local and temporal color"; the go-between Trotacantos is an Ovidian figure, itself borrowed from the Greek New Comedy—the particular artistic temperament of Juan Ruiz is not discussed. The Neveu de Rameau derives from the Davus of Horace (*Satire II, 7*), the "structure" of Diderot's work being that of the Horatian satire, and the motif of the puppet (which goes ultimately back to Plato) is also a reflection of this satire (p. 562): the ultimate meaning of the *Neveu* (and of the puppet-motif) for the personal temperament of Diderot is not mentioned.

The aesthetic harm done to a poem by considering its devices or thoughts as unique is truly less great than that done by the levelling, disillusioning epithet "commonplace." And I do not know whether the best way to call the modern world back to humanism is to call it back to that rhetorical lore which the *humanistisches Gymnasium* taught only too much and too dryly.

I fear indeed—*principiis obsta!*—that Curtius' book, philologically sound as it is, will play into the hands of those *vieux grognons* literary historians who, in this country as in Europe, oppose any attempt at individualizing the artistic appreciation of medieval (and modern) works of art. The ascertainment, with the help of Curtius, of a *topos* in a poem may blind the student to what the individual poet has done with it and how he has transcended it. To declare the catalogue of Roman emperors in Jorge Manrique a *topos* does not dispense with aesthetic questions: the last critic, who has had the opportunity of studying Manrique, Pedro Salinas, still persists in finding the catalogue only "bildungbeweisend." The commendable attempt to furnish an historical understructure for our aesthetic sense must not lead toward the summary identification of the historical with the beautiful, the less so since the historical source may not be identical with the poet's inward source of inspiration (cf. again the relationship Davus—Neveu de Rameau). In my opinion the admirable work of Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis*, written by a German in exile without any resentment against current German movements and interpreting, historically and aesthetically, individual texts that cover the same span of twenty-six centuries as does Curtius' book, and Charles S. Singleton's brief *Essay on the Vita Nuova*, whose author, with profundity and exactness combined, attempts to *reenact* before the American reader one artistic masterpiece difficult of access, lead us farther into the inner sanctum of medieval poetry. Such books truly interpret the individual work of art while Curtius informs us, more completely than his predecessors, about its general background.

Curtius' chapter (18) on Dante which is intended by the author as the summit of his edifice seems to me singularly disappointing: the discussions on the rhetorical and Latinizing character of Dante's poetry, on the medieval genre represented by the *Commedia*, on the number of personages introduced into that work (Curtius uses here statistics in order to prove *Zahlenkomposition*) do not furnish the proper pedestal for the statue of Dante at the end, moulded in a Stefan George manner:

Dante, the *one man* who *alone* opposes, and transforms, the whole "Bildungskosmos des lateinischen Mittelalters." Singleton's monograph, on the contrary, shows us that progress in Dantean philology is not to be expected from trite classifications, but from a closely knit demonstration of the manner in which Dante's aesthetic and moral tenets became with him principles and problems of artistic composition. He is not satisfied with the statement of fact that in the *V.N.* there is number symbolism but shows how the principle  $9 (= 3 \times 3) + 1 = 10$  presides over the composition of the whole work: he is not satisfied with the fact that there are Latin sentences in the *V.N.*, but shows their exact functions. He is not satisfied with such a shallow statement as Curtius' that chapter 25, with its discussion of the use of the figure of speech "Amore," is "not convincingly motivated" and, therefore, can only be explained by Dante's wish "to prove his rhetorical training" (here, suddenly, Curtius seems to espouse Miss Burkart's term "bildungsbeweisend"—but this time in reference to Dante!!), but shows how central is chapter 25 in the *V.N.*, since it serves to delimit the position of the human *poeta* in relation to the divine Maker.

Curtius' great book is a powerful synthesis. As such, it opens the way to, and requires, a new synthesis that transcends it.

#### Two remarks on detail:

There is in Curtius a certain bias against French classicism. We may be shocked by the somewhat trenchant manner in which Curtius disposes of this period according to his personal likes and dislikes. French classicism, we are told, is due to a "humanistic misunderstanding" and represents the "rational basic element of the French mind" (p. 268; is Racine *only* rational? moreover, on p. 197 we had learnt that it is of "minimal scholarly value" to "hypostasize" a national psychology—whom are we to believe, the Curtius of p. 268 [and of the *Essai sur la France*] or the Curtius of p. 197?). Again: "Boileau, dieser beschränkte Banaus"—does Curtius not recognize that Boileau, if negligible as an original critical thinker, has been able to make critical theory *poetic* (in Valéry's formula: *de faire chanter les idées*)? Why must Curtius jeer at Boileau's "Enfin Malherbe vint. . . Et réduisit la Muses aux règles du devoir": "Arme Muse!", instead of accepting the historical fact of seventeenth-century neo-Aristotelian, counterreformational legislation in belles lettres?

Curtius' resentments seem to include the German emigré scholars in Romance who have worked before him in the same direction: there is no mention in his book of Auerbach (whose term *Vulgärentike* would fit into Curtius' ideological system and whose study of "prefiguration" has dealt, if not for the first time, still most incisively, with a signal medieval *topos*), of Hatzfeld (to whom we owe such conceptions as "Calderonian résumé," "veni vidi vici-style"), of Olschki (who showed us the topoi underlying the accounts of medieval and Renaissance explorers) and of myself (for example of my studies on the medieval devices of etymology and gloss—I am not including here my book *Essays on Historical Semantics*, 1948, which Curtius was unable to use, but which comes to the same conclusion as his in the insistence on the importance of late Latin for European semantics).

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LUDWIG RADERMACHER. Weinen und Lachen. Studien über antikes Lebensgefühl. Wien, Rudolf M. Rohrer, 1947. Pp. 220.

Those who, like the present reviewer, have had the privilege of attending the lectures of Ludwig Radermacher over a number of years will welcome this little book as an old acquaintance. The phenomenon of which it tells us has always been one of Radermacher's favorite topics. It is, in one word, the *σπουδογέλοιον*, the immediate proximity or even mutual penetration of grief and joy, fun and earnestness, even of solemnity and lasciviousness—a prominent feature of ancient life and letters. Is it a feature of ancient life only? In the present volume the octogenarian invites us to see the testimony of the ancients against the wide background of universal human experience. Ancient and modern literature, folklore, the history of religion, and to some extent even modern life with its puzzling contrasts and contradictions, all are called upon to bear witness to that surprising polarity of human nature, which cannot bear the burden of life without an occasional escape into exuberant laughter, but which, even in its lightest moods, can never quite forget the dark undercurrent of human existence. There is a comic, and even a grotesque, element in epic and tragic poetry; on the other hand, iambos, fable, comedy, satire are not merely fun for fun's sake; they are always meant to bring home to us some lesson of practical wisdom. Μῆδεν ἄγαν is the key to Greek personality. Different from us, the Southerner, now as in times past, does not suppress his feelings; all the more must he strive for the virtue of moderation. Although the ethical theory of the golden mean is comparatively late, the instinct for it was there from the beginning.

If Chesterton once remarked that German scholars have great learning, but do not know how to bear it lightly, this book might have reversed his judgment. Its composition is seemingly loose, the topics follow one another, as it were, by free association, and the whole is barely held together by an approximately historical scheme. All the same, the reader who commits himself to this charming guide is brought safely to his destination and will, at the end of the journey, gratefully admit that he has seen much that lies off the beaten path. The tone is that of cultivated talk, a late descendant of the Horatian *Sermo*, often witty, never tiring. Behind it, however, we feel a deep understanding of human nature, and a willingness to take life easy even when it is pressing hard.

In spite of its light tone, this book is from beginning to end a work of serious scholarship. There is no vagueness about anything, no cheap generalizing, no theories built in the clouds. Elusive as is its subject, the foundations for its study have been laid by an expert craftsman. Documentation is carefully selected from a wide range of sources, and flashlights on Greek language and style (it would not be Radermacher, if they were missing) add to its appeal.

To cover satisfactorily an almost inexhaustible subject in two hundred pages of small octavo is certainly a rare achievement. Let us then see how Radermacher has managed to do this.

After a brief statement of the problem in general terms, Radermacher singles out some famous episodes in Greek literature which bear out his thesis. He dwells at some length on the story of Polyphemus and its ethnological parallels. The comparison with primi-

tive folktales brings out most strikingly the art of the epic poet; his, in all probability, has been the merit of combining burlesque and horror in an impressive contrast. We find the same technique once more towards the end of the *Odyssey*, where the mock-fight between Odysseus and Iros is a prelude to the killing of Penelope's suitors. Similar in effect is the scene in the *Hekabe* of Euripides where the blinded Polymestor, crawling on hands and feet, makes vain attempts at vengeance. Even Aeschylus relieves his listeners at the climax of the *Choephoroi* by the introduction of the old nurse with her small talk. On the other hand, Aristophanes can be very serious and at times even pathetic; his last comedy, the *Plutus*, is pervaded by the sarcasm of the disillusioned.

If great poetry tolerated the proximity of the sublime and the ridiculous, and occasionally even sought it, this was all the more so in those literary genres which arose more directly out of the people. There was, of course, in antiquity no sharp distinction between the amusements of the upper classes and those of the common crowd. In Horace's *Iter Brundisium* Maecenas and his entourage burst into laughter over the performance of two low-rate clowns. Fun and laughter do not stop at the gates of religion: travesty, mock disputes, and all sorts of lascivious language were part of the Thesmophoria; Demeter in person had, according to the Homeric hymn, been cured of her grief by the jokes of Iambe. The iambos is, in fact, the literary form *par excellence* in which sorrow mingles with laughter. Another such form is the fable, which, in its beginnings, had not yet an outspoken "moral," but told in a parable some common experience. Here the agent is the beast, "man's unruly brother" (p. 35); this comic element, so familiar to the ancients from their favorite game of *eikázein*, covers, like a bright garment, the often pessimistic wisdom which the poet wants to teach. Aesop, the "inventor" of the fable, whose life was told in an old popular "novel," was represented as the impersonation of his poetry: his low birth and comic exterior contrast with his knowledge of human nature and his latent gentleness of heart.

The romance of Aesop contains a symposium scene. Now symposia have since time immemorial been the occasion for practising the art of testing wisdom in a playful manner. Such must have been the "Symposium of the Seven Sages" in its original form. We know it only in the late version of Plutarch, who, we must fear, has divested it of much of its original humor. Cleverly and amusingly Radermacher separates the ancient elements from those of Plutarch's making; reflections of the earlier type he finds not only in the story of Aesop, but also in the symposium scene of the Letter of Aristeas.

No symposium has become more famous than Plato's. Can we find the traditional features even there? Radermacher thinks we can. Here, as never before, sublimity of mind has been wedded to gaiety of presentation. Socrates is the very prototype of the *σπουδογέλοος*; so he was, in fact, called by Dion of Prusa. This is a new and original approach to the problem of Socratic irony. For this purpose Radermacher musters the writings of the early Socratics and the traditions about them, in particular the works of Xenophon. His *Symposium* and *Memorabilia* are of special interest;

a real masterpiece of subtle irony is the dialogue between Socrates and Theodote.

Thanks to the unique personality of Socrates, the *σπουδογέλοιον* has become a tradition in post-Soeratic philosophy. Diogenes "the Dog" and Timon the Scptic represent the type most conspicuously, but, somewhat subdued, it is present in many, even in Plato. With a wink of his eye, Radermacher lays bare this hidden vein in the "divine" philosopher. We cast a glance at Bion and Menippus, a good word is said for Lucian, some sidelights fall on Hellenistic philosophy in ancient Rome; then, at the end of this chapter, we meet with the name of Horace.

*Verba docent, exempla trahunt.* What comes now is not a study of Horace, but an interpretation of *Satire*, II, 6. No better choice of a single piece could have been made. This little work integrates all the various elements of Horace's *Sermones*, satire and idyll, philosophy and fable, in the most perfect way and presents them to the reader with an ease and grace that is uncommon even in Horace. After a short introduction, Radermacher gives a German translation with a brief, but really illuminating commentary (the very contrary of the traditional *commentarius perpetuus*); then follows the original text with a select *apparatus criticus*. In similar manner Radermacher presents, in an appendix, some selections from Greek literature which illustrate certain aspects of his subject: the iamboi on women by Semonides of Amorgos, an episode from the romance of Aesop, Socrates and Theodote from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Lysias' defence of the cripple ("a not altogether sympathetic personality"), and an anecdote from Galen's *περὶ ψυχῆς παθῶν*. In the edition of these texts Radermacher gives fresh evidence of his keen sense for the subtleties of language. In particular, we find a number of important emendations, made in modest anonymity, on the text of Semonides, e. g. χέει for ἔχει at v. 20, or τείρεται (for πέλεται) at v. 100. Nice is also the question mark after ἀναπειθεῖς towards the end of Xenophon, *Mem.*, III, 11, 10. I am somewhat doubtful about *Vita Aesopi*, I, 12, 6 (the sheep) ἐκείνα τὰ συνήθη καὶ μόνα <δόκιμα> δοκεῖ πείσεσθαι. I feel pretty sure that the corruption must be sought in the words καὶ μόνα.<sup>1</sup>

To conclude with some remarks on one detail. An interesting parallel to the gruesome buffoonery of Polymestor (p. 29) is the scene in Hroswith's *Dulcitius*, where the tyrant, lustful for the Christian girls in his prison, wanders around in the dark vaults and, in his mad fury, embraces some rusty pots; with a contrast similar to those in ancient poetry, this scene is followed by the martyrdom of the three virgins.

The book is well produced: good paper, clear letter-press, and a simple, but tasteful cover. The number of misprints is negligible.

Radermacher's latest opus leaves the reader with the consoling assurance that even the turmoil of the present times can be borne not only with the stern *σπουδή* of the stoic, but also in the milder spirit of the *σπουδογέλοιος*, who has learned from the Roman poet the art of *ridentem dicere verum*.

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<sup>1</sup> I suggest ἐκείνα τὰ συνήθη μόνα προσδοκᾷ πείσεσθαι. At the bottom of the MSS reading would then lie the misreading of a προς-symbol as καὶ.

VICTOR EHRENBURG. *Aspects of the Ancient World. Essays and Reviews.* New York, William Salloch, 1946. Pp. ix + 256; 4 pls. \$4.50.

This collection of fifteen papers—some new, others previously published—will appeal chiefly, I think, to those who are interested in learning the mature conclusions and convictions of a distinguished scholar on a variety of subjects. Professor Ehrenberg is a well-known classicist formerly at Prague University and now at the University of London. One purpose of his book—and it must be one of the highest purposes of scholarship—is to show the importance of antiquity for an understanding of the present, and there are few persons who will not be fascinated, in page after page, by Ehrenberg's breadth of knowledge and skill of presentation. We may differ with his estimate (and certainly with the unfortunate photograph) of Nefretete as “the most perfect illustration of the ideal of female beauty as cherished by our own times,” and we may assert that he is wrong when he says that the art, as well as the music, “of the negroes became the fashion of the early twentieth century,” but there is no doubt whatever of his ability to illumine a point, and even an era, by broad and interesting and profound strokes of the brush. Ehrenberg, moreover, makes many acute observations on specialized details. His chapter on Athenian Coinage, for example, is a review of Seltman's *Athens, Its History and Coinage before the Persian Invasion*, and since it originally appeared in 1926 in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, it is well to be reminded of his doubts concerning Pre-Solonian issues and the Pangaeaan coinage of Peisistratus. The chapter on Early Athenian Colonies, originally published in 1939 in *Eunomia* (a short-lived periodical of Prague), is a brilliant exposition of the theme “that the features of fifth-century policy had their true origin in the policy of sixth-century Athens.” And yet, I am not sure that it is correct to speak of this book as always embodying Ehrenberg's mature conclusions and convictions, for I think one weakens his case when he includes references to specific current events: not only do they become quickly dated, but they are open to varying interpretation and endless argument. For example, the chapter on Alexander the Great ends with a hurried paragraph headed “Postscript 1944,” in which Ehrenberg protests against Shaw's comparison of Hitler with Alexander in his *Everybody's Political What's What*.

Another weakness of this book—if indeed these are weaknesses—is that some of the essays are for fellow-scholars, others for a more general public. Ehrenberg hopes “that each group of readers will find it possible to accept those articles which are less in their own line.” I doubt that a collection of essays—some scholarly, others not—can aim with complete success at two so different audiences; one may write for both audiences at the same time, but I believe the style and technique should remain constant. Nor is it always easy to decide which essay is intended for which group, and to judge it accordingly. The final paper, “The Ancient World and Europe”—written “a few weeks after VE-Day”—is probably for the layman, as are “The Beginnings of European History,” “The Greek Coun-

try and the Greek State," and "A Totalitarian State," which was broadcast in German from Prague in 1934, while "Tragic Heracles," "The Early History of the Etruscans," "Eduard Meyer," and "Essays in Historical Criticism," which is an hitherto unpublished review of Gomme's *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (with a reference to Gomme's "sharp sarcasm"), are probably for the scholar.

But if the article on Alexander (originally an address given before an English classical meeting in 1941, "after experiencing the events of 1940 and 1941") is for the general reader, it is not well-rounded; the scholar, on the other hand, may question several interpretations. It is surprising, for example, that one who has previously published a paper on Alexander's *Pothos* (longing) should say here that "it is in the narrative of the years 333 and 332 that for the first time in our sources" we find a reference to this expression; because Arrian speaks of Alexander's "longing" to cross the Danube, and whatever importance there is in *Pothos* must, consequently, be transferred to this earlier period. I doubt that "Egypt was the first of Alexander's conquests that had an old civilization of its own" (Phoenicia had just been conquered); the interpretation of the visit to Siwah on religious grounds strikes me as uninspired (it was militarily important to confirm the fact of the Libyan desert); something wider than vengeance for the burnt Greek temples of 480 was responsible for the burning of the palace at Persepolis (it signified the end of an era); the Greek troops were not merely "dismissed" at Ecbatana, thus ending the fiction of a Panhellenic campaign: many availed themselves of the opportunity to reënlist and marched thenceforth as part of the *imperial* army, which has its own implications for Alexander's policy toward his vast state; Bessus was executed for his opposition to Alexander, not for the murder of Darius (others got off). When one reads of "revolts and conspiracies . . . suppressed . . . with the harshness and arbitrariness of an Asiatic despot," he naturally concludes that the execution of Parmenio is uppermost in the writer's mind, and yet there is no doubt that the execution was judicial. It is untrue that Alexander "learned that there was no Eastern Ocean"; he thought it lay just beyond the Hyphasis, where mutiny stopped him. It is also untrue that "in a huge festival Alexander gave away thousands of Asiatic women to Macedonian officers and soldiers"; these thousands had already married and now received presents. The mutiny at Opis did not lead to a "compromise," for Alexander sent home exactly the troops originally planned. I think it unfortunate to notice seriously those fantastic, and demonstrably unhistorical, last plans of Alexander (Alexander's so-called Memoirs in Diodorus), which included "a road along the whole shore of North Africa (the road now partly built by Mussolini and used in the African war)" and so on. You come out roughly at the same place—at the fact of Alexander's ambition to conquer the West—if you approach the problem from the point of view of Alexander's germinating ideas in Turkestan and India, mentioned by Arrian; perhaps it is all debatable, but the problem can be approached and argued only on those grounds—that is to say, whether or not Arrian is there correct, and his sources are quite different, it may be added, from the ones he used after Alexander's return to Mesopotamia.

To write for the layman as well as the scholar, to interpret antiquity for the present, these are noble, albeit difficult, aims, but they are utterly essential if our research is to have any validity. Let us, therefore, salute Professor Ehrenberg for his own particular attempt.

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Galen, *On Medical Experience*. First Edition of the Arabic Version with English Translation and Notes by R. WALZER. London, Published for the Trustees of the Late Sir Henry Wellecome by the Oxford Univ. Press, 1944. Pp. xi + 1-83 (Arabic text) + 85-155 (English translation and Greek fragments) + 156-164 (Notes and parallel passages).

Except for two fragments, the Greek text of Galen's work *On Medical Experience* is no longer extant. About the middle of the ninth century, however, Hunain ibn Iṣhāq translated the book from Greek into Syriac, and shortly thereafter his nephew and pupil, Ḥubaiš ibn al-Ḥasan turned it into Arabic. An eleventh-century copy of this Arabic version, discovered in 1931 in the Aya Sofya Library at Constantinople, has now been edited and translated into English by Prof. Walzer. As a Latin version of Galen's Υποτύπωσις ἐμπειρική is the only other fairly detailed exposition of ancient medical empiricism which has come down to us, this publication is of obvious importance to students of ancient medicine, science, and philosophy.

The treatise falls into three main divisions: (1) an introduction (I-II), in which Galen, after affirming his own belief in a union of reason and experience as a proper basis for medical knowledge, ridicules Asclepiades the Bithynian and his followers among the "sophists of today" for rejecting experience; (2) an attack upon experience by a Dogmatist "whose opinion resembles Asclepiades'" (III-VII); and (3), following a brief summary of three principal varieties of Dogmatist criticism (VIII), a detailed defence of experience and a counter-attack upon the Dogmatists by "one of the Empiricists, say Menodotus, if you wish, or Serapion, or Theodosius" (IX-XXXI).

Walzer's task in editing and translating the Arabic text was by no means an easy one: he had to work from a single, unvocalized manuscript in which the diacritical points, the sole means of distinguishing between several Arabic consonants, were frequently missing; and while both Hunain and Ḥubaiš were exceptionally able and accurate translators, the chances of misinterpretation are inevitably increased by the fact that the Arabic version was made from a Syriac translation, not directly from the Greek original. Under the circumstances, it is neither surprising that the Arabic text should still stand in need of correction here and there, nor is it a denigration of Walzer's pioneer achievement to suggest that his English rendering has missed the sense of the difficult "translation Arabic" in many passages. The reviewer hopes to publish elsewhere a com-

plete list of his corrections to Walzer's publication, if not a fresh English translation of the entire treatise, since the space which the editor has allotted to this review permits citation here of the merest fraction of the passages which stand in need of revision.

*p. 6, lines 9 ff. — p. 89, lines 10 ff.:* In Walzer's translation, the Dogmatist is represented as asking: "Or how does one discover that a disease is the same as another disease in all its characteristics?" From this, the reader is likely to think that the Dogmatist's question deals with *two different diseases*; and, as Walzer uses similar language in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter (IV), the reader is apt to become confused. Actually, the Dogmatist is asking how (without the use of "reasoning") disease in any one person may be recognized as the same disease which another person has had. For if a "thing" cannot be recognized to be the same each time it recurs, the Empiricists cannot, as they claim, "see the same thing very many times," and cannot rely upon repeated careful observation for "technical" or authentic knowledge. The sentence should be translated: "Or how may a given case of disease be found to be a certain other (person's) disease in all its characteristics?"—Walzer has read the Arabic here as *mardun āharu bi-ainihi*, construing *āharu* = *other*, *another* as an adjective modifying *mardun* = *disease*, and so has rendered "the same as another disease." But *bi-ainihi* cannot mean "the same as"; according to Wright's *Arabic Grammar*, II, 281 D, "*bi-ainihi* after an indefinite noun means *a certain*." Construing as Walzer has done, we should be obliged to translate: "Or how does one discover that a disease is a certain other disease . . . ?" which is absurd. We should, however, treat *mardun* as a noun in the construct state and read the Arabic here as *mardū āhara bi-ainihi* = *a certain other's disease* or *a certain other (person's) disease*. Walzer's error is repeated in the last sentence of this chapter. A related error appears in Walzer's translation, p. 124, line 16: ". . . how it can be that the thing seen 100 times, for instance . . ." should be ". . . how it can be that the thing seen 100 times in the same form . . ."

*p. 17, lines 10 ff. — p. 98, lines 1 ff.:* The second of the three principal varieties of Dogmatist criticism summarized in this section is rendered by Walzer as follows: "Others admit that of the simple, isolated things which in the case of simple symptoms cleave to one's memory, one after the other may be discovered by 'seeing-very-many-times.' But with respect to the other things they reject such a method of discovery, and will have nothing to do with it." Thus rendered, the passage almost defies comprehension; it should be translated as follows: "Others admit that one after the other of the simple, individual things which have been carefully observed and authenticated in regard to simple symptoms might have been discovered by seeing the thing very many times; but as for all other things, they reject and deny their discovery by this method."—In the reviewer's opinion, Walzer has misunderstood the meaning of the verb *hafiza* not only here, where it is rendered "cleave to one's memory," but in most of the other 25-odd passages where it occurs. This important term, fortunately, appears in three passages (VII, 3; VII, 5; and XV, 6) where the Greek of the two extant fragments may be compared, and these afford the clue to its meaning; in each case it is the equivalent of *τήρησις* and means *careful observation*.

Frequently in the Arabic text the term appears as *hafiza bi-r-rasdi*, *to observe by means of watching, observe or study watchfully*; and in chapter VI it appears several times in conjunction with *tafaqqada*, *to examine attentively*. Once something has been "carefully observed" by "seeing it very many times," it is considered authentic, or "technical," by the Empiricists; thus *hafiza*, as used throughout this treatise, is a technical term meaning *carefully to observe and (hence to) authenticate*. To be sure, *hafiza* in Arabic also bears a secondary meaning *to learn by heart*, and its verbal noun *hifzun* means not only *attention, watchfulness, care*, but *memory*. Walzer has gone astray in most of the passages where the term occurs by rendering it in this secondary sense. These passages are too numerous to be noticed here; multiple instances occur in chapters III, VI, VII, X, XXII, XXV, XXVI, XXIX, and XXX.

*p. 48, lines 11 ff. = p. 124, lines 4 (bottom) ff.:* Walzer: "You will then inevitably have to make one of two answers; either you reject the statement and steadily refuse to admit that he is becoming bald, even if all his hair were to fall out, or should this be quite impossible, when, pray, does he then become bald? Your first assertion would logically involve his becoming bald on the falling out of a single hair." The point of the paradox is lost in Walzer's translation: his misunderstanding of *matā* — *when* as interrogative has led him to introduce a question where none belongs and to separate off the balance of what is really *one* sentence. The passage should read: "You would then necessarily be unable to escape one of two alternatives: either, that you would deny and at no given moment admit that he will have become bald, not even if all his hair should fall out; or, if this be impossible, then whenever you say that he has become bald, and the first time you say this, it necessarily follows that he has become bald only by virtue of the falling out of a single hair."

*p. 55, line 1 (bottom) = p. 130, line 16:* Walzer: "If they assert in the case of a healthy man and in the case of one to whom anything in general happens, whatever it may be, that he consists of many, we cannot fail to be surprised at their judgment. For if this were the case, then the regulations issued by law-givers, according to which those people who do good gain praise and honour, while people who do what is bad receive admonition and punishment, are useless and absurd, because it is not just nor right that he who is now honoured and rewarded because of a good deed is a different person from the one who has performed any kind of good work, by means of which he deserved just these very benefits . . ." There are at least three misconstructions of the sense of the Arabic text in this passage: (1) "in the case of one to whom anything in general happens"; (2) "the regulations issued by law-givers"; and (3) "who has performed any kind of good work by means of which he deserved just these very benefits." The passage should be translated: "As for their saying, of anybody who is healthy and of anybody who has any general attribute whatsoever, that he is 'many,' we must marvel at their judgment. For in that event the affirmation of moralists that we owe extreme praise and honor to those who do good, and punishment and chastisement to those who do evil, is useless and nonsensical; since it is surely neither just nor fair that

the person who is presently honored and rewarded for doing good should be another person than the one who had actually done whatever virtuous action the doing of good had called for. . . ."

*p. 72, lines 2 (bottom) ff. — p. 145, lines 17 ff.:* Walzer: "Perhaps you are doing violence to us and rejecting the authorities or attacking those who in no way deserve it only because it is incumbent on you, seeing that we do not find the (case of the) phrenetic uniform by virtue of reasoning from the visible to the invisible, to hate it and reject it on the ground that it is useless." The word *al-a'imma* = *imams*, which Walzer has rendered "authorities," is clearly an error in the text; the reviewer suggests that the verbal noun *al-wai-mata* = *slander, backbiting* may be the correct reading, as this is supported by the immediately following synonym, *at-ta'na* = *calum-niation*. The Arabic words which Walzer has interpreted as "you are doing violence to us" cannot bear this meaning, first, because this would require the verb to govern its object in the accusative instead of being connected with its object by a preposition, as it is here; and secondly, because Walzer's translation simply ignores the accusative which does stand here, namely, *al-amra*. The words should be read *tugallibū 'alainā l-amra*, meaning *you will favor the matter over us*; cf. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, II, 220, s. v. II. The Empiricist is twitting the Dogmatist for favoring the Empiricist principle ("matter") that phrenitis is "one" and not "many" although the Dogmatist logically ought to despise the principle because the Empiricists did not arrive at it by *analogismus*. Translated, the passage reads: "Perhaps you will favor our principle more than you do us and will refrain from slandering or calumniating what does not deserve this; for, in view of the fact that we do not find that the phrenetic is one by means of the reasoning from the manifest to the hidden, it would logically be necessary for you to despise and loathe it as useless."

*p. 82, last line ff. — p. 154, lines 20 ff.:* Walzer: ". . . 'We for our part do not know the logos and have no idea what it is, while he, on the other hand, is able to make use of what he has discovered and learned.'" Here Walzer has failed to recognize an instance of what the Arab grammarians call *qamīru š-ša'ni*, the pronoun of the fact or the story; this 3rd pers. masc. pronoun *-hu*, suffixed to a particle like *inna*, *walakinna* (as in this passage), frequently represents and anticipates a whole subsequent clause; cf. Wright's *Arabic Grammar*, I, 285A, 293B; II, 81C. The sentence should be translated: ". . . We do not know reasoning nor do we know what it is, but what has been discovered and is known can be used."—The Empiricist's point is that utility is the test of knowledge.

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ROBERT W. CRUTTWELL. *Virgil's Mind at Work. An Analysis of the Symbolism of the Aeneid.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1947.  
Pp. 182.

This is a strange and interesting book. Maintaining that to the prosaic mind a primrose is always a primrose and nothing more, whereas "the poetic mind is one to which things mean something more than themselves," Cruttwell states in his Introduction his intention: "a poem's symbolism will verbally communicate a poet's synthesis of things associated in his mind upon three levels—(1) that of unconscious relation to the poet's own heredity; (2) that of subconscious relation to the poet's own environment; and (3) that of conscious relation to the poet's own identity. To apply these principles analytically to the symbolism of the *Aeneid*, and so to follow Virgil's mind at work upon his synthesis, will be the twofold purpose of this book" (p. ix).

Although the author does not always distinguish clearly between conscious, subconscious, or unconscious symbolism, much of his material must obviously derive from the unconscious recesses of Vergil's mind (or possibly from Cruttwell's interest in primitive religion and ritual patterns?), for it has little relation to the *Aeneid* as most readers know it. The chapter headings ("Venus and Cybele," "Iulus and Julius," "Troy and Rome," "Teucer and Dardanus," "Laomedon and Tiberinus," "Atlas and Hercules," "Shield and Maze," "Vulcan and Vesta," "Hut and Hive," "Urn and House," "Ashes and Spirit," "Tomb and Womb") reveal a gradual withdrawal from the realities of Vergilian interpretation to a thicket of hazardous conjecture. Few readers will quarrel with the poetic fusion of history and legend, the synthesis of Rome's tradition of her early Latin, Sabine, and Etruscan past with those of Crete, Troy, and Greece, as described in the opening chapters. The discussion of the maze-pattern common to the Cretan labyrinth and the Trojan game (cf. W. F. Jackson Knight, *Cumaean Gates*, pp. 76 ff., 132 ff.) leads to the conclusion that Vergil associates "the idea of the *troia*'s dolphin-like maze-pattern both with Augustus as central to Aeneas' shield and with Aeneas as uplifting that shield upon his ship" (p. 97).

But when Cruttwell turns to a consideration of the "unconscious because hereditary Vergilian integration of Vesta's Hearth-fire with Vulcan's Earth-fire" (p. 104) and of Romulus' beehive-hut as "the recognized symbol of Rome's foundation" (p. 119), one has the feeling that the *Aeneid* is left far behind. As the book draws to its close, one can only conclude that Vergil had a crematory complex; cf. p. 160, where Cruttwell calls VII, 462 ff. "an explicitly domestic simile whose crematory implications should by now be clear"; cf. also p. 161: "Turnus' reaction is crematory"; p. 163: "Vergil mentally visualizes the entire Juno-kindled Latin-Dardan war in terms of Vulcan's fire"; p. 164: "the marriage of Aeneas with Lavinia . . . will symbolize an integration . . . of Vesta's domestic hearthfire-spirit and hearthfire-ashes with Vulcan's crematory earthfire-spirit and earthfire ashes."

Part of the difficulty of the book is Cruttwell's style; his sentences are labored and so packed with the data of symbolism that they

lose clarity; e.g. *Troia* is "a name carrying for Virgil's mind not only all the Troadic-Idean associations of Dardanus' Phrygian 'Troy-town,' but also all the Alban-Silvian associations (VI. 756-770) of Iulus' Sicilian 'Troy-game,' whose Cretan-Idean labyrinthine symbolism belongs both to the Iulean-foundation ritual of Lavinium's daughter-city Alba Longa and to the Julian-revival ritual of Alba Longa's daughter-city Rome (V. 545-602)" (p. 37). Of the omen of the sow in *Aeneid* VIII we read the following: "Since, moreover, the interior of the sow is at once a rapacious tomb for her greedily swallowed food and a capacious womb for her lustily seeded brood, she came in time to symbolize that equivalence of tomb to womb which in her case meant the birth of her jealously heeded brood as resulting from the death of her jealously heeded food" (p. 174); our admiration for the ingenious balance and rhythm of the phraseology almost blinds us to the meaning of the sentence. Vergil descends "into those dreamlands of the unconsciously functioning because hereditarily determined mind-plane wherein are woven the underlying patterns of his poetic symbolism with all their kaleidoscopic surprises" (p. 166), and this symbolism, as Cruttwell tells us again and again, is the integration of the crematory with the domestic; cf. pp. 167 f.: "Virgil's Elysium so integrates the crematory nature of the earthfire-containing *Volcani domus* with the domestic nature of the hearthfire-containing *Anchisae domus* as to reproduce unconsciously on the spiritual plane the integrally Vulcanic-Vestal symbolism of that material hut-urn whose life-after-death meaning for Virgil is the House of Dardanus, Teucer's son-in-law and heir."

The reviewer wishes in fairness to point out that in spite of many seemingly improbable conclusions the book is not without value; it deserves (and requires) attentive reading and careful thought. Perhaps the basic thought is best expressed in the author's words on pp. 39 f.: "Indeed, the very keynote of the *Aeneid*, as struck by Virgil himself in its first seven lines, is the idea of continuity, as of a single thread persisting throughout some complicated pattern over far distances of time and space—Troy at the one end of the long series, Rome at the other; with Rome inheriting from the Alban-Silvian height that same racial and religious life which Troy inherited from the Troadic-Idean height. . . . The symbolism of the *Aeneid* is therefore axial, revolving as it were spherically about one central line between two poles—the one pole being a Troy whose symbols are Roman, the other pole a Rome whose symbols are Trojan; and the subjectively Roman thought of the poet travels from Rome to Troy, while the objectively Trojan theme of the poem travels from Troy to Rome."

The book in general is filled with subtle and acute observations; much is possible but seems hardly probable. The author pushes too far his observations on fire and bees and beehive-huts, and disregards the fact that similes drawn from fire phenomena and from bees are a part of Vergil's conscious treatment of literary tradition; e.g., cf. *Aen.* VI, 707 f. (discussed on pp. 141 f.) with Homer, *Iliad*, II, 87 ff. and Apollonius, *Argonautica*, I, 879 ff. Is Dardanus really interpreted by Vergil as "the 'king'-bee whose figurative equivalent is Aeneas" (p. 139)? Is it true that "the *Aeneid*'s primary symbol for Virgil's mind, upon its level of unconscious relation to his own

heredity, might well be a beehive-hut" (p. 119)? Is Vergil's mind, consciously or unconsciously, so wrapped up with crematory notions? To this reviewer (who possibly still sees a bit of the primrose) much of the *Aeneid* is lost when almost everything means something else. Does Vergil have an "early Latin" mind, so that he is primarily interested in a "Trojan-Roman tomb-womb equivalence"—"the reincarnational equivalence of the entombment of Dardanus' Troy for eventual resurrection to an enwombment of Romulus' Rome for eventual birth" (pp. 169 f.)? Vergil's mind was undoubtedly at work upon other problems also. What of his architectonic power in constructing incidents and episodes, what of his narrative ability, his superb delineation of character, his interest in dramatic effects? These too are a part of Vergil's *Aeneid*. In this respect, the title of Cruttwell's book is misleading. Readers will find much in the book to ponder on—let them not be disappointed that it does not deal more closely with the *Aeneid*.

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ALFRED ERNOUT. *Philologica*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1946.  
Pp. vi + 232.

This volume is a selection from among the shorter works of the French scholar who has made such important contributions to the study of the Latin language. The first article, entitled *Le Vocabulaire latin*, appears here in print for the first time, having been delivered as an inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in December, 1945. It is quite general in character, dealing largely with the external history of Latin, and devoting considerable attention to the influence of Christianity on the language. All the other articles had been previously published over a period extending from 1921 to 1946, some in journals which are now difficult of access.

An examination of the table of contents will show that most of the articles deal with matters of vocabulary and word-formation. Only one, No. 15 (*Revue de Philologie*, 1945, pp. 93-115, though the usual reference to the original source is here omitted, and the heading is merely accompanied by the phrase *A. M. Einar Löfstedt*), treats a general problem of syntax, the functions of the Greek infinitives and the Latin gerunds and allied verbal forms, with emphasis on the fundamental difference between the two languages in the structure and use of the non-finite verb. No. 2 discusses the Etruscan element in the Latin vocabulary, taking account of semantic classes and tentatively proposing Etruscan origin for many words as an experimental basis for future investigations. No. 3 illustrates the effect of popular etymology on meaning as exemplified by the association set up between *adolēre* and *adolēscere*: when the semantic development *burn (a sacrificial offering) > make burn (an altar with gifts) > load (an altar with gifts) > increase* had been completed, *adolēre* was built as a negative to *adolēre*. No. 4 deals with the formation and history of the verbs *lactāre* and *lactēre*. No. 5 rejects the etymology which

derives *augur* from the roots of *avis* and *gero*, and defends the old association of *augur*, *augeo*, *augustus*. No. 6 deals with words having the suffixes *-cen*, *-cinium*, *-cino(r)*, and their extension beyond the semantic sphere of the notion *sing*, a process in which *tirocinium* played an important part. No. 7 illustrates the interference of homonyms by tracing the history of *crēvi*, perfect of *cerno* and *crēsco*; *crēvi* from *crēsco*, but *decrevi* from *decerno*, tended to predominate. No. 8 deals with the distinction between *cruor* and *sanguis*, the formation of *cruentus*, and the semantic development of *crudus*, whose use in active and passive senses is compared to the two-fold use of *surdus* and *caecus*. No. 9 deals with the replacement of *domus* and *fores* by *casa*, *mansio*, and *porta* and the social factors connected with these substitutions. No. 11 treats the early use of *ilico* and *ilicet*, their subsequent decline, and the slight stimulus given to the use of *ilicet* in late authors after Vergil had employed it in the meaning of the metrically unsuitable *ilico*. In No. 12 the irregular declension of *senex* leads to a detailed discussion of nouns with *k*-suffix in Latin, among which several fairly well-defined semantic classes appear. No. 13, on nouns in *-āgo*, *-īgo*, *-ūgo*, has a close connection with the preceding article, not only on the morphological side, since both deal with guttural suffixes, but also on the semantic side, since the formations described in both articles were extensively used in medical, botanical, and other scientific terminology. Articles 10 and 14 deal with problems of text and interpretation in two literary passages. In 10 the author proposes to take the troublesome *ferae pecudes* in Lucretius, I, 14 as a pair of coördinate substantives used asyndetically, an ingenious suggestion partially anticipated by Bentley's emendation *ferae et pecudes*. In 14 he argues against Bonazzi's proposal to read *te nantis* for Scaliger's generally adopted *Teuthrantis* in Propertius, I, 11, 11, and shows that *nantis* cannot be construed as a partitive with *te*. The passages used as support by Bonazzi lead to a discussion of Löfstedt's theory that a genitive participle may stand in agreement with a *dativus sympatheticus*, a view which Ernout rejects. The last article deals with *senectus*, *iuentus*, *servitus*, and *virtus*, their distinction from cognate words of other stems, the legal and social factors which for a time preserved them, and their eventual fate.

The selection included in this volume is not a fortuitous one. The articles are not arranged in chronological order, but they have been chosen with the intention of illustrating the methods to be employed in etymological investigations, and they reveal a certain unity of doctrine. Special attention is given to the effect of social forces on the vocabulary of the language, whether shown in the replacement of words by synonyms with slightly different connotations or in the preservation of form-classes not well adapted for survival (e.g. *senectus*, etc.). The present volume shows in detailed form a small sample of the material which must have been collected and examined before being more succinctly presented in the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*. Whoever reads it will learn many valuable lessons in Latin linguistic history.

On p. 23 the reference to Plautus' *Persa* should be to the *Poenulus*. On p. 54 read *Moret. 38* for *Moret. 27*. On p. 55 read *Truc. 366* for *Truc. 336*. On p. 79 three lines from the bottom *tībīcen* requires a macron over the second *i*. On p. 93 read *Aen. 12, 905* for *Aen.*

12, 205. On p. 127 read *Ci.* 685 for *Ci.* 865. On p. 135 read *Capt.* 69 for *Cas.* 69. On p. 162 in the quotation from Brugmann the Old Church Slavic words *ovica*, *otici*, etc. should be preceded by the designation *aksl*.

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E. A. THOMPSON. *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus.* Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, Macmillan Company, 1947. Pp. xii + 145. \$2.50.

"Diligence and accuracy" says Gibbon, "are the only merits which an historical writer may ascribe to himself"; and after utilizing Ammianus as his chief source for the period (353-378 A.D.) covered by Ammianus' extant work, he concludes: "It is not without the most sincere regret, that I must now take leave of an accurate and faithful guide, who has composed the history of his own times, without indulging the prejudices and passions, which usually affect the mind of a contemporary." Prof. Thompson (now of King's College, London), in this admirable study of a strangely neglected author, subjects this problem of his impartiality to a painstaking scrutiny, based on an extraordinary acquaintance with the works of his contemporaries. He admits some evidence of hero-worship, and of the influence of the savage censorship under several of the emperors; but his conclusion agrees in general with Gibbon's. Indeed, he rates Ammianus superior in this respect to Tacitus, and also in his remarkable talent for depicting character. He feels "that Ammianus' pictures of Constantius, Julian, Jovian, Valentinian, and Valens will stand for ever substantially unchanged."

Ammianus seems to have been soon neglected in antiquity; Priscian and Cassiodorus are apparently the only writers familiar with his work. But 9th century scribes resurrected him; the Renaissance MSS and editions are all based ultimately on archetypes from Fulda and Hersfeld. With the invention of printing, his value was recognized; the editio princeps, based as so often on an inferior MS, came out in 1474; and in 1609 that doughty translator Philemon Holland turned the history into noble Elizabethan English, "albeit this enterprise seemed unto mee more than difficult, considering the harsh stile of the Author, a Souldior, and who being a Grecian borne, delivered these Hystoricall reports in Latine." Thompson remarks that "his native Greek shines through it on every page"; yet few foreigners have ever striven more manfully to master a language not their own. He must have known Cicero and Livy almost by heart. In a Yale seminar we were studying the corrupt passage (XIV, 6, 6): "per omnes tamen quotque sunt partes quae terrarum," variously mutilated by emending scholars. Bearing in mind that the Fulda MS had been copied from an Insular one, the late Laura Seguine made a brilliant guess: "quot orae sunt partesque terrarum"; and we

found that combination at once in Cicero (*N. D.*, II, 66, 164). Rolfe points out how this style was complicated by Ammianus' adoption of the accentual cursus, which Harmon had shown casts new light on Latin pronunciation of that period.

Thompson deplores the fact that all modern texts of Ammianus are out of print and difficult for the student to obtain, except Rolfe's Loeb edition, to which I feel he does not do full justice; and the publisher's stock of the Loeb series was mostly destroyed by a German bomb. Likewise there has been no complete commentary since Wagner's of 1808. Few authors offer such an attractive task to an ambitious scholar; Thompson's careful work is a valuable introduction. In great detail he analyzes what we know of Ammianus' life and preparation for his work, as a staff officer active from Germany to Persia; his relation to other writers; his thorough utilization of his reading and his shrewd observations during his campaigns; his highly competent geographical excursions; and his keen characterizations of the leading Romans of his time. For both historian and classical scholar, Thompson has done a great service. When I, a Fellow in our Roman School in 1899, decided to take Ammianus as a subject for text study, Traube warned me that Petschenig might be contemplating an edition. So I wrote him; in his reply he said he was too old and busy, and continued: "I am extraordinarily rejoiced that a young scholar proposes to devote himself to the exceedingly difficult but highly rewarding task of editing Ammianus." May some young American scholar find the same stimulus in Thompson's superb introduction to the man whom he considers the greatest of Roman historians.

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T. B. L. WEBSTER. *Political Interpretations in Greek Literature.*  
Manchester, Manchester Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. vii + 149. 7s. 6d.  
(*Publ. of the Univ. of Manchester, Classical Series*, No. VI.)

The author has stated his purpose in writing this book: "to try and see what were the essential ideas of ancient democracy, how they arose, what were the difficulties encountered by full democracy, and what the remedies proposed." The method followed in fulfilling this purpose consists of a chronological survey of Greek political practices with a running commentary of pertinent passages from Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle. Because of the provenience of most of the literature both the commentary and the survey are fairly limited to the Athenian point of view from the sixth century through the fourth.

The generally accepted views on Homeric monarchy with its feudal tendency toward Hesiodic aristocracy and its single seed of democratic revolution, Thersites, are summarized and illustrated. The earliest growth of settled, working communities and of an impersonal common law, the necessary forerunner of democracy, is seen in Hesiod's *Works and Days* as the new wealth of commerce and in-

dstry weakened the power of land-owning aristocrats. The era of elected arbitrators and self-appointed tyrants who facilitated the transition from aristocracy to democracy is reflected in the elegiac and lyric poets alongside the new realization of human moral responsibility on the part both of dwindling aristocrats and pioneer democrats. Aeschylus is seen as epitomizing in mythology the total victory of democracy in Athens and her allies in opposition to the temporarily pacified aristocrats at home, represented by the Eumenides, and abroad. Various authors of the fifth century contribute to the picture of Athens as the political "School of Hellas," with its emphasis on individual responsibility, the moral and philosophical justification of democracy, and the concept of justice, both natural and human. The ideological conflict of the Peloponnesian War is highlighted by the penetrating observation of Thucydides and Aristophanes, both of whom deprecated the post-Periclean demagoguery and the extremes to which the policy of "might makes right" was carried and heralded the rule of law which became the leading idea of the fourth century in Athens. The writers of this century contribute a systematization of political theory and philosophy based on the practice of the previous centuries and the new growth of rhetoric. Symptomatic of the failure of full democracy are not only the conflicting remedies offered by Isocrates and Demosthenes but also the vast scholarly work of comparative politics undertaken by Aristotle to determine the strengths and weaknesses of this and other forms of government. Finally, the conclusion suggests what the modern political animal can learn from the successes and failures, the concepts and experience of the ancient Greeks.

It seems to me dangerous, especially in a book which attempts to apply the lessons of the past to the problems of the present, to indulge in the "modernist fallacy," whether in small matters like the "Athenian national anthem" (p. 22), or in larger matters like the references to political parties (pp. 45 ff.) without careful distinction between the ancient and modern concepts. The exact nature of ancient political parties has yet to be determined. But Webster has pointed out (p. 48) that the history of the democratic development could also be viewed as the history of great men and their contributions. The latter view is the one taken by most Greek authors, whether because it was easier for them to understand personal agencies or because it was actually men rather than party platforms that inspired loyalty and implemented democratic advances.

As always in culling historical material from the dramatists, there is a temptation to credit the poet with all the views of his characters, but Webster has little excuse for yielding to the temptation (p. 69) since the mere fact that the views existed for expression is all that is necessary to his purpose. There is some doubt in my mind on one other small point, that the award of the tragic prize to Sophocles by the *strategoi*, of which Cimon was one, in 468 B. C. (p. 28) can be accepted as proof that Aeschylus was a democrat. But the book as a whole is an admirable and dynamic synthesis of generally accepted facts and interpretations; it proves that the adage "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" has valuable application even to classical scholarship.

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